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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Commentators discussing the cross-examination of rape complainants have tended to focus 
on sexual history evidence and character evidence more generally. The defence use of 
psychiatric evidence has, in contrast, received very little attention to date.  This thesis 
examines the use of women’s mental health records in rape trials, arguing that such use is a 
further demonstration of the resilient focus on the complainant’s character and behaviour in 
rape trials. Against a backdrop of wide stigmatisation and victimisation of those with mental 
health problems, this thesis aims to analyse the existing literature on use of mental health 
records in rape trials, while also serving to highlight the need for more sustained critical 
research and reflection on the treatment of women with mental health problems within the 
criminal justice system.  The thesis argues that the law governing the use of mental health 
records in rape trials is significantly flawed and requires reform, taking inspiration from the 
law in two other jurisdictions – Canada and New South Wales. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the use of female complainants’ mental health 
records in rape trials in England and Wales.  In so doing, it aims to evaluate the current law 
on disclosure of mental health records, and to examine the effects and possible consequences 
of allowing such records to be introduced into the courtroom.  A further subsidiary aim is to 
evaluate potential for reform by performing an exploration of the law governing use of such 
records in other jurisdictions.   
 
While there is a vast amount of critical literature on the use of sexual history evidence,1 and 
the use of character evidence more generally,2 there is significantly less on the use of evidence 
relating to a complainant’s mental health history, 3  making it an under-researched yet 
important area.  Mental health records can be used in a similar way to sexual history evidence: 
to impeach the complainant’s credibility, ‘buying in’ to the myth that women frequently make 
false allegations of rape.  Furthermore, any overall effect may be similar, in that allowing both 
types of evidence may shrink the margins of who is ‘rapeable’ and what constitutes ‘real rape’.  
The introduction of sexual history evidence implies that those who have had an active sexual 
history are more likely to have consented to intercourse on the particular occasion in 
question, and thus effectively disqualifies women’s sexuality and suggests such women do not 
deserve the law’s protection.  Additionally, in cases where there has been a previous 
                                                      
1 Ian Dennis, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Evaluating Section 41’ (2006) Criminal Law Review 
869-870; Neil Kibble, ‘Judicial Perspectives on the Operation of S41 and the Relevance and 
Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence: Four Scenarios’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 
190-205; Neil Kibble, ‘Judicial Discretion and the Admissibility of Prior Sexual History 
Evidence under Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Sometimes 
Sticking to Your Guns Means Shooting Yourself in the Foot’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 263-
274; Jennifer Temkin, ‘Sexual History Evidence - Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Criminal Law 
Review 217-242; Georgina Firth, ‘The Rape Trial and Sexual History Evidence - R v A and the 
(Un)Worthy Complainant’ (2006) 57(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 442-464; Clare 
McGlynn, ‘Feminist Judgment: R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare 
McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 
2010) 
2 Andrew Taslitz, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom (New York University Press, 1999); 
Jennifer Temkin, ‘Prosecuting and Defending Rape: Perspectives from the Bar’ (2000) 27(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 219-248; Louise Ellison and Vanessa Munro, ‘Reacting to Rape: 
Exploring Mock Jurors' Assessments of Complainant Credibility’ (2009) 49(2) British Journal of 
Criminology 202-219; Zsuzsanna Adler, Rape on Trial (London: Routledge, 1987); Susan Lees, 
Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (2nd edn: The Women's Press Ltd, 2002) 
3 Those of note include: Jennifer Temkin, ‘Digging the Dirt: Disclosure of Records in Sexual 
Assault Cases’ (2002) Cambridge Law Journal 126-145; Louise Ellison, ‘The Use and Abuse of 
Psychiatric Evidence in Rape Trials’ (2009) 13(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 28-
49 
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relationship with the accused, the use of sexual history evidence may lead to the assumption 
that once a woman has consented to a particular individual in the past, she is more likely to 
consent in the future. The impact of this will be to seriously limit the circumstances in which 
women are able to say no to sexual activity with their partners or ex-partners.4  In both cases, 
the law can be seen to fail to support women who do not consent to sexual intercourse.5    
Similarly, the use of mental health records in a rape trial may limit access to justice for women 
who have experienced a mental health problem at some point in their lives, either as a result 
of the rape or otherwise, and thus sex without consent for these women may be normalised in 
the same way.   
 
This is of increased importance when considering the evidence that women with mental 
health issues appear to be subjected to assault at a considerably higher rate than other 
women.6  It is therefore of paramount importance that there is an effective response to 
allegations of rape made by women who have a history of mental health problems, however 
serious, throughout the entirety of the criminal justice system.   
 
Yet the use of mental health records is also distinct from the use of sexual history evidence. 
Rather than sexualising the complainant in rape cases, this defence tactic involves the 
hysterisation of the complainant,7 thus utilising a unique overlap between myths relating to 
women and mental illness, and myths relating to victims of rape.  It engages the unique belief 
that women frequently lie about sexual violence out of vindictiveness, fantasy and delusion, 
and it is often effective, as when someone is labelled as ‘mentally ill’, their accounts are often 
disqualified and their rendition of events is no longer viewed as fact.8 Overall, ‘intellectual 
disability and psychiatric instability … tend to be viewed as diminishing the victim’s credibility, 
rather than enhancing her vulnerability’.9    
                                                      
4 McGlynn, ‘Feminist Judgment: R v A’ (n1) 221 
5 Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, ‘The Social Construction of Sexuality and Bodily Autonomy’ 
in Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick (eds), Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 478 
6 Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with 
Mental Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases’ (2012) 50(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 4 
7 Lise Gotell, ‘The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of 
Confidential Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law’ (2002) 40 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 251, 283 
8 Dorothy Smith, ‘K Is Mentally Ill: The Anatomy of a Factual Account’ in Dorothy Smith 
(ed), Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling (London: Routledge, 1990) 12-
52  
9 Jan Jordan, ‘True 'Lies' and False 'Truths': Women, Rape and the Police’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Wellington, New Zealand, 2001) 349 
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Therefore, in order to achieve the aims of this study, this thesis must first examine such myths 
relating to women and mental illness, as well as to mental illness more generally, in order to 
understand how such evidence may impact upon juror decision-making.  In so doing, it 
highlights the prejudicial use of records, as it is clear that such use often takes advantage of the 
myths and stereotypes relating to mental illness. The thesis will then go on to argue that 
women may become stuck in a ‘cycle’ of abuse, as research demonstrates that women who 
have been raped are more likely to experience mental health problems,10 that women with 
mental health problems are more vulnerable to victimisation,11 and that women who have 
been victimised are more vulnerable to re-victimisation. 12   This emphasises both the 
importance of women being able to freely access the help they require, whether this be access 
to counselling or a sense of justice achieved through a criminal conviction, and the 
irrationality of the argument that a woman with mental health problems is less credible, rather 
than more vulnerable.  
 
In the second chapter, the thesis performs a critical analysis of the current procedures for pre-
trial disclosure of evidence, arguing that the current law is flawed for several reasons. For 
example, it retains a focus on who has the evidence at the time, and the tests for disclosure are 
not stringent enough.  Additionally, the limited availability of resistance to disclosure based 
on the public interest does little to protect complainants’ interests.  This chapter also 
considers how the law is operating in practice, and several possible effects of the current law, 
namely: increased ‘secondary victimisation’; the risk of deterring those with mental health 
issues from reporting; and the risk of altering the client/counsellor relationship.   
 
In the final chapter, the thesis will consider alternative approaches to the use of complainants’ 
mental health records.  It will take a comparative approach, examining the law in both New 
South Wales and Canada, and will evaluate the potential for reform in England and Wales.  
In conclusion, this thesis will argue that the law would benefit from distinct rules relating to 
disclosure of confidential records in sexual assault cases, as this would draw public and judicial 
                                                      
10 Catherine Itzin, Tackling the Health and Mental Health Effects of Domestic and Sexual Violence 
and Abuse (Joint Department of Health, National Institute for Mental Health in England and 
Home Office Victims of Violence and Abuse Prevention Programme Implementation Guide, 
2006) 14-15 
11 Bridget Pettitt et al, At Risk yet Dismissed: The Criminal Victimisation of People with Mental 
Health Problems (London: Victim Support and Mind, 2013) 20-28 
12 Cathy Widom, Sally Czaja and Mary Dutton, ‘Childhood Victimisation and Lifetime 
Revicimisation’ (2008) 32 Child Abuse and Neglect 785, 793 
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attention to the particular issues raised in these circumstances and may go some way towards 
preventing focus on the complainant’s character in rape trials.    
 
The scope of the thesis is such that it will only discuss the use of female complainants’ mental 
health records.   This is for two reasons.  Firstly, while male rape is problematic, the vast 
majority of rapes involve female victims.13  Different issues surround each and there is not 
adequate space to give sufficient attention to both here. Secondly, sexual assault against 
people with mental illness, like sexual assault generally,14 is highly gendered.  Women with 
mental illness are affected by myths and stereotypes in ways that are sex-specific,15 and thus the 
intersection of inequality based on gender and on disability justifies looking at women with 
mental illness as a group particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.16  This thesis will also be 
restricted to the use of records in cases involving complainants who are adults at the time of 
trial.  Given the specific procedural and contextual issues that arise in relation to children,17 
this issue merits its own dedicated analysis.   Furthermore, this thesis will only be discussing 
the trial stage of the criminal justice process. This is not to say that this is the only problematic 
stage of the criminal justice system for women with mental health problems in terms of case 
progression.  However, it is suggested that there is a certain circularity of criminal justice 
decision-making in this area.  Cases are regularly abandoned at early stages of investigation, 
often on the basis that jurors at any subsequent trial are believed to be unwilling to convict.18 
Risk that defence will use mental health records only serves to increase belief of subsequent 
acquittal.19  If cases do make it to the trial stage and mental health records are used, a 
subsequent acquittal serves to reinforce the very ideas that prevent such cases reaching trial in 
the first place.  Thus, there is a ‘vicious cycle’ that creates a ‘self-perpetuating feedback loop in 
which the prejudicial disbelief of women’s experience is confirmed by the attrition process 
                                                      
13 Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2013-2014 Data: 
CPS Rape Victim Gender 2007-2014 (London: CPS, 2014) 
14 Ibid 
15 Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority 
for Women with Mental Disabilities’ (2014) 22(2) Fem Leg Stud 131, 138 
16 Suzanne Doyle, ‘The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with Mental 
Disabilities’ (2010) 31 Liverpool Law Review 111, 113 
17 Emily Henderson, ‘All the Proper Protections - the Court of Appeal Rewrites the Rules for 
the Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 93-108; Louise 
Ellison et al, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial Disability and Rape Victimisation’ 
(2014) Criminology and Criminal Justice 1, 4 
18 Vanessa Munro and Liz Kelly, ‘A Vicious Cycle? Attrition and Conviction Patterns in 
Contemporary Rape Cases in England and Wales’ in Miranda Horvath and Jennifer Brown 
(eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009) 284 
19 Pettitt et al, At Risk yet Dismissed (n11) 37 
  5 
within the criminal justice system’.20  Therefore, it is suggested that reforms on one stage of 
the criminal justice system may impact on decisions at all levels, and thus ‘break the cycle’.   
 
Having said this, a brief examination of attrition is important.  The evidence that the more 
vulnerable victims, who might reasonably expect the protection of the law, actually fare the 
worst within the criminal justice system as a whole and are least likely to have their cases 
presented in court, is an significant background to this thesis and highlights the importance of 
further research in this area.     
 
It is accepted in a wider context that most rape cases are never reported to the police21 and, of 
those reported, only a minority result in conviction.22  In 2005, Liz Kelly et al found that the 
vast majority of cases did not proceed beyond the investigative stage, and the conviction rate 
for all reported cases was eight per cent.23  Despite a considerable number of government-body 
commissioned reviews, inspection reports and statistical bulletins to address the attrition 
problem,24 efforts to remove legal barriers to reporting25 and improvement of the treatment of 
victims of sexual offences and rape,26 there is little evidence to suggest that this has improved. 
                                                      
20 Miranda Horvath and Jennifer Brown, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Vicious 
Cycle for Rape Victims’ (2010) 23(7) The Psychologist 556, 558 
21 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual 
Offending in England and Wales (London: ONS, 2013) 16-17 
22  Ibid, 7 
23 Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett and Linda Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases 
(Home Office Research Study 293, 2005) xi 
24 Cabinet Office, The Government Response to the Stern Review (Cabinet Office, London, 2011) ; 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2013-2014 (London: 
CPS, 2014); Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2012-
2013 (London: CPS, 2013); Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls 
Crime Report 2011-2012 (London: CPS, 2012); Andy Feist et al, Investigating and Detecting 
Recorded Offences of Rape (London: Home Office, Home Office Online Report 18/07, 2007); 
HMIC/HMCPSI, A Report on the Joint Inspection into the Investigation and Prosecution of Cases 
Involving Allegations of Rape (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2002); HMIC/HMCPSI, Without 
Consent: A Report on the Joint Investigation and Prosecution of Rape Offences (London: HMIC, 
2007); HMIC/HMCPSI, Forging the Links: Rape Investigation and Prosecution. A Joint Inspection by 
HMCPSI and HMIC (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2012); Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, Southwark Sapphire Unit’s Local Practices for the Reporting and Investigation of Sexual 
Offences, July 2008 – September 2009 (London: IPCC, Independent Investigation and Learning 
Report, 2013); Kelly, Lovett and Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? (n23) 
25 The Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced a new definition of rape and clarified the 
definition of ‘consent to sex’ 
26 For example, the creation of Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs), the introduction of 
specially trained officers to attend to rape and sexual assault cases, video-recording of victim 
statements to spare vulnerable victims from giving evidence live in court, and new police 
guidelines on how to handle rape cases (Association of Chief Police Officers, Crown 
  6 
Official data published in 2013 by the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office and the National 
Office for Statistics showed that the conviction rate is still as low as seven per cent,27 one of 
the lowest in Europe.28  As a result, commentators have expressed doubt as to the effectiveness 
of these measures in reducing attrition.29  Overall, it is clear that in relation to convictions, 
rape has a poor ratio of reform effort to achievement,30 and attrition is still high at every stage 
of the criminal justice process. 
 
One of the earliest UK based attrition studies to make reference to rape complainants with 
mental illness investigated 483 rape cases reported in a year and followed their progress 
through the criminal justice system.31  The rate of attrition for such complainants was not 
specifically examined; however, the authors did record that 40 cases discontinued by the 
police involved women who suffered from a mental disorder or a learning disability.32  Similar 
reasons for discontinuance were cited in a subsequent study by Susan Lea et al.  They found 
that in 3 per cent of cases (of the case sample of 379) the case did not progress on the grounds 
that the victim was deemed inconsistent, and it appeared that this judgement was more likely 
to be made in cases where the victim was vulnerable.33  Although figures are not provided, the 
authors conclude that there is a ‘very high’ rate of attrition in cases where the alleged rape 
‘involved a victim with learning disabilities, psychiatric problems or physical disabilities’.34  
Kelly’s study of 2500 rape cases found similar results.  The authors did not address whether 
the likelihood of conviction was associated with a complainant’s mental health history, but 
                                                                                                                                                          
Prosecution Service and National Policing Improvement Agency, Guidance on Investigating and 
Prosecuting Rape (2010)) 
27 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual 
Offending in England and Wales (n21) 7 
28 Jo Lovett and Liz Kelly, Different Systems, Similar Outcomes? Tracking Attrition in Reported Rape 
Cases across Europe (London: Child and Women Abuse Studies Unit London Metropolitan 
University, 2009) 111 
29 Jennifer Brown, ‘We Mind and We Care but Have Things Changed? Assessment of Progress 
in Reporting, Investigating and Proescution of Rape’ (2011) 17(3) Journal of Sexual Aggression 
263-272; Kate Cook, ‘Rape Investigation and Prosecution: Stuck in the Mud?’ (2011) 17(3) 
Journal of Sexual Aggression 250-262; Jan Jordan, ‘Here We Go Round the Review-Go-Round: 
Rape Investigation and Prosecution - Are Things Getting Worse Not Better?’ (2011) 17(3) 
Journal of Sexual Aggression 234-259 
30 Helen Reece, ‘Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?’ (2013) 33(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 445, 451 
31 Jessica Harris and Sharon Grace, A Question of Evidence? Investigating and Prosecuting Rape in 
the 1990s (London: Home Office, Home Office Research Study 196, 1999) 3 
32 Ibid, 23 
33 Susan Lea, Ursula Lanvers and Steve Shaw, ‘Attrition in Rape Cases: Developing a Profile 
and Identifying Relevant Factors’ (2003) 43 British Journal of Criminology 583, 594 
34 Ibid 
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they did record that convictions were obtained in just 4 per cent of cases involving women 
with disabilities, meaning that they were almost twice as likely to drop out of the system.35 
Research by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for the Constabulary (HMIC) and Her Majesty’s 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) also paid some attention to vulnerable 
complainants, finding that from a sample of 79 cases that had reached the charging stage, the 
conviction rate in cases involving complainants with mental health problems was 33 per 
cent.36  This was compared to the overall conviction rate of 52 per cent.37   
 
A few more recent studies have given more explicit and detailed attention to cases involving 
complainants with a background of mental health issues. Betsy Stanko and Emma Williams 
provided an analysis of 677 rape allegations recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service 
Crime Report Information Service during April – May 2005.  They found that 87 per cent of 
complainants had at least one of four ‘vulnerabilities’, which included being recorded as 
having a mental health issue, and that this contributed significantly to the outcome of the 
case.38  Victims with mental health issues were most disadvantaged; they were three times less 
likely to have their allegation classified as a crime of rape and had reduced odds of reaching a 
conviction.39  Marianne Hester performed a smaller scale study, examining attrition in a 
sample of 87 cases reported across three police force areas in the North East of England.40 
Nearly one in five victims had a mental health problem according to the police record, and 
only about a third of such cases resulted in arrest, compared to half of cases where no such 
problem was recorded.41   Furthermore, more recent data has been collected from the London 
Metropolitan Police Service; 679 allegations of rape received between April and May 2012 
have been examined.  The data reveals that complainants with mental illness are significantly 
more likely to have their case ‘no-crimed’ than complainants without recorded mental illness 
(11 per cent and 5 per cent respectively).42  Additionally, they are significantly more likely to 
                                                      
35 Kelly, Lovett and Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? (n23) 72 
36 HMIC/HMCPSI, Without Consent: A Report on the Joint Investigation and Prosecution of Rape 
Offences (n24) at [13.36] 
37 Ibid 
38 Betsy Stanko and Emma Williams, ‘Reviewing Rape and Rape Allegations in London: What 
Are the Vulnerabilities of Victims Who Report to the Police’ in Miranda Hovarth and 
Jennifer Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 
2009) 214 
39 Ibid, 215 
40 Marianne Hester, From Report to Court: Rape Cases and the Criminal Justice System in the North 
East (Bristol: University of Bristol in association with the Northern Rock Foundation, 2013) 6 
41 Ibid, 13 
42 Ellison et al, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial Disability and Rape Victimisation’ 
(n17) 12 
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have their cases dropped through a police ‘no further action’ decision (45 per cent versus 38 
per cent),43 and significantly less likely to have their case referred to the CPS for a decision (1 
per cent versus 21 per cent).44  The CPS are also significantly less likely to charge in cases 
involving complainants with mental illness (4 per cent versus 10 per cent).45  It is important to 
note that the significantly higher rate of attrition was not attributable to complainants with 
mental health problems withdrawing from the process any more frequently than other 
complainants.46  It therefore follows that higher attrition must be due to a police or CPS 
decision not to continue with the case.  Ultimately, this data shows that victims with mental 
health issues are associated with 2.3 times higher odds of attrition.47 
 
This research has been backed up by examinations of the experience of victims with mental 
health problems more generally.  Participants of research by Mind described negative 
experiences in their engagement with the police, such as not being believed, being perceived as 
unreliable or not credible and not being taken seriously.  As one commented:  
 
The police just wouldn’t believe me … [It] didn’t matter what [police officer] was 
saying to my face but behind my back she was like “yeah, she’s not right, you know, 
it’s a bit dubious about her because she’s under the mental health team”. And the fact 
that they weren’t doing anything, I thought they’re not taking it seriously.48  
 
Some also felt that the case was dropped by the CPS or other professionals because they had a 
mental health problem, and could therefore be easily discredited.  For example:  
 
She was writing, and she kind of stopped. “Bipolar?” I went, “Yeah, manic depressive, 
you know […]”. And she went “Well, his [offender’s] barrister will probably tear you 
apart in court”. […] It was almost like well, do I bother doing this statement or not. It 
was that kind of attitude.49  
 
                                                      
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
46 Katrin Hohl and Elisabeth Stanko, ‘Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: 
Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European Journal 
of Criminology 324, 336 
47 Ibid, 334 
48 Female, victim of partner violence, antisocial behaviour, threats and harassment quoted in 
Pettitt et al, At Risk yet Dismissed (n11) 37 
49 Female, victim of partner violence, threats and harassment quoted in ibid, 37 
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Overall, it is clear that when victims with mental illness did report, they recounted a much less 
satisfactory experience than the general public.   
 
Moreover, an examination of the available research highlights the lack of attention that has 
been paid to this group of vulnerable complainants.  Many studies into attrition tend to 
publish only basic police recording statistics, and involve no in-depth analysis of patterns in 
attrition.50  Some neglect victims with mental health issues entirely, while others, as Ellison 
notes, provide only a ‘fairly rudimentary assessment of the passage of complainants with 
mental illness through the criminal justice system.51  Far more research is needed to begin to 
critically evaluate responses, and if necessary, make improvements. The need for further 
evidence is compounded, as Louise Ellison et al note, by statutory obligations imposed by the 
Equality Act 2010 on all public authorities to actively promote equality of opportunity for 
those with disabilities and to eliminate unlawful discrimination.52  People with long term 
mental health conditions now come under the legislative framework of this Act, so criminal 
justice agencies must have an understanding of the potential barriers to equality of 
opportunity and access that may arise in their handling of such cases.  
 
One of the reasons these cases may be dropped out of the system is a belief that they are a 
‘false allegation’. There is a wide belief that many women lie about rape; for example, one in 
five respondents to a study by the Havens agreed that ‘most claims of rape are probably not 
true’.53  In this context, where researchers have documented the existence of a substantial 
overestimation of the scale of false rape reporting among police officers, 54  a 
‘(mis)understanding of mental illness’ may provide an additional justification for scepticism.55  
For example, in Kelly’s study, complaints by those with a disability were almost twice as likely 
                                                      
50 For example, The Stern Review – a Report by Baroness Vivien Stern OBE of an Independent Review 
into How Rape Complaints Are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales, (London: 
Home Office, 2010); Her Majesty's Inspectorate for the Constabulary, Rape Monitoring Group: 
Adult and Child Rape Data 2012/2013 (London: HMIC, 2014) 
51 Ellison et al, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial Disability and Rape Victimisation’ 
(n17) 9 
52 Ibid, 16 
53 The Havens (Sexual Assault Referral Centres), Wake up to Rape Research Summary Report 
(2010) 7 
54 Kelly, Lovett and Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? (n23) xii ; Lesley McMillan, Understanding 
Attrition in Rape Cases ESRC End of Award Report (Swindon: ESRC, RES–061–23–0138–A, 
2010) 
55 Ellison et al, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial Disability and Rape Victimisation’ 
(n17) 9; Vanessa Lee and Corrine Charles, Research into CPS Decision-Making in Cases Involving 
Victims and Key Witnesses with Mental Health Problems and/or Learning Disabilities (London: CPS, 
2008) 29 
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to be designated as false allegations as the non-disabled,56 and mental illness was often cited as 
a reason for this.  But as noted, many of these cases should not have been recorded as false 
because they did not comply with how police internal rules define a false complaint.57 
 
However, contrary to this wide belief, no reliable evidence exists to show that fabrication 
occurs more often than in other crimes.58  It is not possible to establish an exact figure for the 
prevalence of false allegations, 59  and research has produced widely varying estimates. 60  
Nevertheless, those within the system felt there were very few.  Judges have commented that 
they occur infrequently; one lawyer stated, ‘I have been prosecuting for 20 years and have 
prosecuted for a false allegation once’,61 and while there is significant rhetoric among police 
officers about high numbers of false allegations, when asked, officers were unable to 
document individual cases.62  Additionally, a number of commentators have distinguished 
between more and less robust studies.63  Those considered more robust have consistently 
reported low prevalence rates, prompting Kimberly Lonsway to conclude ‘there is simply no 
way to claim that the “statistics are all over the map”.  The statistics are now in a very small 
corner of the map’.64   Moreover, there is no clear evidence that those with mental health 
problems are more likely to make a false allegation.  Whilst 132 suspects were referred to the 
CPS for charging decisions to be made in relation to perverting the course of justice, only 28 
of these had a mental health problem that had been identified by a medical assessor.65  Of the 
132 suspects, 38 were prosecuted, although it is not clear what proportion of these had a 
mental illness. 
 
                                                      
56 Kelly, Lovett and Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? (n23) 17 
57 Ibid, 50. Police internal rules on false complaints specify that the false complaint category 
should be limited to cases where either there is a clear and credible admission by the 
complainants, or where there are strong evidential grounds. 
58 Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 5 
59 The Stern Review, (n50) 40 
60 Phillip Rumney, ‘False Allegations of Rape’ (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 128, 136 
61 The Stern Review, (n50) 40 
62 Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (n58) 5 
63 David Lisak et al, ‘False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported 
Cases’ (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1318, 1318-1334 
64 Kimberly Lonsway, ‘Trying to Move the Elephant in the Living Room: Responding to the 
Challenge of False Rape Reports’ (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1356, 1358 
65 Alison Levitt and Crown Prosecution Service Equality and Diversity Unit, Under the 
Spotlight: Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in Cases Involving Allegedly False 
Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations (London: CPS, 2013) 17 
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Yet it is this threat of false complaints, fuelled by the long-standing belief that rape is an 
allegation ‘easily to be made’ and ‘harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so 
innocent’,66 that renders a sexual assault victim subject to a series of invasive defence practices 
designed to rigorously test and undermine credibility.  It is often for this reason that defence 
may seek access to a complainant’s personal records, including records of their mental health 
history.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, it is clear that there are still considerable concerns with the treatment of rape victims, 
who face tenacious cultures of scepticism and victim-blaming,67 and must overcome a number 
of serious hurdles before a charge of sexual assault is approved.  It is also clear that these 
challenges are magnified for complainants with a history of and/or current diagnosis of 
mental illness.68  This thesis will focus on one particular aspect of this struggle: the use of 
women’s mental health records in rape trials. In doing so, it will demonstrate that there is 
considerable room for improvement of the law in this area, which would serve to ease more 
than just this stage of the criminal justice process for women with mental health problems.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
66 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Volume 1 (London: Professional books, 
1971) 
67 Jennifer Brown and Miranda Horvath, ‘Do You Believe Her and Is It Real Rape?’ in 
Miranda Horvath and Jennifer Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (Devon: 
Willan Publishing, 2009) 326-327; Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahé, Sexual Assault and the 
Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 33 
68 Mind, Another Assault: Mind's Campaign for Equal Access to Justice for People with Mental Health 
Problems (London: Mind, 2007) 13-16; Pettitt et al, At Risk yet Dismissed (n11) 36-42 
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CHAPTER 1: MENTAL ILLNESS; STIGMATISATION AND 
VICTIMISATION 
 
Many rape cases lack evidence independent of the complainant.  Therefore, with little 
evidence to guide juries, decision-making is vulnerable to influences from pre-existing 
understandings.1  It is therefore important to build a picture of the wider context of mental 
health to understand how such evidence may influence a jury.   
 
This chapter will first examine both historical and current stigmatisation of mental health, 
demonstrating that both the historical association between women and madness, and the 
widespread belief in myths relating to the mentally ill means that the use of mental health 
records in rape trials may be highly prejudicial.  Furthermore, this chapter will provide 
evidence that women with mental health issues can become stuck in a ‘cycle’ of abuse, as they 
are more likely to be victimised and re-victimised.  Moreover, women are more likely to 
experience a mental health problem due to high rates of sexual assault against them.  
Ultimately, this provides an important background for the argument that the current law on 
pre-trial disclosure of mental health records does not adequately protect women, and that the 
use of such records is highly illogical.  
 
1.1 STIGMATISATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
Mental illness has been around for as long as humans have existed,2 and it is estimated that 
one in four people will experience a mental illness at some stage of their lives.3 Despite this, 
reactions to mental disorder are still dominated by ‘fear, pity and scorn’,4 and the stigma of 
mental illness remains a ‘powerful negative attribute’ in all social interactions.5  Furthermore, 
women appear to have outnumbered men in diagnosis and treatment of mental illness, from 
the ‘hysteria’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to mood disorders, depression and 
                                                      
1 Louise Ellison and Vanessa Munro, ‘Getting to (Not) Guilty: Examining Jurors' Deliberative 
Processes in, and Beyond, the Context of a Mock Rape Trial’ (2010) 30(1) Legal Studies 74, 79 
2 Stephen Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness and an Agenda for Change 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) ix  
3 Christopher Murray and Alan Lopez, ‘Global Mortality, Disability and the Contribution of 
Risk Factors: Global Burden of Disease Study’ (1997) 349 Lancet 1436, 1439 
4 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) ix   
5 Peter Byrne, ‘Stigma of Mental Illness and Ways of Dimishing It’ (2000) 6 Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 65, 65 
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anxiety in the twenty first century.6  These facts, along with a common belief that a woman 
may accuse an innocent man of raping her because ‘she is mentally sick and given to 
delusions’7 mean that psychiatric evidence is likely to prove prejudicial in the context of rape.  
 
The first section of this chapter will provide definitions for stigmatisation, stereotypes, 
discrimination and prejudice, as well as attempting to define mental illness.  As the roots of 
stigmatisation of people with mental illness go back a long away, it will then discuss historical 
views of ‘madness’, before turning to evidence of stigmatisation in current society. It will 
conclude that individuals with mental disorder still suffer from stigmatisation, and, much like 
evidence of sexual promiscuity, evidence of mental illness has the power to invoke a ‘gender 
specific stigma of an unstable or manipulative accuser’.8  
 
1.1.1 DEFINING STIGMATISATION AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
Before considering historical and current stigmatisation of mental illness, a definition must be 
given. First, it is necessary to define ‘stereotypes’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’, as these 
terms are strongly linked and often confused.  Stereotypes are beliefs about a social group that 
are made about the group as whole, thus dismissing individuals’ differences.9 Prejudice is an 
unreasonable or unjustifiable negative attitude towards others related to their group 
membership,10 and discrimination is the unfair treatment of others, again based on their 
group membership.11  Thus discrimination is the behavioural response of a prejudice.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary defines stigma as ‘a mark of disgrace associated with a particular 
circumstance, quality or person’.12 So stigma is the negative effect of a label,13 which sets a 
person apart from others.  Stigma therefore incorporates elements of stereotyping, prejudice 
and discrimination.14  Furthermore, Bruce Link and Jo Phelan have made the point that social 
                                                      
6 Jane Ussher, The Madness of Women: Myth and Experience (Routledge, 2011) 1 
7 ‘Corroborating Charges of Rape’,  (1967) 67 Columbia Law Review 1137, 1138 
8 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, ‘Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibility of a 
Sexual Assault Complainant’ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1373, 1375 
9 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 21 
10 Ibid, 22 
11 Ibid 
12 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Stigma’ 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/stigma> accessed 16/1/15 
13 Peter Hayward and Jenifer Bright, ‘Stigma and Mental Illness: A Review and Critique ’ 
(1997) 6 Journal of Mental Health 345, 346 
14 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 24 
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power is a necessary component of stigma.15  While there are many differences between 
people, only some result in stigmatisation, and the authors argue that for this to occur 
perceivers must be in a position of social power.   
 
Additionally, some attempt must be made at defining mental illness. This is important as 
reactions from members of society depend on their understanding of mental illness.  However 
it is very challenging, as the nature of mental disorder is one of the most controversial topics 
in human science. 16   There remains much disagreement between scientists, doctors, 
psychologists and others involved in mental illness, partly due to the fact that there are still 
gaps in knowledge about the brain, and that many symptoms of mental illness are mysterious 
in nature.  Mental illness is essentially a concept that categorises some aspect of mental 
functioning as ‘abnormal, defective or disordered’.17  It is generally considered that behaviour 
is shaped by a combination of biology and environment, although the exact relationship is 
much debated.18  It is a term that covers a very wide variety and range of problems, however 
this thesis will be including both severe forms of mental illness and less serious forms when 
using the phrase ‘mental illness’. This is because behaviour is often stigmatised whenever the 
mental illness label is invoked, regardless of the specific form of underlying problem and the 
extremeness of its severity.19 
 
1.1.2 HISTORICAL STIGMATISATION  
 
It is important to understand historical ideas of mental illness, previously termed ‘madness’, 
to gain an idea of the origins of psychiatric stigma. Western societies have always linked ideas 
of morality and virtue with health and reason,20 and early Christian societies tainted madness 
with ‘images of the demonic, the perverse, the promiscuous and the sinful’.21 Throughout the 
medieval period, it was common for a patient’s own family to disown them: ‘such mentally 
                                                      
15 Bruce Link and Jo Phelan, ‘Conceptualising Stigma’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 
363, 375 
16 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 7 
17 Joan Busfield, ‘The Female Malady? Men, Women and Madness in Nineteenth Century 
Britain’ (1994) 28(1) Sociology 259, 260  
18 Joan Busfield, Men, Women and Madness: Understanding Gender and Mental Disorder (London: 
Macmillan, 1996) 143-164 
19 Simone Farrelly et al, ‘Anticipated and Experienced Discrimination Amongst People with 
Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder: A Cross Sectional Study’ 
(2014) 14(1) BMC Psychiatry 157, 161 
20 Peter Byrne, ‘Psychiatric Stigma’ (2001) 178 British Journal of Psychiatry 281, 281 
21 Amy Schlosberg, ‘Psychiatric Stigma and Mental Health Professionals Stigmatisers and 
Destigmatisers’ (1993) 12(3-5) Medicine and Law 409, 410 
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sick people, most frequently women, were literally thrown out onto the streets’.22  During the 
famous witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many women with mental 
illness were branded as witches and persecuted.23  After the witch hunts, treatments still 
included abandoning individuals, firing canons above their heads to frighten them ‘back to 
sensibility’, throwing them into water, twirling them to the point of unconsciousness and 
chaining them up in asylums that resembled dungeons,24 most of which were located in 
physically and geographically isolated areas. 25   Many struggled to believe that disturbed 
behaviour was a result of biological processes, as opposed to being ‘weak’ and having a lack of 
personal control.26  Furthermore, there remained a clear distinction between the ‘normal’ and 
the ‘abnormal’, with many of the upper classes amusing themselves by touring Bedlam and 
watching those with mental disorders, who were chained up and often screaming.   
 
In the twentieth century, disturbing responses to mental disorder were still common.  
Famously, the Nazis introduced a sterilization law in 1933 making sterilisation compulsory for 
people with a wide range of mental disabilities, and later those with mental illness were 
included in those to be rounded up and sent to death camps.27  This idea was present in other 
countries too; in the US, the Supreme Court upheld a sterilisation order for a woman with 
alleged mental illness.28 Following this, more and more states started to enforce compulsory 
sterilisation of women in state institutional facilities: by 1940, 30 states had enacted such 
legislation.29  This related to an obsession with the sexual habits of people with disabilities, 
with states attempting to control those instincts and prevent the passing on of any mental 
defects.  These attitudes were gendered, with women’s sexuality marked as particularly 
dangerous.30  As Hinshaw notes, it is difficult to imagine a ‘more officially sanctioned and 
institutionalised form of stigmatisation than this’.31   
  
                                                      
22 Gregory Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: Norton, 1941) 141  
23 Gerald Davidson, John Neale and Ann Kring, Abnormal Psychology (9th edn, New York: 
Wiley, 2004) 8 
24 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 64  
25 Ibid, 77 
26 Ibid, 88, 90  
27 Ibid, 77 
28 Buck v Bell [1927] 274 US 200 
29 Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York: 
Knopf, 1985)  
30 Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority 
for Women with Mental Disabilities’ (2014) 22(2) Fem Leg Stud 131, 139 
31 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 77 
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1.1.2.1 ‘Hysteria’ and Women’s Madness 
 
The rise of the Victorian madwomen was significant, as it was during this period that the close 
association between femininity and madness became firmly established within the scientific, 
literary and popular discourse.32  There is some controversy about the gender imbalance of the 
population deemed mad prior to the nineteenth century. For example, Michel Foucault 
argued that the gender balance was even,33 whereas Elaine Showalter has argued that women 
were statistically overrepresented among the mentally ill from as early as the seventeenth 
century.34 However all commentators appear to agree that after the mid nineteenth century, 
women dominated in the statistics of the mentally ill. 35    Furthermore, there was an 
association between female sexuality and madness, which fitted in with the idea of women as 
‘mad or bad’.36  This was demonstrated in nineteenth century literature, where madness in 
male characters represented truth, for example Shakespeare’s King Lear was described as the 
King who ‘tears off the mask and speaks the sane madness of vital truth’.37 In contrast, the 
mad woman is more usually condemned for being in possession of ‘dangerous desire’.38  There 
are constantly juxtaposed images of women as pure and innocent, often the heroines, with the 
evil, sexual witch or madwoman. 39  Examples include Snow White and her stepmother, 
Cinderella and her stepsisters, and Jane Eyre and Bertha Mason.40 
 
The disease of ‘hysteria’ most clearly demonstrates the link between sexuality and madness. 
Hysteria is historically a woman’s disease; the etymology of ‘hyster’ refers to the uterus.41  It 
has been associated with a woman’s repressed sexual desire,42 and symptoms were said to 
include discomfort with situations in which the patient was not the centre of attention, 
interaction with others characterized by inappropriately sexually seductive or provocative 
                                                      
32 Jane Ussher, Women's Madness: Misogny or Mental Illness (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 64  
33 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London: 
Tavistock, 1967) 
34 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980 
(London: Virago Press, 1987) 3 
35 Ussher, Women's Madness (n32) 71  
36 Susan Edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) 52 
37 Herman Melville, ‘Hawthorne and His Mosses’ in P Miller (ed), Major American Writers 
(New York, 1962) 894 
38 Philip Martin, Mad Women in Romantic Writing (Sussex: Harvester, 1987) 14 
39 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the 
Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) 77-80, 359-362, 431, 463-465 
40 Ussher, Women's Madness (n32) 86  
41 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Hysteric’ 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hysteric> accessed 16/1/15 
42 Ilza Veith, Hysteria: The History of a Disease (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) 201 
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behaviour, a rapid shifting and shallow expression of emotions, and theatrically exaggerated 
emotion.43  Hysteria became a ‘metaphor for everything unmanageable in the female sex’,44 
and was described as a woman’s ‘natural state’.45  Furthermore, in 1883 a French physician 
asserted that ‘all women are hysterical and … every woman carries with her the seeds of 
hysteria’.46  Such comments made by high profile doctors suggest to the public that all women 
are to be considered potentially unreliable.  Freud went further, explicitly linking hysteria with 
fabrications of sexual assault. 47  He rejected the idea that his female patients’ hysterical 
symptoms were a result of their history of sexual abuse, and instead believed that ‘they were 
only phantasies which my patients had made up’.48 
 
This association between allegations of rape and female psychopathology was frequent.  
Female sexuality was presented as related to the subconscious mind, manifesting in ‘sexual 
fantasies of sexual domination, violation and rape’.49  For example, Freud argued that women 
were subject to erotic fantasies, and fantasies were actually wishes,50 leading to the common 
rape myth that the woman ‘wanted it’. This was taken a step further in the notion that women 
could not be trusted to differentiate between their subconscious sexual desires and reality;51 
prominent medical figures were warning of women’s tendency to sexual delusion and the 
tendency of ‘neurotic individuals’ to transform ‘fantasies into actual beliefs and memory 
falsifications’.52 Following this, a British False Memory Society emerged, where scientists came 
                                                      
43 Lisa Appignanesi, Mad, Bad or Sad: A History of Women and the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the 
Present (Virago Press, 2008) 161 
44 Mark Micale, ‘Hysteria Male/Hysteria Female: Reflections on Comparative Gender 
Construction in Nineteenth Century Medicine’ (paper presented at The Wellcome 
Symposium on the History of Medicine: History of Hysteria, 6th April 1990, London)  
45 Thomas Laycock, An Essay on Hysteria (Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington and Haswell, 
1840)  
46 Auguste Fabre quoted in Elaine Showalter, ‘Hysteria, Feminism and Gender’ in Sander 
Gilman and others (eds), Hysteria Beyond Freud (Berkele, CA: University of California, 1993) 
286-287  
47 Sigmund Freud, ‘An Autobiographical Study’ in Peter Gay (ed), The Freud Reader (New 
York: W W Norton, 1989) 20-21  
48 Ibid, 21 
49 Edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law (n36) 101  
50 Sigmund Freud, ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’ in Peter Gay (ed), The Freud Reader 
(New York: W W Norton, 1989) 439 
51 Louise Ellison, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric Evidence in Rape Trials’ (2009) 13(1) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 28, 29 
52 Karl Menninger (a psychiatrist) quoted in John Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1940) 463-464 
  18 
together to argue that memories could easily be changed by suggestion or wish.53  Thus fears of 
false allegations of rape reached new heights.54 This position was endorsed by many legal 
scholars, who called for evidentiary rules that allowed for the rigorous testing and careful 
scrutiny of rape complainants.  For example, Machtinger argued that the admission of expert 
psychiatric evidence was necessary to protect innocent men from unfounded accusations:  
 
[T]he fact that many of these charges stem from a psychopathic mind makes it 
essential that the rules of evidence permit complete investigation into the truth of the 
charges.  The most useful kind of evidence in a sexual case is the opinions of 
psychiatrists, social workers and probation officers as to the moral and mental traits of 
the prosecutrix.55 
 
More famously, John Wigmore argued that the criminal courts should order the psychiatric 
evaluations of rape complainants prior to prosecution to test their credibility,56 as he argued 
that women’s ‘psychic complexes are multifarious and distorted’, and this was often 
manifested through ‘the narration of imaginary sex-incidents of which the narrator is the 
herorine or the victime’.57  Similar warnings followed, with Glanville Williams suggesting rape 
complainants should have to take a lie-detector test as their evidence may be ‘warped by 
psychological processes which are not evident to the eye of common sense’,58 and John 
Heydon commenting on the ‘danger’ of false accusations ensuing from ‘all kinds of 
psychological neuroses and delusions’.59 
 
1.1.2.2 How Is This Relevant Now? 
 
Throughout history, and particularly in the nineteenth century, there was a marked cultural 
affinity between women and madness. Therefore questions about a rape complainant’s mental 
health may spark images of the link between female psychopathology and promiscuity,60 and 
                                                      
53 Appignanesi, Mad, Bad or Sad (n43) 472; ‘British False Memory Society’, 
<http://bfms.org.uk> accessed 16/1/15  
54 Eugene Kanin, ‘False Rape Allegations’ (1994) 23 Archives of Sexual Behaviour 81, 84-87 
55 S Machtinger, ‘Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases’ 
(1949) 39(6) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 750, 752 
56 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (n52) 459-460 
57 Ibid, 459 
58 Glanville Williams, ‘Corroboration - Sexual Cases’ (1962) Criminal Law Review 662, 663 
59 John Heydon, Evidence: Cases and Materials (London: Butterworths, 1975) 81 
60 Mark Micale, Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994) 191  
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while hysteria is no longer recognized as a mental disorder, it is an easy intuitive leap for a 
jurist to go from ‘mental illness’ to the stereotypical hysterical woman.61  Furthermore, the 
association between false complaints and psychopathology is an important background to rape 
trials today, even if such views are not expressed so openly anymore. For example, when a 
defence lawyer questions a complainant about her mental health history, it is typically with the 
aim of undermining her credibility and this is likely to prove effective ‘because it invokes the 
gender stereotyped image of a mentally unstable accuser’.62 
 
Additionally, while Wigmore and Glanville Williams were writing many years ago, Lordships 
in the Supreme Court, and probably other judges, may have been educated and trained at a 
time when their ideas and influences were still pervasive. While judges are required to attend 
training throughout their careers, it is possible that the assumptions underpinning Wigmore 
and Williams’ arguments may continue to be expressed.  Furthermore, training on mental 
health is not included in legal education or judicial training and refresher courses. This means 
that judges are judges unlikely to have adequate mental health awareness or understanding of 
mental capacity.63 
 
1.1.3 CURRENT STIGMATISATION  
 
This section will aim to demonstrate that stigmatisation of people with mental health issues is 
not purely a historical problem, but a global phenomenon,64 which is still prevalent and 
persists over time.65  It will firstly consider the end of the twentieth century and the beginning 
of the twenty-first to gain an understanding of the way that stigmatisation has developed, 
before arguing that stigmatisation still affects the everyday lives of those with mental health 
problems, and despite some evidence of improvement, remains a substantial problem. 
                                                      
61 Wilkinson-Ryan, ‘Admitting Mental Health Evidence’ (n8) 1389  
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There is an abundance of evidence that suggests that despite an increase in public knowledge, 
stigmatisation of those with mental illness remains common.  In 1996, Mind undertook a 
survey that produced shocking results in terms of the extent to which stigmas of mental health 
affected every area of life, 66  raising ‘deep concerns’ about the ‘staggering’ level of 
discrimination.67   47 per cent of respondents had been harassed or abused in public because 
of their mental health problems, including being shouted at and being physically attacked,68 
and over half felt afraid of attack. 69   The largest problem area in people’s lives was 
employment,70 and this was often triggered by a history of mental disorder rather than a 
documented disability.71  As one respondent commented:  
 
It seems absurd to me that a criminal record can be ‘spent’ when we have to 
constantly declare our lifelong psychiatric history, which can be painful and 
distressing in itself and can even stop people seeking help when they are in need of 
it.72   
 
This is backed up by evidence that less than a quarter of people with severe mental health 
conditions have a job73 and fewer than four in ten employers said they would consider 
employing someone with mental health problems.74  In addition, 80 per cent of organisations 
surveyed did not have a specific mental health policy.75   
 
Furthermore, mental health issues have also affected the personal life of many.  One study 
found that interpersonal interactions with family were consistently reported as a primary 
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source of discriminatory behaviour. 76   Stigmatisation can also influence court decisions 
relating to divorce or custody. For example, a woman with a history of depression lost custody 
of her children despite the fact that she ‘remained stable, worked and continued medication 
and therapy’.77  This history of mental illness resulted in her being deemed the less fit parent 
even though her husband had a criminal record for driving under the influence and 
possessing drugs.  Such prejudices may be a result of the myth that those with mental health 
problems are ‘crazy all the time’.78  Many people seem to have the idea that those with mental 
illness are ‘ill-equipped to cope with life and to look after [themselves] in every way’.79  In 
reality, people with mental health issues can get on with life perfectly well; as Premila Trivedi, 
a mental health service user, trainer and advisor, notes: mental health problems are just ‘one 
part of your personality and one part of your life’.80  But this side to mental illness is not 
visible because it is not widely publicised.   
 
Often a link is made between mental health problems and violence, which can have an affect 
on many areas of life.  There is a damaging stereotype that people in mental distress are a 
danger to society, 81  and the high proportion of stories linking mental ill health with 
criminality and violence, discussed below, contributes to this.  There have even been attempts 
to enshrine such discrimination in legislation; in 2000 the Labour government introduced a 
Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder Bill in an attempt to establish legislation 
that would enable people who ‘might’ commit serious violent crimes to be preventatively 
arrested.82  Fortunately, the Bill was severely amended following an outcry from the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists and a warning from The Lancet that dangerous severe personality 
disorder was so vaguely defined that six people would have to be detained to prevent one from 
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acting violently.83  Although there is a small association between mental illness and risk for 
violence, this link pertains only to certain forms of psychotic behaviour, and only to those 
currently displaying a mental health problem.84  A review of evidence found that across eight 
economically developed countries, between 6-15 per cent of all homicides were committed by 
people with a clear diagnosis of schizophrenia,85 with a more recent review concluding the 
range is between 5-10 per cent.86  A survey with 8098 respondents has shown that having 
symptoms of an anxiety related disorder within the last year is associated with a modest 
increase in the risk of violence. 87   For those that had previously been diagnosed with 
depression, but had not had the condition in the previous year, the rate of violence was one 
per cent, which is half the rate of those who have never been given a psychiatric diagnosis.88  
Another study found that of 2000 murders, only 34 were committed by people who had been 
in touch with psychiatric services before the incident.89 Those that were responsible were a 
tiny proportion of people experiencing mental health problems.  In comparison, drug or 
alcohol misuse contributes to at least one quarter of all violent incidents.90   These results 
show that it is misleading to speak of violence or danger in relation to the ‘mentally ill’, just as 
it would be in relation to the ‘physically ill’,91 and that risk depends on the type of diagnosis 
and the nature and severity of symptoms. 
 
Additionally, it is not just those who may lack knowledge who are accused of such stigmatizing 
attitudes; anecdotal, narrative and survey evidence reveals that those entrusted with the care 
and treatment of the mentally ill can also display similar views.92 One Northern Ireland 
general practitioner wrote that neurotic patients: 
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[T]ake up far too much of our time and energy – people complaining, miserable, 
depressed, neurotically whining about how unhappy they are, pouring out all their 
problems in the surgery and dumping them on my doorstep.  It would be really 
unbearable if I was actually listening to them.93 
 
It is difficult to know the extent of such practices, but even a small percentage translates into 
thousands of communications.94  More recent evidence suggests that professionals working in 
all areas of health care, including mental health, stigmatise and discriminate against people 
with mental illness.95  
 
As a result of such overwhelming evidence of stigmatisation, there has been much focus on 
increasing public and professional understanding of mental health problems and therefore 
reducing stigma and discrimination.  The Royal College of Psychiatrists launched a five-year 
long campaign to try and achieve this in 1997.96  Similar to the above evidence, a population 
survey undertaken before the start of the campaign showed that negative opinions about 
people with mental illness were widely held.97  The same survey was repeated five years later, 
and the pattern of responses found was similar,98 indicating that stigmatisation may be deeply 
engrained in society. However, there was a small decrease in the percentages of people 
expressing negative opinions.99  While the positive changes cannot solely be attributed to the 
campaign because opinions are subject to many influences simultaneously, the results may 
suggest stigmatisation is slowly decreasing.   
 
Following this, the mental health anti-stigma programme Time to Change, which is run by 
Mind and Rethink Mental Illness, has stated that data shows public attitudes have improved 
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significantly, and that the biggest annual improvement in the last decade has taken place in 
2013;100 the most recent data from the National Attitudes to Mental Illness survey shows that 
there was a 2.8 per cent improvement in attitudes between 2012 and 2013.101   More people 
than ever before are acknowledging that they know someone with a mental health problem,102 
and there were declines in the proportion of people agreeing with statements such as ‘anyone 
with a history of mental problems should be excluded from public office’ and ‘it is frightening 
to think of people with mental problems living in residential neighbourhoods’.103   
 
Furthermore, mental health can now fall under the Equality Act 2010.  The Act protects those 
with a disability from discrimination, and now defines a disability as a ‘physical or mental 
impairment that has a substantial, adverse and long-term effect on your normal day-to-day 
activities’.104  While this focuses on the effect of a mental health problem, rather than the 
diagnosis, it may still be the case that not all experiences of mental illness fall within this.  
Furthermore, while it is advantageous that mental illness is now legally recognised as a 
disability equal to a physical impairment, there is still a clear disparity in many employers’ 
treatment of those with mental and physical illness.105   
 
So while there is some positive change, there is still a lot of work to be done to end stigma and 
discrimination faced by people with a history of mental illness in their everyday lives.  While 
findings indicate that there have been improvements in how people intend to behave and a 
trend towards more positive attitudes, there has been no significant improvement in 
knowledge about mental illness or reported behaviour at a national level,106 and it appears that 
many public attitudes and desire for social distance remain stable over time.107  There are still 
worrying percentages of people agreeing with statements such as ‘less emphasis should be 
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placed on protecting the public from people with mental illness’ (only 34 per cent),108 and 
there has been no significant changes in some views such as ‘as soon as a person shows signs 
of mental disturbance, he should be hospitalised’,109 and ‘one of the main causes of mental 
illness is a lack of self-discipline and will-power’.110  It is clear that such attitudes are picked up 
on by those suffering with mental illness; 72 per cent of respondents in one study felt that 
they had to conceal their mental health status to some extent. 111  Furthermore, stigma 
associated with mental illness has also been found to act as a treatment barrier to professional 
mental health care.112  Attitudes about employment are also still trailing behind. Although 
knowledge about the prevalence of mental health problems has improved, as has stated 
willingness to offer reasonable adjustments, there has been no increase in the existence of 
formal policies on workplace mental health.113  A study conducted prior to the introduction of 
the Equality Act 2010 revealed that the extent to which employers and managers believe that 
employees suffering from stress can work effectively remained unchanged.114  Following the 
implementation of the Equality Act 2010, views of disclosure in job applications did not 
change, with over three quarters of employers believing that people with mental health 
problems should disclose prior to employment, despite the legislative changes making this 
unlawful.115  This is echoed in research into those with mental health problems, with 49 per 
cent of respondents in one study saying they would not feel comfortable talking to an 
employer about their mental health.116  Ultimately, discrimination is still experienced by many 
with mental illness; 87.6 per cent of respondents in one study had experienced some form of 
discrimination in the last twelve months, and almost the entire sample (92.6 per cent) 
                                                      
108 TNS BRMB, Attitudes to Mental Illness: 2013 Research Report (n101) 4 
109 Ibid, 10 
110 Ibid, 21 
111 Elizabeth Corker et al, ‘Experiences of Discrimination among People Using Mental Health 
Services in England 2008-2011’ (2013) 202(s55) The British Journal of Psychiatry s58, s61 
112 Lisa Dockery et al, ‘Stigma- and Non-Stigma-Related Treatment Barriers to Mental 
Healthcare Reported by Service Users and Caregivers’ (2015) 228 Psychiatry Research 612, 614 
113 Kirsty Little et al, ‘Employers’ Attitudes to People with Mental Health Problems in the 
Workplace in Britain: Changes between 2006 and 2009’ (2011) 20(1) Epidemiology and 
Psychiatric Sciences 73, 75 
114 Claire Henderson et al, ‘Mental Health Problems in the Workplace: Changes in Employers’ 
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in England 2006-2010’ (2013) 202(s55) The British Journal 
of Psychiatry s70, s73 
115 Graeme Lockwood, Claire Henderson and Graham Thornicroft, ‘The Equality Act 2010 
and Mental Health’ (2012) 200(3) British Journal of Psychiatry 182-183 
116 TNS BRMB, Attitudes to Mental Illness: 2013 Research Report (n101) 40 
  26 
reported an anticipated discrimination.117  While this is still the case, it cannot be assumed 
that stigmatisation of mental health problems is no longer an issue. 
 
Furthermore, it may be hard to detect the full extent of stigmatisation.  Public opinion surveys 
can be criticized for underestimating levels of stigmatisation, as those who are disinterested 
may refuse to participate in a survey, and some of those participating may be more aware of 
socially acceptable responses.118  In the context of investigating rape myth acceptance, it was 
found that given subtler wording, a higher proportion of participants appeared to endorse 
them.119  Additionally, people may not consciously engage in stigmatising those with mental 
health problems, and investigation thus far has mostly focused on overt attitudes, rather than 
deeper levels of stigma, meaning that the degree of hidden bias within the general public is 
unknown.  
 
This chapter will now examine in more detail how mental illness is depicted both through our 
language and in the media, suggesting continued stigmatisation is widespread, and in some 
cases contributing to stigmatisation.   
 
1.1.3.1 Language  
 
Much of the language commonly used that is associated with mental illness provides further 
evidence that prejudice and ignorance remain widespread. Words used through history to 
describe mental illness are disparaging, for example, insanity, madness and lunacy.  In modern 
times, many of the synonyms and slang phrases for mental illness are derogatory and rival 
racial and sexual epithets as sources of ridicule, such as ‘crazy’, ‘nuts’, ‘wacko’, ‘loony’, ‘out of 
your mind’ and ‘deranged’.120  While it is now uncommon to hear racial or ethnic insults due 
to current social standards, there are few social restrictions on terms used to denote mental 
illness.  Such stigmatising words are also common in the national press, with almost half of 
tabloid stories covering mental illness including terms such as ‘nutter’.121  As well as this, there 
is no specific word for prejudice against mental illness, whereas there are lots of recognised 
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descriptions for other prejudiced beliefs, for example racism, sexism, and homophobia.122  
While it may fall under ‘ableism’, as mental illness now falls under the definition of 
disability,123 this term does not serve to capture the unique prejudices in the same way.  
Furthermore, language used in everyday conversations is revealing, for example unpopular 
ideas are often dismissed as ‘crazy’ and unusual or eccentric plans are branded as ‘madness’.124   
In this way, the same words used to describe mental illness are also used negatively and 
dismissively.  Overall, this evidence suggests stigmatisation of mental illness is routinely 
accepted in everyday language, and therefore may be deeply embedded in society. 
 
1.1.3.2 Media Coverage  
 
Stereotyping and stigmatizing attitudes towards mental illnesses are maintained and often 
reinforced though the media, as images are distorted and negative stereotypes are over-
emphasised.  Media coverage is only one of a complex range of factors which influence beliefs 
about mental health,125 but it is a crucial one as it is a main flow of information to the mass 
public, therefore playing an active part in shaping what mental illness means in our culture.126 
 
The first area of media to consider is newspaper portrayals of psychiatric issues.  Newspapers 
have come under criticism for focusing on the ‘doom and gloom’ side of mental illness,127 in 
particular producing disproportionately large amounts of stories on dangerous actions of 
mentally ill individuals.128  One study found that almost 46 per cent of press coverage on 
mental health was about crime, harm to others and self- harm, and that stories making the 
link between mental ill-health and violence were given greater prominence than more positive 
pieces.129  Examples of such headlines include ‘Maniac killed twin sisters’130 and ‘Knife maniac 
freed to kill. Mental patient ran amok in the park’.131  While in reality such stories represent 
only a tiny minority, they are often portrayed as representative of anybody with such problems, 
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which skews public understanding.132  These results were backed up by another UK study that 
compared coverage of mental health and physical health items.  The authors found that not 
only were there five times more articles about physical rather than mental illness,133 64 per 
cent of psychiatric stories were negative compared with 46 per cent of general medical 
pieces.134 Their analysis suggested that ‘negative articles about medicine tended to be about 
“bad doctors”, whereas negative articles on psychiatry tended to describe “bad patients”’.135  
While more recently, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of anti-
stigmatising articles, there has been no concomitant proportional decrease in stigmatising 
articles.136 
 
Evidence has shown that such stories can have an effect; a national survey on public attitudes 
to people with mental illness took place just before Michael Ryan killed 15 people in 
Berkshire and was repeated afterwards.137  There was a significant increase after the event in 
the number who agreed that people who commit horrific crimes are likely to be mentally ill.138  
Importantly, newspaper reports of the stories suggested Michael Ryan was mentally ill, 
although there was no clear evidence of this.  The authors concluded that ‘either the 
Hungerford massacre, or the media account of it, strengthened the public view of extreme 
violence as a product of mental illness’.139  This same trend has also been found after other 
such events,140 and in other research.141  
 
Stigmatisation of mental health in television and film has also been studied. Glasgow Media 
Group in Scotland analysed one month’s output for national and local television, including 
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content from factual news through to cartoons, and found that 66 per cent of those about 
mental illness reported on harm to others.142  This is backed up by a US study that found that 
mentally ill characters were nearly 10 times more violent than the general population of 
television characters. 143  At the other extreme, people with mental illness are frequently 
portrayed as helpless victims,144 forcing them into a mould which they may not fit.  Mental 
illness is also frequently used as a ‘substrate’ for comedy, more usually laughing at rather than 
with the characters,145 although this was more often the case in fictional representations.146  
Furthermore, ‘mental illness’ is often referred to generally, with no further specification as to 
diagnostic category, which can be constructed as stereotyping.147  Research shows the pattern 
of portrayals of madness in films is very similar.  Steven Hyler et al researched a number of 
Hollywood films and concluded that representations of mental illness are of ‘over-privileged, 
oversexed narcissistic parasites’. 148   In a more complete assessment, many hundreds of 
productions were analysed and the author argued that media portrayals ‘misuse or casually use 
psychiatric terms’ and are fundamentally inaccurate.149 
 
The media also serves to provide inaccurate images of mental illness to members of society 
who may not have encountered mental disturbance, including children.  Claire Wilson et al 
studied children’s television programmes and found that 46 per cent referred to mental illness 
using derogatory terms, such as ‘bananas’, ‘twisted’, ‘cuckoo’ and ‘freak’.150  They also found 
that characters were typically labelled as ill with no other redeeming characteristics and were 
‘losing control, constantly engaged in illogical and irrational actions’.151 Research in the US 
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found almost identical results,152 and a Canadian study into Disney films found that 85 per 
cent of films contained verbal references to mental illness and they were mainly used to ‘set 
apart and denigrate’ the characters.153 
 
From this, it is clear that the media perpetuate stigma, giving the public narrowly focused 
stories or programmes based around stereotypes and focusing public attention on the most 
negative attributes of mental illness.  This appears to be because most programmes focus on 
entertainment rather than education,154 news features emphasise the ‘newsworthy rather than 
the worthy’155 guided by values such as novelty, universality and controversy,156 and stereotypes 
allow for news production to be quick as they follow a ‘tried and tested formula’ known to 
work.157 
 
1.1.3.3 How is This Relevant?   
 
This section has aimed to show that stigmatisation of mental health, although reduced, 
remains common among the general public, and that this has ‘far-reaching’ consequences.158  
As one respondent commented, ‘I have suffered more because of ignorance of certain people 
than I have throughout my actual mental health problems’.159  One such consequence is the 
way mental health records may be viewed in the courtroom.  Jurors are selected from the 
general public, so if even a significant minority of the general public stigmatise those with 
mental illness, then it is possible that a significant minority of the jury will too. As Andrew 
Taslitz notes in relation to character evidence more generally, ‘even if character evidence is 
deemed relevant … rape juries magnify it, giving it far more weight than it deserves’.160  In the 
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same way, when jurors hear evidence relating to the mental health of the complainant, they 
may give this more weight than they should.  Moreover, the more they adhere to stigmatising 
beliefs, the more likely it is to skew their perception of the complainant unjustly.   Therefore, 
a more tolerant and understanding society would bring both a great improvement to the lives 
of people with mental health problems, and an increased chance that mental health records 
will not be distorted to the detriment of the complainant.  However, as Jennifer Rankin notes, 
‘changing minds is slow work’.161   
 
1.1.4 WHY DOES STIGMATISATION EXIST? 
 
There are various possible reasons people react to mental disorder in such a way. Many fear 
not having full control over mental and emotional faculties, and are reminded of their own 
shaky sense of rationality by mentally disordered behaviours.162  Therefore the temptation to 
distance oneself from this, and by doing so exaggerate differences, can be strong.163 As one 
woman suffering from mental health problems stated, ‘I think people are frightened by “the 
mind illness” whereas “physical illness” is there to be seen’.164  Societal communication then 
consolidates these stereotypes, exploiting ‘deep anxieties about security, the unknown and the 
unpredictable’.165 
 
Part of the reason for continuing stigmatisation may also be that mental illness is perceived as 
less real than physical illness, as there is a lack of ‘hard biological indicators’ underlying their 
presence.166  Many subscribe to a ‘pull yourself together’ attitude,167 indeed, one study found 
that several participants commented on people not believing in their mental illness.168  This 
may come down to a lack of understanding: complete understanding about psychopathology is 
                                                      
161 Jennifer Rankin, Mental Health in the Mainstream: Developments and Trends in Mental Health 
Policy (London Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004) 14 
162 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 145   
163 Charles Stangor and Christian Crandall, ‘Threat and the Social Construction of Stigma’ in 
Todd Heatherton and others (eds), The Social Psychology of Stigma (New York: Guildford Press, 
2000) 73-79 
164 ‘Linda’, quoted in Thornicroft, Shunned (n91) 119  
165 Greg Philo, ‘The Media and Public Belief’ in Greg Philo (ed), Media and Mental Distress 
(London: Longman, 1996) 103 
166 Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame (n2) 14  
167 Byrne, ‘Stigma of Mental Illness’ (n5) 66 
168 Sarah Hamilton et al, ‘Discrimination against People with a Mental Health Diagnosis: 
Qualitative Analysis of Reported Experiences’ (2014) 23(2) Journal of Mental Health 88, 90 
  32 
not yet a reality, and furthermore, very little is taught about mental disorders within the 
education system.169 
 
Following on from this, some may see mental illness as an ‘excuse’.  The perception that 
mental illness can eliminate punishment, as a result of the insanity defence and the partial 
defence of diminished responsibility, may fuel the view that mental illness is a faked condition 
through which ‘guilty individuals can escape responsibility for criminal actions’.170  In reality, 
the insanity defence is rarely invoked171 and its success rate very low.172  Often it is considered 
worse to be involuntary hospitalised than to go to prison, as release from prison may come 
sooner. However success in several highly publicised cases has led to increased 
stigmatisation.173   
1.2  CYCLE OF ABUSE  
 
This section will discuss evidence that rape and sexual violence can increase chances of mental 
distress, that mental distress can increase chances of victimisation, and that victimisation can 
increase chances of re-victimisation.  In this way, it will argue that is it possible to enter into a 
spiral of mental health and victimisation, where once one has a mental health issue (whether 
as a result of sexual violence or not), it becomes increasingly difficult to break out of the 
‘cycle’.   
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1.2.1 INCREASED CHANCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS DUE TO RAPE 
 
Sexual violence against women and girls is endemic in our society, and while we can only 
guess at the reality of its prevalence due to underreporting,174 evidence makes it clear that it is 
very high.175  It is also clear from research that rape and sexual assault in both adulthood and 
childhood can have devastating lifelong effects on both the physical and mental health of its 
victims.176  This section will analysis such evidence, arguing that the result of high rates of 
sexual assault against women therefore makes the effect of mental health evidence ‘doubly 
discriminatory’177 as women are ‘disproportionately likely to be clients of medical, therapeutic 
and counselling services’.178   
 
However, there is a danger in analysing the psychological consequences of sexual assault 
simply in terms of negative ‘effects’, as not all survivors of sexual violence experience these 
psychological effects to the same extent.179  This may serve to deny women’s ‘individual 
subjectivity’180 and reinforce the perception of women as victims.181  Therefore, the complexity 
of women’s responses to sexual abuse must be acknowledged.   
 
There is a whole body of research about the detrimental impact rape and sexual assault can 
have on adult women.182  Various studies report a range of mental health problems following 
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rape, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety and panic attacks, 
and substance abuse.183  Liz Kelly’s study of 60 women found that 78 per cent reported 
flashbacks, 69 per cent dreams or nightmares of the events, 61 per cent described how they 
forgot or ‘cut off’ the experience and 47 per cent spontaneously described their enhanced 
sense of vulnerability or fear.184  These are close to typical symptoms of PTSD. Kelly’s research 
has been backed up,185 with one study finding that, on average, the rate of flashbacks among a 
group of people who had been raped was 83 per cent per year.186 However the frequency with 
which flashbacks occur varied considerably across individuals.  Furthermore, a review of the 
literature on the psychological impact of sexual assault found that 7-65 per cent of women 
with a lifetime history of sexual assault develop PTSD, with most studies reporting rates in the 
33-45 per cent range.187 
 
Along with feelings of fear and vulnerability, as noted by Kelly, feelings of anxiety, anger or 
depression can be consequences of sexual abuse.  Research has found that 13-52 per cent of 
victims meet diagnostic criteria for depression,188 73-82 per cent develop fear or anxiety and 
12-40 per cent experience generalised anxiety.189  It is also not uncommon for victims to have 
suicidal ideation.190   As well as this, there is evidence of a link between sexual violence and 
eating disorders.191  One study compared women who had been raped recently with women 
who had experienced a different life-threatening trauma in the previous 9 months.  It was 
found that 53 per cent of the women who had been raped had developed an eating disorder, 
in comparison to 6 per cent of those who experienced a different trauma.192 
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For many sexual assault survivors, these psychological distress symptoms decline within a few 
months, but it is not uncommon for women to continue to experience emotional distress for 
several years after the assault.193  Some symptoms can remain long term for around 50 per cent 
of women, even with the intervention of counselling or therapy.194  Overall, it is clear that it is 
not uncommon for women to experience some form of mental illness after being raped.  
Therefore, if anything, mental health records should back up an allegation of rape rather than 
being used to question the credibility of the complainant.   
 
Sexual abuse and rape during childhood can also have a significant on mental health.  The 
most commonly reported long-term effects include depression, anxiety, low self-esteem and 
PTSD.195  Studies also suggest that as many as 70 per cent of involuntarily detained female 
psychiatric patients in the UK have been abused in childhood.196 
 
Overall, there are gender differences in psychiatric diagnoses. In England, women are more 
likely than men to have a common mental health problem,197 and are almost twice as likely to 
be diagnosed with anxiety disorders.198 Additionally, women predominate in depression, with 
unipolar depression being twice as common in women as men.199  In comparison, there are no 
marked gender differences in the rates of severe mental disorders like schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder. 200  Many commentators believe that sexual violence can provide an 
explanation for these gender differences in psychiatric diagnoses, for example Natallia Sianko 
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comments that ‘the stunning incidence of violence against women undoubtedly contributes to 
these disparities’.201   Given that these disparities exist, and are partly as a result of high rates 
of sexual assault, it becomes clear that using women’s mental health issues against them in 
rape cases can be highly illogical. 
 
1.2.2 INCREASED CHANCE OF VICTIMISATION DUE TO MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES  
 
Much has been written about the risk posed to members of the public by those with mental 
illness, as discussed above.  Contrary to this popular perception, overall evidence shows that 
people with mental health problems are more likely to be victims of crime than perpetrators, 
and are disproportionately at risk of victimisation when compared to the general 
population.202  Many studies have focused on violent crime, as people with mental illness are 
particularly vulnerable to this.203 One such study compared the official statistics of prevalence 
of violent victimisation from the British Crime Survey with statistics of violent victimisation of 
those with mental health issues living in communities.204  They found that the figure for those 
with mental health issues was more than twice that recorded from general population figures 
in the UK during the same time period.205 A similar study has been repeated in America, and 
found similar results: more than a quarter of people with severe mental illness had been 
victims of a violent crime in the past year, which was higher than the National Crime 
Victimisation Survey showed for the general population.206  A more recent report published by 
Victim Support and Mind found that 45 per cent of people with severe mental illness were 
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victims of crime in the past year,207 and that they were five times more likely to be a victim of 
assault than people in the general population.208  As one respondent commented:  
 
[Having a mental health problem] it’s a license, it makes you so vulnerable.  It’s awful.  
It’s like this is a sitting duck we can do whatever we want to, however we want.209 
 
It is also clear that women with mental health issues are at a heightened risk of sexual assault 
and rape210 and that experiences of sexual violence among those with mental illness are 
alarmingly high.  The research by Mind found that women are ten times more likely to be 
assaulted if they have a mental health problem.211  Furthermore, women with long term 
psychiatric problems were found to have been more likely to have reported being pressurized 
into unwanted sexual intercourse,212 and a New Zealand study found that almost a third of 
respondents with a mental illness had been sexually abused.213  In the US, a study of women 
who were examined in an emergency department after sexual assault found that the 
prevalence of psychiatric illness was 26 per cent.214  This was more than twice that of the 
baseline in the hospital.215  The research by Victim Support and Mind found that 40-62 per 
cent of women with severe mental illness reported rape or sexual violence, compared to 10-24 
per cent of control women.216 Furthermore, this evidence may be limited as it only includes 
women who have reported the abuse, and there may be many women with mental health 
problems who have chosen not to report their rape.  
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Qualitative interviews revealed that many participants felt that having a mental health 
problem was a factor in their victimisation.  They believed that perpetrators sometimes picked 
up on visible signs of vulnerability, or targeted them because they understood that people with 
mental health problems were more easily discredited and commonly disbelieved when they 
report.217 As well as this, some considered that isolation and social exclusion contributed to 
the increased risk of victimisation.218  Furthermore, studies have also revealed that those with 
mental health problems are at risk of victimisation in psychiatric facilities, which should be 
offering care and safety.  Nine participants in the Mind study were victimised in psychiatric 
inpatient wards, and they commented that they felt under threat from staff and other 
patients.219  Earlier research by Mind also reported that 18 per cent of inpatients in mental 
health wards had been sexually harassed and that one in twenty had been sexually assaulted.220 
This was backed up by the National Patient Safety Agency, which found disturbingly high 
rates of sexual harassment and sexual assault, including 19 allegations of rape.221  It is also 
clear that this situation is not improving, with much more recent evidence suggesting sexual 
violence is still soaring in hospitals, in particular mental health units.222 
 
Research therefore clearly demonstrates that having a mental health problem alone increases 
the risk of crime by three fold for any crime, and to ten fold for women to be assaulted. 
Another layer is added to this when considering the chances of re-victimisation. 
 
1.2.3 INCREASED CHANCE OF RE-VICTIMISATION DUE TO VICTIMISATION 
 
In addition to sexual violence increasing the chances of mental health problems, and mental 
health problems increasing the chances of sexual violence, victimisation also increases the 
chances of re-victimisation.223  Much research has been undertaken on the effect of childhood 
victimisation on subsequent victimisation. One such study found that about one third of child 
sexual abuse victims had a two to three times greater risk of adult victimisation than women 
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without a history of child sexual abuse.224   Additionally, a study by Cathy Widom compared a 
group of physically and sexually abused children with matched controls and followed them 
into adulthood.  Results provide strong support for the theory that childhood victimisation 
leads to increased risks for lifetime re-victimisation.225  However, the findings also showed that 
this does not extend to all types of victimisation, rather only to what can be described as 
interpersonal violence, for example physical assault or sexual assault.226   Similar studies have 
been undertaken to investigate the effect of adulthood abuse, and have found that those who 
have experienced victimisation are more likely to be repeatedly victimised and to experience a 
range of crimes.227  One study that researched women with a history of sexual assault in 
childhood, adulthood or both life phases, found that victims of sexual assault in both life 
phases were more likely to report multiple traumatic events, PTSD and mental health service 
seeking than victims of sexual assault in one life phase.228    
 
Additionally, not only are people with mental health problems at high risk of victimisation, as 
discussed above, but for some, the impact of the crime may also be more substantial. 
Compared to victims who did not have mental health problems, victims with serious mental 
illness were more likely to suffer ‘social, psychological and physical adverse effects’ as a result 
of the crime,229 and their existing disorders may also be exacerbated.230  The impact of sexual 
violence is particularly serious, with 40 per cent of women who experienced this having 
attempted suicide as a result.231  The most common negative effect of crime was on victims’ 
emotional well-being.232  Many described their mental health as deteriorating, with some 
individuals being admitted into hospital.  This can then increase their chances of re-
victimisation, as they are more vulnerable as a result of their worsening mental health.  As one 
respondent described;  
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[I was] always […] getting drunk by myself […] because I felt really alone […] I saw my 
ex, the guy I was with who thought I’d cheated on him by being raped […] and just 
seeing him, hit me like a ton of bricks […] And what do I do when I have negative 
emotions, I go and get drunk, and I went to a fish and chip shop, the people working 
there said something like “oh, we’ve got some weed in the back, do you want some?” I 
really wanted to just obliterate my mind so I said yes.  And agreed to go to the back 
and […] the next thing you know, I have men having sex with me in turn and I don’t 
remember how I got there, I don’t remember saying yes. […] I don’t remember if 
protection was used.  At that time I didn’t really care […] I felt like people weren’t 
taking me seriously with my depression because it was invisible so I had set out to try 
and catch AIDS […] I figured that if I had this terminal condition […] then people will 
take my suffering seriously.233 
  
In summary, the evidence can be split into two parts.  Firstly, the chances of being re-
victimised following initial victimisation, particularly sexual abuse, are high.  The reason for 
this is not clear, and requires further research. However, some commentators have argued that 
it may be because perpetrators of abuse are skilled at identifying, tracking and targeting 
women who show signs of vulnerability. 234  Secondly, the chances of being re-victimised 
following initial victimisation for those with mental health problems are also high, as 
victimisation can lead to worsening mental health and therefore increased vulnerability.   
 
1.3 CONCLUSION  
 
The overwhelming majority of evidence points towards widespread stigmatisation of mental 
illness, affecting the everyday lives of those with a mental health problem, from employment 
to aspects of their personal life.  It is clear that there is a general lack of understanding of what 
different mental illnesses involve, and how these can affect a person’s functioning.  
Additionally, the historical association between female sexuality and madness, and the 
subsequent belief in false accusations as a result of mental illness, remain an important 
background to rape trials.  Together, this could translate to juries giving a lot of weight to 
mental health evidence and potentially viewing the complainant as less reliable as a result. 
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However, it is also clear that research on mental health may point to the opposite conclusion.  
Rather than mental health problems meaning the complainant is automatically less reliable, it 
may actually mean she is more vulnerable to victimisation and re-victimisation.  Therefore she 
is increasingly likely to have been the victim of rape.  Furthermore, evidence of mental health 
problems after the alleged assault may in fact be evidence of the veracity of the complainant’s 
allegation, as it is clear that sexual assault can have devastating effects on the mental health of 
the victim. For these reasons, evidence of a complainant’s mental health history is more likely 
to contribute to confusion and prejudice than shed light on the veracity of her account. 
 
Following this, it is argued that the law should be strict on allowing use of mental health 
records by the defence in court, to prevent such prejudices and myths entering the courtroom.  
However, this is not the case.  The next chapter will examine the ways in which the law on 
pre-trial disclosure of such evidence is in fact failing to protect those with past or present 
mental health problems.  
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CHAPTER 2: MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS IN THE 
COURTROOM 
 
Rape trials are beset with misinformation and mythology,1 and there is a long history of trying 
to impeach the credibility of complainants by invoking misogynist stereotypes about women. 
This is often effective as the accused and the complainant are competing in a contest of 
credibility as there are rarely any other witnesses.  A claim by the accused that the sexual 
contact did not happen, or more frequently, that it was consensual, is essentially an attack on 
the credibility of the complainant.2   ‘Rape shield’ laws have attempted to restrict the use of 
sexual history evidence to protect complainants,3 however this was not entirely successful and 
was subsequently broadened in R v A.4 In comparison to the wealth of academic literature on 
sexual history evidence,5 the use of mental health records has received very little attention to 
date, and thus there is a real risk that evidence in personal records becomes another, or 
alternative, source of humiliation, as it has in Canada and Australia. 
 
Although no jurisdiction follows Wigmore’s lead in mandating psychiatric examinations for 
every accuser,6 defendants may request disclosure of documents to enable cross-examination as 
to a complainant’s mental health history.  The range of medical records that the defence 
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might seek to recover in sexual offence prosecutions is very broad,7 including historical 
records, or counselling records made after the offence occurred. Given the wide stigmatisation 
of mental health problems, the introduction of such evidence is particularly problematic, and 
provides another method for myths to be introduced into the courtroom.  
 
This chapter will discuss the law relating to disclosure of such material.  As women with 
mental health problems are significantly more likely to be sexually assaulted than other 
women,8 the role of the law is important because the failure to provide an effective response to 
such assaults has the potential to reinforce the status of women with mental issues as targets 
for abuse.9  This thesis will argue that judges have a very broad discretion in the determination 
of disclosure disputes, and that notions of relevance are often distorted by myths and 
stereotypes.  Additionally, the use of such material has an adverse impact, further reinforcing 
these myths and stereotypes.  Furthermore, it will pay particular attention to the way in which 
the complainant’s interests are represented within a disclosure dispute, and how these can be 
viewed within the context of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  It will then examine the law 
in practice, arguing that judges are often overly permissive in admitting evidence of the 
complainant’s psychiatric history.  Additionally, it will consider how defence lawyers use such 
evidence, arguing that disclosure can create prejudice and confusion for the jury, rather than 
assisting the court in its fact-finding role. Finally, it will argue that applications for access to 
records have a differential adverse impact on groups of women whose lives are more likely to 
be heavily documented, including women with mental health issues.10   
2.1 PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE  
 
The law relating to disclosure of material such as mental health records is complex, and has 
been criticised as ‘illogical’ and ‘arbitrary’.11  This section will aim to outline the law in this 
area, before analysing in more detail the dual disclosure system, whereby the relevant test 
depends on who has seen it; the disclosure tests themselves and how issues of relevance are 
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decided; and the regime for resisting disclosure.  Where such records are in the hands of the 
prosecution, then the disclosure regime that applies to all prosecution material applies here as 
well.  But where such records are not in the hands of the prosecution, but rather still with the 
third party, a separate procedure applies if the defence seeks access and cannot obtain 
voluntary disclosure.  These will each be examined in turn. 
 
2.1.1 THE DISCLOSURE PROCEDURE  
 
The disclosure regime used when records are in the hands of the prosecution is set out in the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), as amended by the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. This is likely to be relevant when the victim or witness gives qualified consent to 
access to records, allowing their medical or counselling history to be disclosed to the police 
and prosecutor but not to the defence. The test in s3 states that material fulfils the test if and 
only if it might ‘reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution 
against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused’, save to the extent that the court 
orders it is not in the public interest to disclose it.12  It was stated in R v H and C13 that: 
 
[F]airness ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution that weakens 
its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied upon as part of the formal 
case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence … The Golden Rule is 
that full disclosure of such material should be made.14  
 
This rule has been confirmed in the Judicial Protocol on the Disclosure of Unused Material 
In Criminal Cases.15  The protocol also states that requests for disclosure should be rejected if 
they are not referable to any issue in the case,16 and it has been stated that ‘[t]he trial process is 
not well served if the defence are permitted to make general and unspecified allegations and 
then seek far-reaching disclosure in the hope that material may turn up to make them good’.17    
 
When considering if material fulfils the disclosure test, the prosecution may make an 
application for non-disclosure in the public interest. This requires the court to perform a 
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balancing exercise, ‘balancing on the one hand the desirability of protecting the public interest 
in the absence of the disclosure against, on the other hand, the interests of justice’ in the 
sense of fairness to the defendant.18  Further guidelines are set out in R v H and C, in the form 
of a set of questions for judges to address.19   If it is considered that material may weaken the 
prosecution case, then judges must ask if there is a risk of serious prejudice to an important 
public interest. If yes, can the defendant’s interest be protected without disclosure or 
disclosure be ordered to an extent that will give adequate protection to the public interest in 
question and also afford adequate protect to the interests of the defence?  If limited disclosure 
is ordered, judges must consider whether the effect is to render the trial process, as a whole, 
unfair to the defendant. If this is the case, then fuller disclosure should be ordered even if this 
leads to the prosecution discontinuing proceedings to avoid having to make a disclosure.  
While the categories of public interest are ‘not closed’,20 it has been held that public interest 
immunity does apply to counselling records,21 on the basis that it ‘does fall within the category 
of “sensitive material”’ and ‘there are sound and obvious reasons for holding that documents 
such as this should not ordinarily be disclosed’.22 
 
If a victim or witness does not consent to the release of their medical records, the prosecution 
will need to consider whether to make further enquiries, bearing in mind that if they are 
granted access to material, it is also much more likely to end up in the hands of the defence.23 
The defence can also make their own enquiries unrelated to that of the prosecution.  There is 
no specific procedure for disclosure of material held by third parties in criminal proceedings, 
however, s2 of the Criminal Proceedings (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 provides that 
‘where the crown court is satisfied that (a) a person is likely to be able to give evidence likely to 
be material evidence, or produce any document or thing likely to be material evidence … and 
(b) the person will not voluntarily attend as a witness or will not voluntarily produce the 
document of thing … in such cases the Crown shall issues a summons’.24  So therefore, where 
the third party in question declines to allow inspection of the material, or requires the 
prosecution or defence to obtain an order before providing copies, the prosecutor or defence 
will need to consider whether it is appropriate to obtain a witness summons under this act.  
                                                      
18 R v Governor of Brixton Prison Ex Parte Osman [1992] 1 All ER 108 at [116] 
19 R v H and C (n13) at [155]-[156]; for full details see Appendix 2 
20 D v NSPCC [1977] 1 All ER 589 at [605] per Lord Halisham 
21 R v Azmy [1996] 7 Med LR 415 at [420] 
22 Ibid, at [54] 
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Public interest immunity issues may also arise in this context, if a third party or the 
prosecution seeks to resist a witness summons.  In this case, the court does not have to engage 
in the balancing act described above until it has first been decided whether or not the 
evidence is ‘material’.25 
 
The critical issue at the hearing of an application of a witness summons is whether the 
documents concerned contain evidence that is ‘material’ to the case.  The meaning of the 
word ‘material’ was first discussed in R v Derby Magistrates Court ex parte B,26 in the context of 
s97 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980. This deals with disclosure applications in the 
Magistrates Court, however it has previously been held that jurisprudence on s97 applies 
equally to s2 of the Criminal Proceedings (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1985.  In Derby, it 
was held that s97 was not to be used to obtain discovery of documents for use in cross-
examination.27 This was later upheld in R v Reading Justices ex parte Berkshire Country Council,28 
which found that material evidence documents must not only be relevant to the issues raised 
in the criminal proceedings but also admissible as such evidence.  Documents that are merely 
desired for the purpose of possible cross-examination are not admissible in evidence and thus 
are not material.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal have held that before taking steps to 
obtain third party material, it must be shown that there was not only a suspicion that the third 
party had relevant material, but also a suspicion that the material held by the third party was 
likely to satisfy the disclosure test.29   
 
Additionally, it was held in R v Stafford Crown Court 30  that due to procedural fairness, 
complainants’ should be given notice of an application and have the opportunity to make 
representations if she wished before the witness summons was made. This resulted in the 
drafting of part 28 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, now restated in the Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2014, which requires the court to consider the rights of those to whom the 
confidential information relates before a witness can be required to give evidence about them.  
This goes some way towards allowing those whose records are sought to have their wishes 
expressed to the court and taken into account, and has equal application in respect of 
applications made by the defence to access such third party material by way of witness 
summons.  
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To summarise, in the case of material in the hands of a third party, there is essentially a two-
stage process. The first stage requires the defence to satisfy the materiality test from Reading 
Justices, and the second stage involves the court performing the balancing act required by 
public interest immunity (PII).  When material is in the hands of the prosecution, there are 
still two elements that must be satisfied: the disclosure test in s3 CPIA, and the PII balancing 
act.  However, this is not so clear-cut in terms of satisfying one stage before moving on to the 
next.  
2.1.2 DISCLOSURE UNDER S3 CPIA VERSUS THE MATERIALITY TEST AND THE 
CREDIBILITY RULE 
 
The current laws on disclosure have been criticised as operating erratically,31 as it seems that 
the procedure depends upon not the content of the record, but rather the technicality of who 
holds the record, and who has seen it.  
Where a prosecutor suspects that a third party has material or information that might satisfy 
the s3 disclosure test if in the hands of the prosecution, they will have to consider whether it is 
appropriate to seek access to the material or information.  This decision is made more 
complex by the fact that if the prosecution does obtain disclosure of such documents, 
disclosure to the defence becomes far more likely.  This is because courts have interpreted s2 
of the Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 as requiring a more stringent 
test of materiality than merely ‘assisting the defence’, as in s3 CPIA.32  Thus documents are 
subject to higher scrutiny under this materiality test;33 they must be not only relevant to the 
issues at trial, but also immediately admissible in evidence.  
Courts have attempted to solve this conflict in Brushett,34 although not entirely successfully. In 
this case, the accused was charged with offences involving sexual abuse of children in a 
children’s home.  The Court of Appeal noted that there were two lines of ‘irreconcilable’ 
authority on third party disclosure: the disclosure test under s3 CPIA applied to third party 
documents already seen by the prosecution and the materiality test from Reading Justices and 
approved in Derby applied to uninspected documents remaining in the possession of the third 
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party.35  At first instance, the judge decided to allow disclosure of documents suggesting that 
the complainants had been sexually abused previously and had made false allegations.  Public 
interest immunity was claimed in respect of all records, both those in the prosecution’s 
keeping and those still with the social services department.  However, the judge decided that 
since the prosecution held some of the documents, it would be unfair to the defence to have 
to satisfy the demands of the materiality test in Reading Justices, as this was likely to result in 
little, if any, disclosure.  Instead, he proceeded directly to the second stage, performing the 
balancing act required by the PII claim on all the material. This resulted in disclosure of all 
the documents.  The judge emphasised that if none of the material had previously been 
disclosed to the prosecution, the test in Reading Justices would have applied, but no other 
reason was given for his approach.  Furthermore, he advocated for a flexible approach, stating 
that he believed that there were two categories of documents which would not normally be 
disclosed under the materiality test, but that if he ‘saw anything like that on the files, it would 
be immediately disclosed’.36   These categories were previous false allegations and previous 
similar sexual activity with another adult.  The Court of Appeal approved the decision, 
suggesting that this evidence had a bearing on the reliability of the complainants, and that the 
judge’s approach was ‘eminently sensible and pragmatic’.37 
This has subsequently been interpreted in Doski38 as ‘making clear that disclosure should be 
granted where there had been alleged false allegations by the subject of the report, or where 
there had been sexual activity with another adult’.39 This is problematic as it appears that 
disclosure of evidence of false allegations or past sexual activity has been ‘elevated to the status 
of an established clear exception’40 to the rule that evidence is not admissible if it relates to 
cross-examination on reliability.  Almost invariably, the defence’s purpose in using evidence of 
allegedly false allegations or of previous sexual activity with another person would be to attack 
the complainant’s credibility,41 so it should fall within the non-disclosure rule. It also implies 
that s41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 can be circumvented if such 
evidence is contained in mental health records. Given this section was enacted in an attempt 
to curb the use of sexual history evidence, it is unlikely that the courts intended to license 
fishing expeditions into women’s previous sexual experiences whenever records might be 
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available, just because she has been in contact with social services or counsellors.42 It is argued 
that this exception needs to be reversed.  Furthermore, the law would benefit from having one 
rule relating to disclosure, whether the evidence is in the hands of the prosecution or a third 
party, that is applied strictly and does not allow for fishing expeditions to find evidence that 
can be used to malign the complainant’s credibility.  
2.1.3 ‘MATERIAL’ EVIDENCE AND THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE  
 
Despite the term ‘material’ being crucial to the disclosure of third party documents, there is 
no statutory definition of the term.  As stated above, it has been held that ‘material’ 
documents must be relevant to the issues at trial and admissible as evidence. However, what is 
‘relevant’ has not been explored, despite being a deeply contested issue in the literature 
concerning rape trials,43 and the source of much disagreement over the introduction of sexual 
history evidence.44  This is also true of the disclosure test in s3 CPIA, where there are no 
guidelines on what sort of material is relevant in relation to weakening the prosecution case or 
strengthening the defence case. The decision about disclosure or admissibility of records 
therefore turns on the exercise of judicial or prosecutorial discretion, 45  and so may be 
dependent on the views of the particular individual.46 The result of this is that sensitive and 
personal information such as mental health history could be characterised as material and 
relevant information, when arguably it should not be.   
 
While judicial discretion remains a useful tool, Jennifer Temkin points out that it does leave 
admissibility regimes at the ‘mercy of any prejudiced assumptions a judge may have’,47 and 
Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dube has observed that decisions of relevance are ‘particularly 
vulnerable to the application of private beliefs’.48  Therefore, while relying on logic, common 
sense and experience may be unproblematic in many contexts, ‘many judicial officers remain 
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uninformed about the issues affecting complainants in sexual assault trials’,49 and mental 
illness in particular is an area where this may be infected by stereotype and myth,50 as 
demonstrated in Chapter One.  Indeed, in the Canadian context, academics have concluded 
that disclosure decisions operate to reinforce rape myths in the same way that admissibility 
decisions relating to a complainant’s sexual history do.51     
 
Furthermore, as noted in relation to sexual history evidence, leaving relevance determinations 
to male judges can solidify a ‘male perspective to questions of relevance’, 52  which may 
undervalue women’s experiences and interests.53  Further to the commentary around R v A, 
there are additional instances where a woman’s perspective has offered a markedly different 
approach: this is also illustrated through Lord Walker’s comments in Stack v Dowden,54 where 
he stated that Baroness Hale’s perception of the ‘human and social issues involved’ in the case 
was so useful that he ‘set aside as redundant most of the opinion’ he had previously 
prepared.55   It is therefore problematic that overall, just over a quarter of judges are female,56 
meaning that the majority of cases will be heard by a male judge. Additionally, female judges 
are still concentrated in the younger age bands and lower levels of the judiciary: only eight out 
of thirty eight Court of Appeal judges are women,57 and the Supreme Court is currently made 
up of just one female and eleven male justices.58 Unless this changes, future precedent is 
highly likely to be set by at least a majority male bench. While judicial gender diversity at all 
levels remains the same, women’s experiences may not be properly and fully considered when 
decisions on the admissibility of mental health records are being made.  
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In relation to s3 CPIA, this ‘vests an enormous discretion in the prosecution both as to any 
assessment of relevance of the material concerned and also as to the impact that such material 
might have on the outcome of the case’.59  A major concern of commentators, which is 
demonstrated by Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson’s empirical study,60 is that no matter 
how professional a prosecutor is, this decision still relies on a subjective assessment of 
relevance,61 thus may be a source of injustice for the same reasons as above. Additionally, it 
has been commented that in reality it is the police who retain ultimate influence in this 
scenario.  The prosecution makes the decision to disclose based on the material generated by 
the attitudes and mythologies of others,62 thus ‘in most cases, the issue of what material is to 
be disclosed … will be made by the police’.63  Research into police attitudes relating to rape 
complainants, and those who are mentally ill, is not favourable, and often shows that they do 
subscribe to rape myths,64 which may influence assessments of relevance. 
 
Additionally, there is little guidance to be derived from decided cases as to the question of 
relevance of mental health history. For example, in R v Tine,65 the Court of Appeal upheld a 
trial judge’s decision to disallow questioning on the basis that the defence had insufficient 
material to justify an exploration of the psychiatric history of a burglary victim.  But no 
guidance was offered on the issue of relevance, nor did the court draw attention to the 
potential prejudicial effect attached to psychiatric evidence and how this might be 
appropriately addressed when determining whether cross-examination should be permitted on 
this basis. Without guidance, it is very difficult for judges to determine what evidence is 
relevant, and therefore ‘material’.  As Fiona Raitt points out in relation to jurors, but which 
also applies to individuals in the judiciary, it is not within common knowledge to be able to 
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assess what effect, if any, a common illness such as depression might have on the credibility or 
reliability of a witness.66  Neither are they equipped to assess the impact of a complainant’s 
referral to counselling for self-harm or the probative value of medications prescribed years 
earlier, to name but a few examples.  
 
While documents containing information relating to the mental health of a complainant may 
be relevant in some cases, it is argued that this is not often. Women with mental health issues, 
who often lead heavily documented lives, usually have no opportunity to read what is written 
about them in files, nor do they have an opportunity to correct or contribute to their own 
records.67  When a woman alleges sexual assault, a whole new set of records may be generated 
by those involved in their care, including counsellors.  The problem with introducing such 
records as evidence is that there are basic tenets of psychotherapy that may skew the 
interpretation of the documents.  For example, within the context of therapy, feelings are 
discussed that relate to the inner world of the victim, rather than to the external reality of an 
event.68  Patients are often permitted and sometimes encouraged to ‘discuss fantasies, imagine 
hypothetical scenarios, or enact unlikely role-plays’.69   In relation to counselling records 
following rape, it is a recognised aspect of rape trauma syndrome for victims to blame 
themselves and express feelings of guilt about what has occurred.70  These should not be 
deemed relevant as they are not reliable records of matters at issue in a sexual assault trial. As 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube notes, ‘the vast majority of information noted during therapy sessions 
bears no relevance whatsoever or, at its highest, only an attenuated sense of relevance to the 
issues at trial’.71  Furthermore, the idea that a history of depression or history of suicide 
attempts and overdoses suggest a person is unreliable, unstable, incredible and liable to make 
a false claim is ‘not supported by any medical evidence’.72  Victims and witnesses in other 
crimes are rarely required to show their mental stability to prove their credibility unless their 
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mental capacities are clearly at issue in the case.73  As well as this, questioning relating to 
events or episodes that occurred some years previously taps into the common but erroneous 
view of mental illness as inevitably unremitting.  In reality, evidence of illness that precedes 
the current event or where symptoms are controlled by appropriate treatment is often 
irrelevant.74   
 
In conclusion, there is a stereotyped and flawed understanding both of mental illness and the 
link between mental ill-health and witness credibility.  As a result of this, having wide judicial 
discretion, with very limited guidance, on the issue of what evidence is ‘material’ is 
problematic, and can have serious implications for the fair administration of justice in rape 
cases.  Irrelevant evidence, especially evidence that could mislead or distract the jury, should 
be excluded to protect the integrity of the trial,75 and so introducing mental health records 
which are not directly relevant to the victim’s ability to comprehend and recall the events of 
the sexual assault should not be permitted. 
 
2.1.4 PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY AND THE COMPLAINANT’S INTERESTS 
 
Disclosure of third party documents held either by the prosecution or still in the hands of the 
third party can be resisted by claiming public interest immunity.  The PII regime was approved 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Atlan v United Kingdom. 76   However, it is 
problematic in this context, as it does not offer any obvious protection to the privacy interests 
of the victim or witness, 77  meaning their interests could be ‘heavily compromised’ in 
circumstances in which they have no access to independent legal advice.78   Although these 
arguments were originally made in relation to Scottish law, they apply equally to the current 
situation in England and Wales. 
 
The main concern with the PII regime is that it reduces the complainant’s interests to one of a 
series of interests comprising the ‘public interest’.  Rather than resisting disclosure on the 
basis of the complainant’s privacy rights alone, this argument has to be voiced in relation to 
the ‘public interest’ in keeping medical records confidential to prevent constraining the record 
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keeper, and the ‘public interest’ that victims of rape are not dissuaded from reporting such 
attacks because of a fear that all sorts of confidential information about them will be disclosed 
to the defence and potentially used in open court.79 While these are legitimate arguments, the 
individual complainant’s private rights under the ECHR cannot be canvassed forcefully and 
competitively against other interests,80 and so become lost. 
 
Furthermore, the PII regime means that complainants are compelled to rely on prosecutorial 
discretion to identify sensitive information and seek an application for non-disclosure.  
However, prosecutors are under no obligation to protect the complainant’s privacy, and 
therefore may do nothing to prevent an application. As Raitt suggests, this is increasingly 
likely as applications for non-disclosure will not be a priority for the Crown’s increasingly 
stretched resources, which impose a massive workload on prosecutors.81   Therefore, the third 
party may be left to defend the complainant’s interests, but this is something that they may 
feel ill-equipped for. The likelihood of this is increased by complex procedural rules relating to 
witness summons.82   These provide that if a third party wishes to make representations 
concerning the issue of a witness summons at a hearing, the appropriate court officer must be 
informed within seven days.83  If not, the application is referred straight to the judge who can 
decide on the matter with or without a hearing.84  A counsellor, therapist or doctor who is not 
used to the ways of the court and who is not familiar with this procedure may fail to respond 
within the seven-day deadline.  They may also feel reluctant to appear unrepresented at a 
hearing before a judge, or may be too busy.85  Evidence from Jennifer Temkin and Barbara 
Krahé’s research also suggests that local authorities have different practices with regard to PII, 
and that some will never bother to claim it, while others will hand over any material requested 
by the defence to the judge without the need for any application to be made.86  The result of 
this is that the complainant’s interests may be threatened, and disclosure of personal records 
could become routine.   
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Additionally, it has been held that where the liberty of the defendant is at issue and disclosure 
might be of assistance to the defence, a claim of disclosure would often be strong. 87  
Furthermore, in R v H and C, it was held that, where it is otherwise unavoidable, the accused’s 
right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR must trump the ‘public interest’ in non-
disclosure.88  In light of this, it must be considered whether the complainant’s rights and 
interests are being given enough weight. 
 
2.1.5 COMPLAINANTS’ AND DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS  
 
While disclosure of evidence is a fundamental component of a fair trial, in particular the 
principle of equality of arms, this section will argue that human rights law has developed to 
include victims’ interests, and that this must be taken into account when considering the 
complainants’ right to privacy in relation to medical records.   
 
Defendant and complainant rights, and how best to balance these rights, is an issue that faces 
policy makers in many areas, and whether the right balance has yet been achieved is a much-
discussed issue in England and Wales at the moment.89  Research has suggested that there is a 
strong perception among victims that defendants have more rights within the criminal justice 
system,90 and in the context of defence access to counselling records, the assiduity with which 
some judges scrutinised files for material which in their view could be useful to the defence in 
undermining the credibility of the complainant91 does give rise to some concern in relation to 
issues of fairness between complainants and defendants.   
 
Refusing to disclose material to the defence has the potential to violate the accused’s right to a 
fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR. This right has often been described as ‘fundamental 
and absolute’,92 and UK courts have noted that in balancing competing public interests, the 
right to a fair trial is of paramount concern.93  However, British courts have also considered 
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that article 6 can be ‘balanced’ against the interests of other participants in that trial.94  
Hoyano argues that this predilection for ‘balancing’ is fundamentally misconceived,95 as it 
does not state within article 6 that the right to a fair trial is subject to qualification against 
other competing interests, in comparison to other rights, such as those within articles 8-11, 
which do include explicit sub-articles providing for such limitations.96  However, it is suggested 
that it is not about balancing the defendant and complainants’ rights per se, but rather what 
the right to a fair trial actually means.  The metaphor of ‘balance’ is confusing, as it reflects the 
idea that the rights of victims and offenders are strictly oppositional.97 Rather, it is wrong to 
state that the concept of victims’ rights brings about a reduction in the rights of the accused,98 
and that the right to a fair trial is purely about the defendant’s rights.99  Protection of the right 
to a fair trial is important to society as a whole, as we all have an interest in ensuring that trials 
are conducted fairly, and that the innocent are set free and the guilty convicted.100 It therefore 
follows that when determining the scope of the right to a fair trial, the interests of the accused 
are part of a balance to be struck with the victim’s interests, those of the state and society as a 
whole.  This interplay of factors was recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in a 
landmark judgment, Doorson, that read victims’ interests into the fair trials rights found in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  They stated that: 
 
It is true that article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses in general 
[…] to be taken into account.  However, their life, liberty or security may be at stake 
[…] against that background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate 
cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims 
called upon to testify.101 
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As a result, it is important that account be taken of victims’ interests, including their right to 
respect of private life.  Additionally, it has been held by Lord Justice May that the disclosure of 
a complainant’s medical records does engage article 8 of the ECHR,102 and the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR has confirmed that ‘information about the person’s mental health is 
an important element of private life’.103   
 
Furthermore, the article 6 right does not require that any particular rules of evidence are 
followed. 104   The European Court stated that it ‘does not lay down any rules on the 
admissibility of evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under 
national law’.105  Therefore, the article 6(3) right for defendants to call and cross-examine 
witnesses is not absolute.  In Baegen v The Netherlands,106 the Commission took the approach 
that regard should be had to a wide range of factors when considering this issue, and that in 
cases involving rape:  
 
In the assessment of the question whether or not in such proceedings an accused 
received a fair trial, account must be taken of the right to respect for the victim’s 
private life.  Therefore, the Commission accepts that in criminal proceedings 
concerning sexual abuse, certain measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting 
the victim, provided that such measures can be reconciled with an adequate and 
effective exercise of the rights of the defence.107 
 
The Law Commission has advised that there is ‘no explicit right in the Convention to adduce 
whatever evidence the defence wishes to adduce’,108 and therefore the exclusion of relevant 
evidence does not in itself render a trial unfair, rather ‘[i]t depends how relevant the excluded 
evidence is to the crucial issues in the case’.109  Subsequently, Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
also made it clear that the defence does not have an absolute entitlement to full disclosure.110  
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This means that where psychiatric evidence has little bearing on a witness’s credibility, its 
consequent exclusion would be compatible with article 6(3)(d).111   
 
Therefore, the extent of disclosure should be such as to impair the right to privacy as little as 
possible.  The court must consider whether there is a need for interference, and if the means 
employed are proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by the state.112  So while it will 
sometimes be necessary to introduce evidence about a complainant’s mental health, thereby 
constituting a necessary and justified interference with privacy rights, this is not invariably the 
case. Questions that are unnecessarily intrusive, are not strictly relevant and are asked as a 
matter of routine may potentially be in breach of the complainant’s article 8 rights.  
Furthermore, in performing the balancing exercise required for public interest immunity, the 
court should consider whether, given the importance of complainants’ interests within the fair 
trial right, the effects of disclosure of records on the individual would be so severe that it 
would not be justified by the purpose it is intended to serve. All of this must be considered in 
light of the argument that mental health evidence is rarely relevant, and is only viewed as such 
due to discriminatory and stereotypical ideas about mental health and female sexuality.  
 
Where evidence or questioning is not necessary and reaches the requisite threshold of harm, 
article 3, prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, may be directly engaged.  
As article 3 is a non-derogable right, other convention rights, such as the article 6 right to a 
fair trial, would not take precedence.  However, it has been held that disclosure of records 
relating to mental health does not constitute a violation under article 3, as this has too high a 
threshold.113  This case related to a father’s contact with his daughter.  A young woman, X, 
alleged she had been abused by the father, however she did not want to take any further 
action.  Yet, the mother wanted these allegations to be tested and resolved.  X was suffering 
from a long history of physical illness, which worsened as an apparent result of stress relating 
to the pressure arising from the legal issues.  She argued that both disclosure of her social 
services records and requiring her to give evidence in person would interfere with her article 3 
right not to be subject to inhumane or degrading treatment, because of the effect this would 
have on her health.114  Other parties to the case questioned whether mere disclosure can 
amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3.115  The court highlighted that 
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a high threshold was required, going beyond the ‘inevitable element of suffering or 
humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment’.116  Therefore, they required 
attention to be paid to context: not only was the state acting in support of some important 
public interests, X was under the specialist care of a consultant psychiatrist, who would act to 
mitigate further suffering which disclosure may cause. This case is made more complicated by 
the fact that it involved two sets of complex conflicting interests – those of the vulnerable 
young woman who made an allegation in confidence and those of the girl and her parents in 
having the allegation properly investigated and tested.  As Lady Hale stated, the court was 
being asked to ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’.117  However, the basis for the decision that 
disclosure does not reach the threshold for article 3 may be applicable in a wider range of 
cases.    
 
Despite this, article 3 could be engaged indirectly, as Clare McGlynn has argued in relation to 
sexual history evidence.118  Restrictions on the admission of mental health evidence that is not 
strictly relevant may be necessary to ensure compliance with a State’s positive obligations, 
inherent in article 3, to bring perpetrators of rape to justice. States’ human rights obligations 
have changed and developed, moving towards greater responsibility for harms caused by 
private individuals.  One such development is a growing recognition that States need to be 
more proactive in ensuring protection of rights. 119   This has meant that human rights 
obligations on States now extend ‘far beyond the traditional confines of negative rights, 
towards more positive requirements or obligations to take action to secure and protect 
rights’.120 
 
There are two types of situations that have been classified as involving the State’s positive 
obligations.  Firstly, where the State is aware of the harm or possible harm, but fails to take 
action.  An example of this occurred in Z v UK,121 where a local authority failed to take steps 
to protect children known to be at risk of ill-treatment by their parents.  In relation to the 
offence of rape, this situation is most likely to occur in the context of other forms of sexual or 
gender-based violence.122    
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Secondly, and of more relevance here, this doctrine of positive obligations has been deployed 
to bring to account more generic State failures regarding the investigation and prosecution of 
rape.123  This will be applicable where the State was unaware of a particular risk by non-state 
actors, so cannot be held directly responsible for not preventing it.  But it can be held 
responsible for either administrative failings in terms of investigations, or for general 
inadequacies of the legislative framework.124  For example, in X and Y v the Netherlands,125 the 
Dutch state was held to have failed to proscribe to a sufficient extent the rape of a mentally 
disabled individual, and in MC v Bulgaria,126 the Bulgarian state was held responsible for its 
failure to ensure that all rapes were appropriately investigated and proscribed by law.  The 
court acknowledged that States have positive obligations in terms of article 3 to ‘enact 
criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through 
effective investigation and prosecution’.127  Thus the failure in law to proscribe all forms of 
rape violates the positive obligation inherent in article 3.  As Clapham notes, ‘if the national 
criminal system is unable or unwilling to prosecute certain acts of violence, it becomes a 
matter for the European Court of Human Rights, which will hold the State responsible for 
failing to protect individuals from non-state actor violence by ineffectively securing their 
human rights’.128  Thus, to the extent that the admission of mental health evidence impedes 
proper investigation by causing prejudice, restrictions may be justified on this ground.   
 
2.2 THE LAW IN PRACTICE 
 
While there are severe problems with the law itself, there are also issues with the way it is used 
in practice. Disclosure has been described as ‘one of the most important – as well as one of 
the most abused – of the procedures relating to criminal trials’. 129  A range of serious 
misunderstandings exist, relating to the exact scope of material that can be disclosed and the 
role to be played by the judge in ensuring the law is properly applied. Too frequently, 
applications by the parties and decisions made by the judges have been made ‘based either on 
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misconceptions as to the true nature of the law or a general laxity of approach’.130  This 
section will discuss this in greater detail, first considering how frequently third party disclosure 
applications are made and the judicial approach to such applications, and then examining the 
basis on which defence appear to make such applications and how they use the evidence.  
 
2.2.1 FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY DISCLOSURE APPLICATIONS  
 
Canadian research indicates that restrictions on the use of sexual history evidence have 
resulted in an increase in applications for third party disclosure of written records relating to 
the complainant.131 While this area lacks considerable research in England and Wales, this 
strategy has also been documented.132 It has been suggested that applications for disclosure 
have become ‘standard practice’, 133 with judges also agreeing that third party disclosure 
applications are ‘frequent’.134  This thesis will use the existing research to argue that third 
party disclosure applications are made often, and that there is no uniform judicial response to 
such applications, which is troubling. 
 
Although its focus was on sexual history evidence, the Home Office study by Liz Kelly, 
Jennifer Temkin and Sue Griffiths was the first study in England and Wales to investigate the 
extent to which applications for disclosure of confidential records are made in sexual assault 
cases.135 It found that a total of 71 applications were made, out of a case sample of 236.136  
These occurred across 54 separate cases, which is nearly a quarter of the sample. Furthermore, 
the proportion of cases in which applications were made was roughly equal to those in which 
section 41 applications were made. 137  Although the study did not monitor whether 
applications were accepted or not, it did find that in cases where an application was made, 55 
per cent resulted in acquittal, whereas in cases where no application was made, 47 per cent of 
cases resulted in acquittal. 138   Scottish research has found similar results; out of 47 
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applications to introduce prohibited evidence (including sexual history evidence and character 
evidence), a quarter concerned evidence relating to the complainants’ character, which 
includes mental health evidence.139  In addition to this, Canadian research has found that in a 
number of cases, the content of records was used without any reference to a formal 
application being made.140  While research has not been undertaken in England and Wales to 
examine if this is the case here too, it must be considered as a possibility.  In the context of 
sexual history evidence, it certainly is the case that evidence is sometimes introduced without a 
formal s41 application,141 and again, research from Scotland has shown that both sexual 
history evidence and ‘character’ evidence are admitted in the absence of any application.142  
Furthermore, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee has drawn attention to reports it has 
received that applications for the production of confidential documents held, for example, by 
health and local authorities, often were made late.143  While this is objectionable in itself, it 
also raises the possibility of further disobedience of procedural rules. 
 
Temkin and Krahé have undertaken qualitative research, interviewing those within the legal 
profession in relation to third party disclosure applications.  These suggest that there is a 
judicial failure to apply the law properly.  Several judges interviewed in the study stated that 
the courts were willing to accede to disclosure requests on a much broader basis than the case 
law permits, and that the term ‘material evidence’ was being interpreted far more widely than 
the decision in Reading Justices would allow.144  Furthermore, one judge stated that not only 
did he personally ignore the law, but that at the refresher courses judges are required to 
attend, they were asked ‘“How do you approach disclosure in these cases?” and nobody stuck 
by the strict letter of the law at all’.145  Instead, it appears that judges would look for, and then 
order disclosure of, evidence broadly relevant in their view to the complainant’s credibility, or 
material that would be in the interests of the defence to have.146 
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It is also clear that despite the law stating fishing expeditions are not to be accepted, these are 
frequent, with one judge commenting that he believed most applications were fishing 
expeditions.  The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee commented that applications were 
often made ‘without adequate consideration being given to the relevance and admissibility of 
the documents concerned’,147 despite the fact that when one is made, it should identify the 
documents in question and the grounds on which it is believed they are likely to constitute 
material evidence.148 A barrister in Temkin and Krahé’s study also confirmed that fishing 
expeditions were made regularly by defence counsel and that there were frequently no 
problems in getting them accepted.  This may be a result of the fact that there is no uniform 
judicial response to such applications.  While some took a tough approach, others commented 
that fishing expeditions are ‘legitimate’149 or believed that even if they are aware that an 
application was a fishing expedition and therefore improper, if it turns up documents that 
could assist the defence, these should still be disclosed.150   
 
While this research does not mean that records are invariably ordered, produced or disclosed, 
and there may be numerous cases involving complainants with a mental health history where 
applications for third party disclosure have been denied, it is worrying that there is no 
predictable pattern in judicial decision making with respect to such applications. It appears 
that stereotypical beliefs about complainants play a role in the assessments of some judges as 
to what should be disclosed to the defence, and that many differ in their approach to 
disclosure, with some being very lenient.  Furthermore, it is clear that the law, which does not 
offer complainants much protection in the first place, is not being strictly adhered to.  This 
increases the likelihood that use of medical records will become standard practice.  
 
The limited research available also gives an indication as to the types of documents being 
requested.  The Home Office study found that the combination of social service and medical 
records accounted for over 80 per cent of all third party disclosure applications. 151  
Furthermore, interviewees in Temkin and Krahé’s study believed applications were often 
made in the case of child complainants or complainants who were children at the time of the 
alleged abuse, although applications in relation to adult complainants could also occur where 
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there was some psychiatric or medical history.152  Defence would be looking for evidence of 
counselling, mental health problems, previous sexual abuse or previous allegations of abuse.153  
The next section of this chapter will examine how defence aim to use such material.  
 
2.2.2 DEFENCE USE OF MENTAL HEALTH EVIDENCE 
 
In most rape cases, defence arguments focus on the issue of consent.  Where the alleged 
offence occurs in private, as it almost always does, it comes down to the word of the 
complainant against that of the accused.154  Numerous studies have been conducted on the 
range of tactics used to cast doubt on a complainant’s testimony, in particular, testing their 
credibility and consistency as a witness,155 and there has been a lot of research affirming that 
such tactics do impact on (mock) jurors’ perceptions and judgments in rape trials.156  It is 
often with the same purpose of attacking and destroying the complainant’s credibility that the 
defence may seek access to documentation including psychiatric or psychological records, 
reports and notes.  This is likely to prove effective as it taps into common prejudices about 
mental health and the link between mental ill health and witness credibility in ways that 
‘undermine prospects for fair and just outcomes’.157  Furthermore, there is a high probability 
that the cross-examination process will distort or misinterpret information in records. 158 
Defence lawyers have a tendency to exploit the ‘dramatic resonance’ of certain mental 
illnesses, so that they can magnify the impact of the illness to support their assertion of the 
relevance of the records. 159  
 
A complainant might seek advice from a counsellor or therapist in the wake of a sexual 
assault.  Alternatively, she may have received therapy in the past, or received psychiatric 
treatment for mental illness. The assumptions behind requests for disclosure of such records is 
that mental illness affects a person’s ability to provide credible and reliable evidence, and thus 
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it can be used to suggest that the complainant is fabricating the allegation. The defence 
therefore use such evidence to interrogate the complainant’s honesty in several different ways.   
 
One of the more common ways to use mental health evidence is to suggest that the 
complainant is a fantasist, or a disturbed individual, who is confusing illusions and reality.160  
This assumption reflects earlier medical myths about women as prone to hysterical 
delusions,161 and implies a link with ‘hysterical women’ and female sexuality.   Generally, 
while certain mental illnesses may include a tendency to confuse fantasy and fact, it is 
erroneous to suggest that mental illness impairs a person’s ability to differentiate between the 
two.162  Yet the attitude that the defence is trying to encourage in the jury is one of disbelief in 
these women, similar to the idea that ‘hysterics shout, much ado about nothing’.163 
 
Similarly, if the complainant has been raped before, defence may use counselling or medical 
notes relating to the historic abuse to suggest that the traumatic effects of this have left the 
complainant unable to distinguish between the previous assault and the consensual sex she 
was having with the defendant.164  For example, when a complainant has been diagnosed with 
post-traumatic stress disorder, defence lawyers have proposed that flashbacks to a prior sexual 
assault could have caused confusion between consensual sexual intercourse and rape on the 
occasion in question.165  However, this is based on a misconception about the nature of 
flashbacks.  While these may be consuming and painful, they are not hallucinations, and a 
person who experiences a previous traumatic event is aware of their pathological nature, as 
opposed to a person suffering from a psychotic delusion who lacks insight into the nature of 
the problem.166  Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that rape victims experience confusion 
between traumatic flashbacks and contemporaneous encounters.    
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Counselling records made after the alleged rape also provide a novel ground for ‘repackaging 
defence claims of fabricated allegations’.167  The defence may attempt to suggest that the 
complainant’s memory has been distorted or falsified by the type of counselling employed,168 
which may prove effective if couched in scientific terms relating to ‘false memory syndrome’, 
discussed in chapter one.  This phenomenon could be inappropriately used to discredit large 
categories of complainants, even though only a small proportion apparently recover memories 
in therapy.169  Furthermore, they may seek to adduce statements made during counselling in 
which the complainant explores her own feelings of guilt and shame, in an effort to show that 
either she wanted sex to occur, or that her conduct led the accused to mistakenly believe she 
was consenting.170  This allows for an introduction of rape myths into the courtroom. 
 
The defence may also seek to demonstrate that the complainant is ‘emotionally unstable’ as a 
result of mental illness, and therefore more likely to fabricate the allegation. This is one of the 
natural implications that follow from cross-examination as to a history of treatment for mental 
or emotional problems.  A Dispatches documentary monitored every rape trial in England and 
Wales over a two-week period (about 30), and carried out a survey of 120 women who said 
they had been raped in the last five years. This provides some examples of the types of 
questions put to rape complainants during cross-examination.  One woman descried how the 
defence raised the fact that she had experienced post-natal depression in an attempt to 
impugn her credibility, and it seems that this evidence was deemed relevant as if it alone could 
supply a satisfactory motive for fabrication.171  The trial judge also adhered to this view, 
referring directly to the complainant’s depression in his summing up, where he noted that it 
had caused her to have ‘mood swings’.172   It reality, mood disorders do not typically cause a 
complainant to have difficulty remembering events or relating testimony in a truthful way,173 
and it is estimated that one in five will suffer from a depressive illness at some point in their 
life.174  As the woman herself stated, ‘my depression’s controlled by anti-depressants.  I do 
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everything just like a normal person, I am a normal person’.175  The defendant in this case was 
found not-guilty. Another case involved a complainant who had self-harmed ten years prior to 
the case.176  This was brought up in court to attempt to supply jurors with an explanation as to 
why a woman would not only fabricate an allegation of rape, but would also subject herself to 
demeaning and violent sexual encounters.  Yet, typically, those who engage in self-harm do so 
privately, and attempt to conceal it.  It is not a means of manipulation but a way of coping 
with acute stress and other strong emotions.177  By using such evidence, defence lawyers are 
feeding into ‘the common prejudices and myths about people with mental illness’.178  
 
While further research is needed to work out ways in which assessments of credibility and 
reliability of complainants are made in cases involving complainants with mental health 
problems, findings from mock juror studies suggest that certain case characteristics, such as 
the complainant’s consumption of intoxicants or incomplete recall in her account can damage 
her credibility in the eyes of the (mock) jurors.179  Therefore, it is likely that evidence relating 
to past or present mental health problems will have a similar, if not more, damaging effect, as 
jurors are likely to attach exaggerated significance to psychiatric evidence. Furthermore, use of 
such evidence reinforces several rape myths, such as the myths relating to false allegations and 
women fantasising about rape, and the idea that ‘mad women can’t be raped’.180  Additionally, 
it introduces a false identification of mental illness.  
 
2.3 THE EFFECTS OF ALLOWING MENTAL HEALTH EVIDENCE  
 
Allowing mental health evidence has several consequences for rape trials, such as the 
enhanced ‘secondary victimisation’, which is something that has already been discussed in 
great detail in relation to rape trials generally, and the use of sexual history evidence more 
specifically.  Furthermore, there are several consequences that flow from the (rational) fear 
that mental health evidence will be disclosed. These include a reluctance to report, which may 
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serve to increase the chances that those with mental health problems become victimised in the 
first place, a reluctance to disclose information relating to mental health problems when 
reporting, and a potential altering of the client/counsellor relationship, which in the worst 
case scenario, may manifest in complainants having concerns about remaining in therapy at 
all.181 These will each be discussed in turn. 
 
2.3.1 SECONDARY VICTIMISATION 
 
A wealth of research has highlighted that victims find giving evidence ‘gruelling at best’,182 and 
cross-examination has been described as ‘secondary victimisation’,183 with many likening it to a 
repeat of the initial violation. 184    It has been noted that events that lead to victims 
experiencing such intense negative emotions include having friends, family members and the 
general public see and hear them talk about intimate violation,185 and it is argued here that 
this is worsened by also having their psychiatric history made public and used against them. As 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube has observed: 
 
[T]hese people must contemplate the threat of disclosing to the very person accused of 
assaulting them in the first place, and quite possibly in open court, records containing 
intensely private aspects of their lives, possibly containing thoughts and statements 
which have never even been shared with the closest of family and friends.186 
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For example, one of the woman on the Dispatches documentary stated that her reaction when 
her GP told her he had to give up her medical records was outrage, as ‘they’re very private, 
personal things, your medical records.  It’s like reading your personal diary and they’ve no 
right to do that’.187  If the records sought were made after the rape, it is possible that 
complainants are further psychologically traumatised by the knowledge that the accused may 
find out about the effects of the assault.188  In the Australian context, one woman described 
how she ‘felt sick when this happened, because he was allowed to have access to my thoughts 
and fears … all the things I had discussed with my counsellor’.189  Another woman commented 
that it ‘was like having him invade my life again’.190  This distress is more extreme when the 
victim does not know her medical records are going to be brought up in court. Although this 
should be prevented by part 28 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, if evidence is indeed 
adduced without a formal application, suggested as a possibility above, then this could occur.  
Victim Support reported a case in which a complainant’s confidential psychiatric records 
were, unbeknown to her, discussed in open court while family members sat in the public 
gallery, and commented on how this caused her ‘intense dismay’.191 
 
Furthermore, if the woman is suffering from a mental health problem at the time, disclosing 
her mental health evidence and allowing it to be discussed in court may be more distressing to 
her than otherwise, depending on the nature and severity of the condition.  Additionally, 
subjecting such women to rigorous cross-examinations with repeated and leading questions, in 
a confrontational and often accusatory manner, may make them less able to get their story 
heard,192 and so may interfere with the fact-finding role of the court. While it is a very varied 
group of complainants, and so it would be wrong to assume that every complainant has 
precisely the same difficulties or needs,193 the available social science literature supports the 
view that witnesses with mental health problems are able to give accurate, useful and truthful 
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evidence that furthers the truth seeking process, but that their ability to do so may be 
hindered by current cross-examination practices.194  
 
As one of the main purposes of the current rape shield law is to protect witnesses from 
intrusive and humiliating cross-examination, it is reasoned that the same argument can be 
made for evidence of psychiatric history.  
 
2.3.2 DETERRING REPORTING AND/OR DISCLOSURE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS  
 
Fear of not being believed or of attacks on their credibility during cross-examination is already 
a renowned disincentive for those considering whether to report a sexual assault.195  The 
chance that victims with a psychiatric history will have to answer questions on their mental 
health, and may be discredited on this basis, may be yet another reason not to report an 
assault.  For example, 30 per cent of respondents to a Mind study elected to tell no one of 
their assault, for fear that involvement in the criminal justice system would expose them to 
further discrimination or vulnerability.196  This is neither in the public interest nor in the 
interests of justice.  The Canadian experience has shown similar concerns over the possibility 
of records disclosure, with women saying ‘that they were unwilling to risk being re-victimised 
by “being put under a microscope during the trial”’.197 
 
Furthermore, victims have no adequate assurance of how their privacy interests will be 
safeguarded in this scenario,198 and may be afraid that the decision whether to allow defence 
access to records will be made without taking their view into account,199 leading to private 
information becoming public knowledge.  They may also have concerns about the potential 
detrimental impact that involvement in the criminal process could consequently have on their 
mental health.200  This may affect victims’ decision-making, from the decision to report to 
                                                      
194 Mark Kebbell, Christopher Hatton and Shane Johnson, ‘Witnesses with Intellectual 
Disabilities in Court: What Questions Are Asked and What Influence Do They Have?’ (2004) 
9(1) Legal and Criminological Psychology 23, 23 
195 Regan and Kelly, Rape: Still a Forgotten Issue (n183) 8 
196 Mind, Another Assault: Mind's Campaign for Equal Access to Justice for People with Mental 
Health Problems (London: Mind, 2007) 9 
197 Tina Hattem, Research Report: Survey of Sexual Assault Survivors (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice, Canada, 2000) 15 
198 Raitt, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’ (n43) 55 
199 McDonald, ‘Resisting Defence Access to Counselling Records in Cases of Sexual 
Offending’ (n181) 15 
200 M Pedlar, S Baker and C Williams, Silenced Witnesses (London: Mind, 2000) cited in Ellison 
et al, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial Disability and Rape Victimisation’ (n157) 6; 
  71 
their appearance in court.201 It will have a detrimental impact on a particularly vulnerable 
group of people who have had contact with mental health services at some point in their lives, 
and whose decision to withdraw from the criminal justice system may reinforce their already 
vulnerable status.202 
 
Moreover, even if the rape itself is reported, fear of the use of psychiatric records may deter 
victims from disclosing their mental health problems as they do not want it being used against 
them or affecting their credibility.  This may result in them not receiving adequate support 
that they are entitled to, including practical support such as special measures, 203  and 
emotional support such as counselling.  
 
While there is limited research specifically concerned with the experiences of court users with 
mental health conditions, findings indicate that where court users were not assured their 
condition would be treated sympathetically, were unsure of its relevance to the situation, or 
were concerned that the information would discredit their evidence, they were less likely to 
disclose it.204  Additionally, those with mental health conditions tended to be more reluctant 
than other groups, such as those with learning disabilities, to disclose their condition, because 
they believed that doing so would negatively impact on their case.205 As one court user stated, 
‘I didn’t really want to mention my suicidal tendencies or depression; my brother said it 
wouldn’t help my case’.206  Another commented that she was ‘frightened that all my mental 
health issues would come out, and my drugs and medication would be seized on, and it would 
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be used against me’.207  This is problematic, as it may prevent complainants getting the 
support that they might need. As the police and CPS are the first points of contact for a 
complainant,208 and are under an obligation to identify ‘vulnerable or intimidated victims’,209 
court staff, legal representatives and the judiciary often work on the assumption that the 
police and witnesses care unit have already identified eligible vulnerable witnesses.210  They 
suggested that if a mental health condition was not picked up during contact with these 
practitioners, it was unlikely to be thereafter as there was no other agency that had direct 
contact. 211    However, research suggests that police officers have difficulty identifying 
vulnerable witnesses in practice, particularly those with mental disorders.212  Practitioners 
across the board suggested that they lack the necessary skills to identify a condition 
themselves,213 and thus they are heavily reliant on individuals choosing to self-disclose. 
 
If a current mental health condition is not disclosed to police or the CPS, complainants who 
may benefit from support fail to receive it.  This encompasses practical support, which 
includes general assistance and care required to enable full engagement with, and 
understanding of, the case, and emotional support, which consists of the care provided to 
court users to ensure their emotional well-being and confidence.  Overall, practical and 
emotional support received in criminal cases was viewed positively by court users and 
practitioners,214 and those complainants who felt supported were more likely to continue with 
the case.215  Furthermore, where legal representatives were aware of the court users’ needs and 
took steps to ensure they understood what was happening, court users reported feeling 
respected and listened to, and as a result, they were generally more positive about their court 
                                                      
207 Rosie McLeod et al, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning 
Disabilities and Limited Mental Capacity Report 2: Before Court (London: Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Justice Research Series 9/10, 2010) 34 
208 Ibid, 31 
209 Home Office, Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Home Office, 2013) 32 
210 McLeod et al, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities 
and Limited Mental Capacity Report 2 (n207) 33 
211 Ibid 
212 Mandy Burton, Roger Evans and Andrew Sanders, ‘Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses 
and the Adversarial Process in England and Wales’ (2007) 11(1) International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof 1, 7 
213 McLeod et al, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities 
and Limited Mental Capacity Report 2 (n207) 39 
214 Ibid, 18 
215 Ibid, 16 
  73 
experience.216 Even those with milder conditions, who did not disclose, regretted this because 
they would have wished for support if they had known it was available.217 
 
Ultimately, complainants appear to be aware that informing the police or CPS that they have 
a mental health condition may lead to such evidence being disclosed, and therefore choose to 
keep it quiet.  However, this means they cannot access support which may make the process 
easier for them, and may also increase the chances that they will be able to give the best 
evidence they can.  It is therefore argued that if the laws around disclosure of mental health 
evidence were stricter, and notions of relevance were not distorted, complainants may feel 
more comfortable informing those within the criminal justice system that they have a mental 
health issue and require support.  
 
2.3.3 ALTERING THE CLIENT/COUNSELLOR RELATIONSHIP 
 
It is clear from literature discussed in chapter one that sexual assault is particularly detrimental 
to women’s mental health.  Yet, if victims have received counselling to assist them to come to 
terms with what has happened, and deal with any resulting mental health issues, ‘the 
counsellors’ notes will be unused material, which may fall to be disclosed’.218  As complainants 
should be encouraged to obtain counselling as part of their recovery, and evidence suggests 
that such support is an important resource for victims coping with sexual violence,219 this is 
problematic, and could have several consequences.  
 
One such consequence is that if confidential communications are revealed in the courtroom, 
or there is a fear that this will be the case, then relationships within which such confidences 
are imparted with suffer.220  If complainants are not guaranteed confidentiality within a 
counselling relationship, they may be inhibited in their discussions221 and therefore hinder 
                                                      
216McLeod et al, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities 
and Limited Mental Capacity Report 3 (n205) 9 
217 McLeod et al, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities 
and Limited Mental Capacity Report 2 (n207) 37 
218 HMIC/HMCPSI, Without Consent: A Report on the Joint Investigation and Prosecution of Rape 
Offences (London: HMIC, 2007) para 11.12 
219 Sarah Ullman, ‘Correlates and Consequences of Adult Sexual Assault Disclosure’ (1996) 
11 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 554, 562; Catherine Kaukinen and Alfred DeMaris, ‘Sexual 
Assault and Current Mental Health: The Role of Help-Seeking and Police Response’ (2009) 
15(11) Violence Against Women 1331, 1333 
220 Bronitt and McSherry, ‘The Use and Abuse of Counselling Records’ (n161) 266 
221 Ibid 
  74 
their recovery process as they will be unable to receive the full benefit of counselling.  Many 
may not feel comfortable revealing information to a psychiatrist or rape crisis counsellor that 
is of a sensitive nature, including feelings of guilt or embarrassment about the rape, if they are 
aware it could be disclosed as evidence.  As commented in an American case: 
 
[S]uch communications are likely to be among the most personal imaginable – the 
women is traumatised … by the offensive intrusion into her human sexuality, 
compounded by the unique social reaction to the victim as influenced by the cultural 
myths of rape.222   
 
In the Canadian context, it has been noted that ‘[d]iscovering that the one place they thought 
was safe for them is another place where they have no control is counter therapeutic ... [T]his 
is one of the major roadblocks to recovery for individuals who have been sexual assaulted’.223  
As such, it is ‘crucial’ to the recovery of the victim that post-assault interventions do not 
‘contribute to the client’s existing feelings of violation, helplessness and powerlessness’.224  In 
the worst case scenario, victims may feel that they are faced with the choice between 
counselling or the criminal justice process,225 which may result in them being deterred from 
seeking counselling at all,226 or delaying it until the trial concludes, which could be a number 
of years.  Indeed, this has been the case in Canada; one counsellor commented how ‘when I 
told my clients that the counselling notes of our session may be subpoenaed I have had direct 
experience of clients leaving counselling’.227 
 
There are also practical consequences if defence are given routine access to counselling 
records. Counsellors will inevitably curtail their note taking and recordkeeping to attempt to 
protect complainants if they are aware of this. There is evidence from Nicole Westmarland 
and Sue Alderson’s study that Rape Crisis Centres have been extremely cautious in keeping 
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any form of permanent client records due to concerns about them being requested by defence 
lawyers and used in court.228   This is backed up by similar evidence from Canada, where the 
spokeswomen for the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres was quoted as saying that 
‘centres have adopted all kinds of measures to protect files.  We are using every means at our 
disposal to protect records’.229  One result of this is that research into the impact and 
effectiveness of such intervention outcomes in England and Wales is very limited.230  Another 
is that such methods of file-keeping can be detrimental to the on-going welfare of a client, as 
well as counsellor accountability, since they do not satisfy the therapeutic and professional 
needs for keeping files and reduce the ability of other counsellors to understand the complete 
history of a client.231 As Justice L’Heureux-Dube notes, attempts to pressure the integrity of 
counselling by altering or destroying notes makes it ‘extremely likely that the therapeutic 
process … is being harmed in their absence’.232   
 
Additionally, there is potential for cases to be dropped as a result of defence not being able to 
access this evidence when they believe it may be relevant. Indeed, this problem has occurred in 
Canada.  In Carosella,233 a teacher was charged with the historic sexual abuse of a former pupil. 
The sexual assault crisis centre that had offered counselling to the complainant had adopted a 
policy of destroying files with police involvement before any court order could be served, to 
protect the privacy rights of clients.  Thus, when the centre was ordered to disclose notes of its 
counselling sessions, the file was empty.  The Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge had 
been correct to halt the prosecution as the accused’s right to a fair trial had been 
compromised by the destruction of the interview notes.  In Sophinka J’s opinion the defence 
had a right to the material because it ‘could have assisted the defence in the preparation of 
cross-examination … [and] revealed the state of the complainant’s perception and memory’.  
As the documents had been held to be relevant, denial of access was therefore a denial to 
make full answer and defence.  Clear parallels can be seen between both the test for disclosure 
of third party documents in Canada at the time of the Carosella decision and the current test 
in England and Wales, and the fair trial discourse that surrounds these tests.  So although 
there has not been a case like this in England and Wales, if Rape Crisis and other counselling 
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organisations are being cautious in their note-taking as evidence suggests,234 it is not a stretch 
of the imagination to consider that this could happen.  
 
Both a reduction in those seeking counselling in the aftermath of rape and a lack of research 
into how effective such counselling can be is problematic, as what evidence there is suggests 
that counselling can be very useful and important for victims of rape.235  Victims often ‘live 
and relive the event’,236 to the extent that their lives can be defined as a traumatic on-going 
survival process.237  It is therefore crucial that victims receive responsive treatment, where their 
needs are prioritised, to enable them to move on from the experience.238   
 
In England and Wales, a study into Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs) found that 
counselling was accessed by between one third and two thirds of SARC users, and most of the 
research participants who used it valued it.239 Many appreciated the opportunity to talk about 
the consequences of the assault to a professional who was disconnected from their circle of 
friends or family,240 with one use commenting that ‘a counsellor is definitely the best person 
to talk to. And because they’re removed from it, because somebody who’s close, you’re aware 
of the effect on them’.241  Furthermore, Westmarland and Alderson have conducted a study 
that attempts to measure the impact of rape crisis counselling on mental health and well-being 
over time.  The results showed that most change was made in relation to the statement ‘I feel 
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empowered and in control of my life’, with 61 per cent strongly disagreeing or disagreeing at 
the first data collection point compared to 31 per cent at the last.242  A level of perceived 
control over one’s life is an important factor of psychological wellbeing,243 thus traumatic 
events, especially those involving a loss of control, can have serious implications for an 
individual’s mental health.244  Rape in particular has been shown to threaten assumptions and 
beliefs victims have about themselves,245 and this may be especially pertinent in cases of 
acquaintance rape.246 Furthermore, one aspect within the notion of control is perceived 
control over the recovery process, and access to counselling may help achieve this.  Studies 
have found that, among sexual assault victims, those who had higher levels of perceived 
control over their recovery process were less depressed and had lower levels of post-traumatic 
stress.247  Indeed, counsellors described their role as exploring thoughts and feelings, as well as 
enabling service users to regain a sense of control,248 ‘empowering [them] so that [they] can 
carry on [their] life in a positive way’.249 
 
Large shifts were also seen in relation to ‘I have “flashbacks” about what happened’, and ‘I 
have panic attacks’.250  Overall, some degree of positive change was seen for all measures, 
although this was small for some.251  In addition to this research, there is a range of positive, 
often life-changing feedback from women in England and Wales who have accessed rape crisis 
and other sexual violence services available,252 for example, in focus group data collected by 
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the Women’s National Commission, which was used across three policy reviews.253  This 
found that women consistently spoke of the crucial role of women’s services in ‘empowering 
them to aid recovery from abuse and to regain control of their lives’.254  Additionally, women 
appreciated their holistic approach, in the way that they ‘responded to complex and multiple 
needs and focussed on their safety and empowerment, without labelling or judging them, or 
limiting the services to times of crisis’.255  Overall, the evidence indicates that where there was 
good practice in responding to violence against women, women felt ‘valued, confident and 
safe, that their human rights were being realised and that they were able to participate in their 
community’.256 Counselling may also be particularly important for those with a mental health 
problem pre-existing the rape, as evidence suggests that such cases are more likely to drop out 
the criminal justice system earlier, and therefore may rely on alterative service provision more 
heavily.  Both SARCs and Rape Crisis Centres are premised on the idea of believing women, 
and respecting their confidentiality and autonomy. 257  Therefore, the importance of 
uninhibited access to counselling, whether this is through a SARC or a voluntary organisation 
such as a rape crisis centre, cannot be overstated.   
 
Moreover, it is also very important to encourage research into determining effective 
responses. 258  A lack of research demonstrating effectiveness of counselling, such as that 
provided by rape crisis centres, may affect funding, which voluntary organisations rely on259 
and often struggle to obtain.260 For example, evidence suggests that Rape Crisis Centres’ role 
in dealing with the causes of many issues relating to mental health and well-being is 
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overlooked, as in 2006-2007 just 8 per cent of funding came from local health authorities,261 
and the health commissioners often disregarded them, viewing them as ‘niche’ or even 
irrelevant to health commissioning.262 As a result, Rape Crisis Centres in England and Wales 
faced a crisis of their own, as their numbers declined from 68 centres in 1984 to just 38 in 
2008.263  As demonstrated by Jo Lovett et al’s research, in areas where SARCs and Rape Crisis 
Centres are present, support is much more readily available,264 so it is a relief that this number 
has since risen again.  It does, however, remain crucial for centres to maintain and even 
increase funding, which can only be assisted by detailed research into the long-term 
effectiveness of counselling and other services provided.  
 
Routine disclosure of such notes could therefore be said to undermine the culture and 
infrastructure created to support women in the aftermath of sexual violence, which has 
provoked much critical commentary in the Canadian context,265 and which should be taken 
seriously in England and Wales too.   
2.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Other jurisdictions have documented a shift in focus from a complainant’s sexual history to 
their psychiatric history, and although this issue has not yet received adequate attention in 
England and Wales, existing research has showed that there is a significant possibility this is 
the case here too.  This is problematic, as it is based upon unwarranted generalisations about 
women who seek professional counselling.266  Rather than trying to show that the complainant 
is ‘bad’, this defence strategy attempts to show she is ‘mad’, or at the very least, untrustworthy 
and incredible.  
 
The law in England and Wales is unfortunately not equipped to deal with this strategy.  The 
courts rely on out-dated and inaccurate conceptions of relevance, making it too easy for 
defendants to introduce evidence that has no logical bearing on the complainant’s credibility, 
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but will nonetheless prejudice the jury against her and humiliate her. This is worsened by a 
failure to protect complainants’ interests in many cases, as these can only be represented as 
part of a ‘public interest’.   It is also clear that implementation remains inconsistent, and that 
many judges allow disclosure of mental health evidence when the law would not allow it.  
 
It is argued that the law should be stricter, and evidence related to the complainant’s mental 
health should only be adduced in rare cases when it is strictly relevant to her credibility or to 
an issue in the case.  Furthermore, its relevance must outweigh the prejudicial effects of 
allowing it.  The stigma attached to promiscuity is qualitatively different than that associated 
with psychopathology, but the underlying principle justifying protection is the same:267 it is the 
defendant on trial, not the complainant, and thus the focus of the evidence should relate to 
the defendant’s actions rather than the complainant’s character.   
 
Moreover, if women with mental health problems are in fact more likely to find themselves 
participating in court proceedings and more likely to be sexually assaulted, as it is suggested in 
chapter one, then the need for procedures and policies designed with their needs in mind is 
all the greater.268  Just as general rape myths must be eliminated from the courtroom, so too 
must myths about the veracity and credibility of women with mental health problems.  
 
The next chapter will consider alternative approaches to restricting the use of mental health 
records taken in other jurisdictions, and will evaluate the potential these systems could have in 
England and Wales.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
267 Wilkinson-Ryan, ‘Admitting Mental Health Evidence’ (n69) 1378 
268 Benedet and Grant, ‘Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental 
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues’ (n2) 520 
  81 
CHAPTER 3: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Having analysed the current structure of the law relating to disclosure of personal records in 
England and Wales, it is necessary to consider ways that it could be improved.  This chapter 
will take a comparative approach, exploring the different systems used in other jurisdictions 
and critically evaluating the potential for each.   
  
First, this chapter will examine the law in New South Wales, Australia.  It will consider the 
drafting of the sexual assault communications privilege that exists there, before examining the 
judicial response to this.  It will then describe the more recent change to the law and the 
provision of free independent legal representation to victims, before analysing the potential of 
these provisions for England and Wales.  It will then go on to consider the law in Canada.  
Although the law has not been developed as recently as in New South Wales, and therefore 
the research relating to the law is not as current, it is still a helpful comparison as the way the 
provisions have been drafted would potentially solve several of the problems the law faces in 
England and Wales.  This chapter will therefore outline the law in Canada, and the way it has 
been subsequently eroded in the Supreme Court decision of Mills,1  before arguing that 
although the drafting has potential to improve the law in England and Wales, judicial 
interpretation has severely limited the law and would need to be overcome to make the 
provisions successful.   
 
3.1 NEW SOUTH WALES  
 
In New South Wales, there exists a sexual assault communications privilege (SACP), which 
prevents disclosure of a communication made for the purpose of counselling a complainant of 
a sexual assault in circumstances prescribed by the provisions of the legislation.2  Prior to the 
passing of the legislation, there were no specific provisions to protect confidential 
communications between a counsellor and a sexual assault victim, and the defence were able 
to subpoena witnesses and records for trial purposes, leaving the record holder with little 
choice other than to produce the record and testify.  However, concerns grew that the defence 
were attempting to circumvent rape shield laws3 by accessing counsellors’ notes in order to 
discredit victims.  By invading the privacy and confidentiality of counselling in this way, the 
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effectiveness of counselling is impaired.4  Then in 1995, Di Lucas, of the Canberra Rape 
Crisis Centre, was subpoenaed to produce a client’s counselling records to the court. She 
refused, and was charged with contempt of court and held in custody for a number of hours. 
This attracted a large amount of publicity and public debate, and following this, the NSW 
government passed the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communication) Act 1997, 
introducing a statutory SACP.5 
 
The primary aims of the SACP were twofold: firstly, to protect a sexual assault victim from the 
harm that may be caused if their records are revealed; and secondly, to safeguard the broader 
public interest in maintaining the integrity of counselling and encouraging the reporting of 
sexual assault.6  As the Attorney General recognised, ‘knowing a perpetrator has had access to 
counselling files can further traumatise victims and increase their sense of powerlessness’, and 
as ‘the primary purpose of counselling is not investigative’, but rather therapeutic,7  the 
defence counsels’ use of personal records ‘is not a justifiable use of the laws of evidence’.8  
 
3.1.1 THE DRAFTING OF THE SACP 
 
The Sexual Assault Communications Privilege is covered in sections 295-306 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (CPA).9  The SACP may be claimed to prevent production of a document 
recording a protected confidence, or the adducing of evidence disclosing a protected 
confidence.10  A protected confidence is defined as a ‘counselling communication’ that is 
made by, to or about a victim or alleged victim of a sexual assault offence.11   Counselling 
communications fall within s296 even if the communication is made before the acts 
constituting the relevant sexual offence occurred, and even if the communication was not 
                                                      
4 Glenn Bartley, ‘Sexual Assault Communications Privilege under Siege’ (2000-2001) NSW Bar 
Association Journal 6, 6 
5 Alicia Jillard, Janet Loughman and Edwina MacDonald, ‘From Pilot Project to Systemic 
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6 Jeffrey Shaw (Attorney-General), NSW Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council (22 
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10 s296 CPA 1986 
11 s296(1) CPA 1986 
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made in connection with the alleged sexual assault or any condition arising from it.12  A 
person counsels another person if they have undertaken training or study or has experience 
that is relevant to the process of counselling persons who have suffered harm,13 and the 
persons listens to and gives verbal or other support or encouragement to the other person,14 or 
advises, gives therapy or treats the other person,15 whether or not for a fee or reward.16  Any 
document containing a protected confidence does not have to be disclosed, and evidence 
disclosing a protected confidence or the contents of a document recording a protected 
confidence cannot be adduced, unless the court sees it and determines that three conditions 
are fulfilled.17  First, the document concerned must either by itself, or in combination with 
other evidence, have substantial probative value.18  Secondly, other evidence of the matters 
contained in the document must be unavailable.19  Finally, the public interest in preserving 
the confidentiality of protected confidences and protecting the confider from harm must be 
substantially outweighed by the public interest in allowing inspection of the document.20 In 
carrying out this exercise, the court must take into account the likelihood, nature or extent of 
the harm that would be caused to the alleged victim if the document is produced or the 
evidence adduced.21  Harm is defined to include ‘actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, 
stress or shock, damage to reputation or emotional or psychological harm such as shame, 
humiliation and fear’.22 
 
3.1.2 RESISTANCE TO THE LAW AND RESULTING CHANGE 
 
This statutory innovation has ‘surprised and perturbed’ many legal practitioners and judicial 
officers since its inception, 23  and there has been a clear tension between attempts by 
Parliament to implement a strong, broad and effective privilege, and restrictive interpretations 
of the legislation by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal.   
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The first challenge to the legislation came in R v Young.24  In this case, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that the privilege could only be claimed at the adduction of evidence stage, and 
not at an earlier stage, when the documents are produced upon subpoena.   The majority 
refused to extend the meaning of the words ‘adduced in a proceeding’ 25  to ‘embrace 
production [of documents] pursuant to a subpoena’.26  This narrow interpretation negated 
much of the intent of the original legislative scheme,27 as the defence could still gain access to 
the records by subpoena and thus the privacy of the complainant was still invaded.28  The New 
South Wales legislature quickly acted to reverse this decision by enacting the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 1999. This Act 
inserted a new Part 7 into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, attempting to strengthen the 
SACP by broadening several important definitions and inserting new provisions intended to 
prevent future weakening of the legislation.  As a result, the privilege now expressly and 
irrefutably applies to the production of documents upon subpoena.29  The definition of 
‘counselling communication’ was expanded in s296(4) (at the time s148(4)) to incorporate all 
communications by or to or about the victim made in confidence in the course of counselling. 
Previously, the only communications that were protected were the alleged victim’s own 
ruminations or, in other words, the alleged victim’s own confidential communications. This 
meant that defendants could still access, for example, the counsellors response to the 
complainant, and so resulted in the therapeutic basis for the counselling being undermined in 
just the same way as if the protected confider’s own ruminations were accessible.30 There is 
also a tougher requirement for establishing the consent of a principal protected confider to 
production or adduction of a protected confidence; for example, it must now be given in 
writing.31   
 
Provisions of the legislation were challenged for a second time in R v Norman Lee.32  In this 
case, the subpoenaed records comprised 73 pages of notes of communications relating to the 
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complainant of a sexual assault.  The communications took place between the complainant 
and a youth support worker of the Sydney City Mission, who did not provide counselling 
herself, but instead arranged referrals of the complainant for counselling, therapy or 
treatment, as well as listening to accounts of her visits to those other persons.  The original 
definition of a counselling communication included confidences made ‘in the course of a 
relationship in which the counsellor is counselling, giving therapy to or treating the 
counselled person for any emotional or psychological condition’.33  The court held that the 
relationship in this case amounted to the social worker ‘look[ing] after her in a general way, 
but not in a way which fell within s148(4)’,34 and thus the documents should be produced for 
inspection.   
 
To reach this conclusion, the court interpreted both ‘any emotional or psychological 
condition’ and ‘counselling’ very narrowly.  When considering what ‘any emotional or 
psychological condition’ might include, Heydon JA said that:  
 
An emotional condition is a state of consciousness turning on emotions like pleasure, 
pain, desire, aversion, surprise, hope, joy, sorrow, fear or hate … which reveals or 
reflects some defect or illness or disease or abnormality.  Similarly, a psychological 
condition refers to a particular condition of health – a state of health which is poor or 
abnormal or diseased or otherwise defective from the emotional or psychological 
point of view … a psychological condition is a state of mind in which there is some 
defect or illness or disease or abnormality in the victim’s mental states and processes.35 
 
This interpretation was problematic, as it implied that s148(4) required a recognisable 
psychiatric illness to be established, and appeared to equate an ‘emotional condition’ with a 
‘psychological condition’.36  However, many survivors of sexual assault do not develop a 
recognisable psychiatric illness,37 and if they do, sexual assault counsellors do not make or 
record such diagnoses. Moreover, it is impracticable and expensive to obtain a diagnosis from 
a psychiatrist years after the records have been made.  Thus, not all victims would be able to 
access the privilege.  
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Heydon JA also defined counselling as:  
 
[T]he provision of expert advice and procedures by persons skilled, by training or 
experience, in the treatment of mental or emotional disease or trouble.  The 
expression does not include persons who merely seek to assist others suffering from 
an emotional or psychological condition.38 
 
This narrow construction of ‘counselling’ does not necessarily fit well with all sexual assault 
counselling, as this can involve ‘reactive listening and drawing out of innermost thoughts, 
feelings and insecurities’, and the ‘subtle guiding of the counselled person towards identifying 
options and making choices’.39  If sexual assault counselling does not constitute the provision 
of expert advice, sexual assault counsellors may adjust their methods, feeling forced to give 
some prescriptive advice so that they trigger the legislation.  Indeed, the women’s legal 
resources centre at North Lidcombe advised counsellors of ways to distinguish from Lee or to 
fit within it.40  If they did not, there may be potential for defence counsel to access records.   
 
Overall, the Criminal Court of Appeal in Lee construed section 148(4) in a way that would 
severely limit the scope of the privilege.  However, once again, the legislature responded to the 
judgement by changing the provisions.  The Act now reflects a wider definition of counsellor, 
as well as the type of assistance that can be given to a victim, avoiding the necessity of the 
victim being diagnosed as mentally ill.  A counsellor includes a person who has undertaken 
training or study or has experience that is relevant to the process of counselling, and 
counselling now occurs when the counsellor ‘listens to and gives verbal or other support or 
encouragement’ to another person, 41 as well as when they ‘advise, give therapy or treat the 
other person’.42  This therefore encompasses persons such as psychiatrists and psychologists as 
well as more general medical practitioners and those who have no formal qualifications but do 
have training or experience in counselling and other support services. It also includes listening 
and support, which is often associated with sexual assault counselling. The changes therefore 
broaden the scope of the privilege considerably. 
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3.1.3 LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND FURTHER REFORM  
 
In December 2010, the New South Wales government announced that it was reforming the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 again, to enhance victims’ participation in decisions affecting 
the confidentiality of their counselling and therapeutic records.43  This was accompanied by 
an announcement by the Attorney-General that $4.4 million in funding would be given for a 
specialist victims’ advocacy service, which would ensure that victims can receive advice and 
representation when asserting the privilege.44 These reforms were largely informed by the 
Sexual Assault Communications Privilege Pilot Project, coordinated by Women’s Legal 
Services NSW. 
 
The project grew from a concern that the lack of legal services for sexual assault victims 
seeking to protect the confidentiality of their counselling notes meant that the laws limiting 
disclosure or use of counselling records were in effect ‘an empty promise’.45  The project 
partners collaborated to provide free legal assistance to victims seeking to protect the 
confidentiality of their counselling and therapeutic records, and data collected during the 
project revealed the extent and nature of legal need, whilst also identifying problems with the 
operation of the privilege.   
 
One issue encountered was a person’s right to assert the privilege in relation to counselling 
records about them.  The capacity to object to production on the basis of the privilege 
technically rested in the person subpoenaed, and so did not extend to the ‘protected confider’ 
(the victim).46  This meant that the production of documents was at the discretion of the 
subpoenaed person, rather than the victim, and so could mean that if the subpoenaed party 
did not object, the protected confider was technically bereft of standing to object. The project 
highlighted that this did indeed happen, and that subpoenaed services did regularly provide 
documents containing protected confidences to the court without objecting.47  Out of 80 
subpoenas raising privilege issues, 32 rejections were lodged, with only 24 of those specifically 
mentioning the privilege, and just 10 actually involving someone asserting the privilege in 
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court, with the others only made in writing.48  This may indicate a general lack of awareness of 
the privilege among service providers.  The Courts and Crime Legislation Further 
Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) has attempted to address this issue of standing.  A protected 
confider now has an automatic right to appear in criminal proceedings and to object to the 
production of documents or adducing of evidence containing protected confidences. 49 
Furthermore, the court must now satisfy itself that the protected confider is aware of the 
protections and has been given a reasonable opportunity to seek legal advice.50  It is hoped 
that this will ensure all complainants can resist access to their records if they so wish. 
 
Concerns were also raised in relation to compliance with the notice provisions.  In all cases in 
which the project was involved, formal notice requirements in the Criminal Procedure Act, 
requiring notice to be given to the principal protected confider,51 were not complied with.  
This could have been a result of general lack of awareness of the privilege, the absence of 
sanctions for non-compliance, or reliance on the issuing party to identify which subpoenas 
would result in the SACP claim. However, whether through oversight or otherwise, section 
299 has been described as a provision ‘honoured more in breach than in observance’.52  In 
addition to absence or inadequacy of notification to victims, orders for subpoenas were 
frequently made late.53  This can have a devastating impact on victims, and lack of notice can 
significantly reduce a victim’s capacity to seek legal advice, and a lawyer’s capacity to prepare a 
case to maintain privilege; often the barrister participants in the scheme were only asked to 
appear the day before the return date of the subpoena, or on the first day of the trial.54  
Difficulties can also arise with the provision of notice by the police and prosecution.  In 
several matters described by Catherine Gleeson, protected confidences appeared in the police 
brief, sometimes with the consent of the complainant but sometimes without.55  It then 
becomes very difficult to sustain an argument that other protected confidences should not be 
revealed when some are already ‘out in the open’.  The recent reforms have now introduced 
tighter requirements for notice of an application for leave to produce or adduce a protected 
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confidence, in an attempt to rectify some of these problems.56  For example, there is a new 
statutory notice period of 14 days, except where exceptional circumstances can be 
demonstrated.  
 
A further problem identified was related to the requirement of harm.  The project 
demonstrated the need to clarify the degree of evidence required to establish and quantify the 
harm to the protected confider, and to the public interest, that would flow from disclosure of 
their protected confidences.  One aspect of the public interest test, as described above, 
requires the court to take into account the likelihood, and the nature and extent of harm that 
would be caused to the protected confider if the document were adduced in proceedings.  
However, there is uncertainty among practitioners and the judiciary about what evidence the 
protected confider was required to provide.57  Reliable and useful evidence of the likely harm 
arising from disclosure tends to reveal the very type of confidential information the privilege is 
designed to protect.58  For example, if a written statement of harm was provided to a judicial 
officer, this would be open to inspection and the maker of the statement could be cross-
examined on it, thus negating the purpose of the privilege.  It is therefore very difficult for the 
complainant’s representative to satisfy the court that harm will be caused to a complainant in 
anything but the most general sense.59  Under the Courts and Crimes Legislation Further 
Amendment Act 2010, a protected confider can now provide an affidavit outlining the harm 
likely to be suffered if the protected confidence is disclosed.  This would be disclosed to the 
duty officer only, and would not be subject to cross-examination.  In this way, confidential 
harm statements address the difficulty previously faced in trying to describe how a 
complainant might suffer if protected confidences were disclosed without revealing the 
substance of the protected confidence in question.   
 
Furthermore, in 2011, the funding provided established the sexual assault communications 
privilege unit at legal aid.  This provides specialist solicitors to represent sexual assault victims 
in privilege matters, and to oppose either the production of protected confidences or the 
offering of evidence in relation to protected communications.60  So this means that sexual 
assault complainants in New South Wales now have access to free, specialised legal advice and 
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representation to assist them in protecting the confidentiality of their records.61    It was clear 
from the pilot that this is a valuable service.  In 91 per cent of cases in which the complainant 
was represented between February 2009 and December 2010 the complainant was able to 
successfully assert the privilege, and prevent or limit the defendant’s access to their records.62  
Furthermore, in its first full year of operation, the service provided free legal representation in 
122 matters where complainants asserted the privilege.63  A legal representative for the victim 
has also brought significant benefits to prosecutors, with many being very positive about the 
availability of free representation for victims, as this helps to create positive experiences for 
victims and saves time for prosecutors, allowing them to focus on other issues.64  The unit is 
also responsible for raising awareness of the changes to the law surrounding the privilege, 
particularly among the legal profession, government departments and organisations likely to 
receive subpoenas for counselling records of sexual assault victims.  In its first year, the service 
provided specialist legal advice and information to 83 organisations, such as health 
practitioners and lawyers.65  Overall, the education initiative appears to have been successful, 
with reports of increased awareness of the privilege and its use across courts in New South 
Wales.66  Ultimately, the introduction of this service, along with the recent reforms, provides 
stronger protection for victims and gives them a greater voice in the criminal justice process. 
 
3.1.4 POTENTIAL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES  
 
The law in New South Wales offers many advantages.  By ensuring that counselling records 
are automatically protected by privilege, it sets a higher hurdle.  It begins from the opposite 
presumption of both the Canadian and the English and Welsh legislation;67 counselling 
records are not to be disclosed unless the defence can satisfy the three separate elements of the 
test.  Furthermore, the requirement that the records be of substantial probative value involves 
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a higher standard than that of the materiality test in England and Wales68 so should prevent 
irrelevant evidence from being adduced. It is suggested that by both starting from this 
presumption, and having a distinct privilege for sexual assault communications, the law in 
New South Wales draws public and judicial attention to particular issues raised by the 
disclosure of confidential records in sexual cases, and this is something from which the law in 
England and Wales would benefit.   
 
The SACP scheme also offers real protection for victims.  With stricter notice provisions, 
complainants should not be ambushed in trials, 69 and moreover, they are able to make 
representations and appear in the proceedings that follow the application.  With the added 
benefit of access to free legal representation, complainants in New South Wales are able to be 
involved in the decision making process relating to their personal records, and are given a real 
chance of defending their right to privacy.  There is a strong case for alteration of the current 
procedure in England and Wales to give complainants a right to oppose disclosure of 
confidential records at a hearing, and to entitle them to legal representation in order to do 
this more effectively.  In theory, there is no reason why this could not be implemented.  The 
feasibility of some form of independent legal representation in adversarial jurisdictions is 
often dismissed on the ground that affording legal standing to complainants would be 
incompatible with the principle of equality of arms that is integral to a fair trial. 70  
Commentators have argued that as a criminal trial is a contest between the state and the 
defendant, the defendant starts from a position of profound disadvantage, as a result of 
resources accessible to the state.71  Thus, fairness has been achieved by measures built into the 
trial to redress this balance, for example the burden and standard of proof.72  If both the 
victim advocate and the prosecution counsel were seen to be ‘joining forces’73 against the 
accused, it ‘would seem like having two pitchers throwing possible strikes at the batter’.74  
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However, this view is misplaced, as versions of independent legal representation operate in 
several adversarial jurisdictions, including New South Wales and Ireland.75 If it is perceived as 
a threat to the adversarial concept of a fair trial, this may be based on misplaced assumptions 
about what it actually involves. Models can be designed, as in New South Wales, which 
protect the complainant’s interests at key procedural stages without infringing upon those of 
the accused.76  However what may prove a bigger problem in England and Wales is funding 
for such a scheme.  Given the current economic climate, and the cuts that have already been 
made to legal aid for defendants,77 it is highly unlikely that the government would provide a 
budget for complainants to access free legal representation.    
 
The courts in NSW also have the additional advantage of being able to make a range of orders 
designed to limit the harm that may be caused by disclosure.  They can order that all or part of 
the evidence be heard, or the document be produced in camera.78  Furthermore, they can seek 
to protect the safety and welfare of the complainant or counsellor by regulating the 
production and inspection of the document, by supressing the publication of all or part of the 
evidence, and by ensuring that addresses and telephone numbers are withheld.79  The public 
interest in open justice and fair reports of court proceedings would need to be weighed in the 
balancing exercise articulated in the SACP provisions when considering these measures.80  
While the need to protect sensitive witnesses and avoid deterrence from giving evidence has 
been recognised as providing an exception to the principle of open justice,81 this will not be 
the case in relation to every complainant. However, there will be circumstances in which the 
harm that is likely to be caused by publication of the contents of counselling communications 
will outweigh the need for open justice, and may not be overcome by the restrictions on 
disclosure of the complainant’s identity by s578A of the Crimes Act. As the publication of 
intensely private counselling communications in association with the event to which the 
proceedings relate, or to historical events, and the discussion of those records by the public at 
large, may cause significant shame and humiliation to the complainant and may interrupt the 
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complainant’s continuing treatment, such orders may well be appropriate.82  It is argued here 
that courts in England and Wales should be given greater powers to regulate the manner of 
disclosure in order to enhance protection of the complainant’s privacy.  Currently, under R v 
H and C, disclosure short of full disclosure may be ordered.  However, any measures proposed 
must represent the minimum derogation from the ‘golden rule of disclosure’.83  Thus, any 
edits made to records must represent the minimum derogation necessary to protect the public 
interest in question.84  So judges are not given room to consider providing records that have 
been edited or anonymised to reduce harm to individual complainants.   
 
There are also some remaining problems with the scheme, which would need to be overcome 
if it were to be effectively implemented in England and Wales.   The New South Wales 
example demonstrates the importance of clarity in statutory language of this kind,85 as their 
attempts to implement a strong, broad and effective SACP have been curtailed through 
judicial interpretation several times, and thus the legislation has been amended repeatedly.  If 
similar legislation were to be implemented here, lessons could be learnt from the experience 
in NSW, and the statute would need to be drafted with more focus and precision.   
 
However, it is possible that this may not be enough.  The scheme in New South Wales has 
faced resistance, both from legal practitioners and the judiciary.  It may be that even if the 
provisions were drafted with more precision, judges would still find any new law wanting, or 
difficult to accept, as in New South Wales.86   The New South Wales Bar Association strongly 
opposed the introduction of an SACP 87  on the basis that it involved ‘a substantial 
infringement on the rights of the accused persons and carries with it a grave risk of 
miscarriages of justice’.88  Although it is suggested that this is not the case, as the privilege is 
not absolute and so disclosure will be ordered where clearly necessary, if similar arguments 
were made in England and Wales they may be detrimental to any legislation.  It is already the 
case that the judiciary allow disclosure requests on a much broader basis than the case law 
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would allow,89 and some permit fishing expeditions when the evidence produced assists the 
defence.90  
 
Furthermore, when considering the history of rape shield legislation in England and Wales, 
arguments against infringing the defendant’s right to a fair trial have featured heavily. In the 
context of sexual history evidence, the judiciary were quick to subvert the legislative intent of 
s41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act in the case of R v A91 by reintroducing the 
discretion that the provision aimed to check.92  The case involved a challenge under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 to the rape shield enacted in s41, and the House of Lords agreed that 
certain evidence made inadmissible by s41 might endanger a fair trial for the accused.  They 
aimed to show that it was a matter of ‘common sense’ that restrictions on sexual history 
evidence had never intended to include evidence relating to a sexual relationship with the 
accused,93 but it is clear that the desire to admit such evidence was based on distorted notions 
of relevance.94  Research has since shown that trial judges have typically interpreted A to mean 
they now have a very broad discretion to admit sexual history evidence in order to ensure a 
fair trial under Article 6.95  Arguably, it may therefore be the case that any new legislation 
introducing a privilege for sexual assault communications would meet the same fate.  This 
would not necessarily be insurmountable; in New South Wales, the legislature intervened and 
amended the legislation to reverse the broad interpretations by the courts.  However, this is 
rare and, in England and Wales, no such move has been made since the decision in R v A.  
 
Furthermore, the scheme is still a discretionary one, leaving it to the judges to decide when 
records are of substantial probative value.96  ‘Substantial probative value’ is not defined in this 
Division of the Act, and there is little guidance provided as to matters which should be taken 
into account in the exercise of this discretion.  Probative value is however defined in the 
Dictionary to the Evidence Act as follows: ‘“probative value” of evidence means the extent to 
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which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of 
a fact in issue’, and ‘substantial’ has been held to refer to a greater degree of relevance than 
‘significant’.97  In contrast to these definitions, the phrase ‘substantial probative value’ has 
been analysed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v El-Azzi98 in relation to s103 of the 
Evidence Act 1995.  This section provides an exception to the credibility rule, permitting 
cross-examination of a witness if the evidence is of substantial probative value.  In this case, 
the court held that the definition of probative value as defined in the Dictionary to the 
Evidence Act does not apply to the use of the term in this section.  Rather, ‘evidence adduced 
in cross-examination must therefore have substantial probative value in the sense that it could 
rationally affect the assessment of the credit of the witness’.99  This has led some practitioners 
to conclude that, given the nature of sexual assault trials where the prosecution typically relies 
solely on the evidence of the complainant, and where the reliability and credibility of the 
complainant can be challenged by a document or evidence that has a bearing on the jury’s 
assessment of the complainant’s credibility in a significant or substantial way, it must have 
substantial probative value.100  As mentioned in Chapter Two, it is not within the standard 
knowledge of judges to be able to assess what effect a mental illness might have on the 
credibility or reliability of a witness,101 nor how far statements made in counselling can be 
taken as evidence of fact.  This means that the scheme may run into similar problems that the 
current law in England and Wales faces; namely that sensitive and personal information could 
be characterised as of ‘substantial probative value’, when it should not be.    
 
3.1.5 SUMMARY 
 
There is a lot that is good about the SACP in New South Wales.  Having a specific privilege 
highlights the particular issues related to disclosure of medical records, and starting from the 
presumption of non-disclosure increases the burden on the defence.  Through this, and by 
offering free legal representation, clear steps have been taken to afford protection to 
complainants.  However, the New South Wales experience also teaches a couple of clear 
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lessons; firstly, even the most detailed and careful legislation will come to little with a judiciary 
that does not want to follow through and implement in the intended spirit of such legislation.  
Yet, secondly, this can be overcome, as demonstrated in NSW, by a persistent legislature. This 
chapter will now turn towards the legislation enacted in Canada.  
3.2 CANADA 
 
The production and disclosure of confidential records is now governed by s278 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code. 102  Historically, defence lawyers have been advised to obtain 
personal records,103 in order to scour them for evidence of inconsistency, faulty memories or 
reason to lie.104   The tactic flourished following the 1992 passage of Bill C-49, which restricts 
questioning of complainants about their sexual history,105 and with the growing public and 
judicial interest in ‘false memory syndrome’.106   Research reflected this, with one study 
finding that interviewees, including Crown attorneys, judges and court officers, felt that the 
use of personal records had increased since the early 1990s, and one judge commented that he 
had had twelve recent requests for personal records, which all went unchallenged.107  Access to 
information relating to a complainant’s personal history has been assisted by the Canadian 
Court’s general concern with protecting the rights of the defendant,108 and by the ruling in 
Stinchcombe,109 which greatly expanded the scope of disclosure required in a criminal trial.  It 
was held that ‘the right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of criminal justice 
on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not convicted’, and thus ‘all 
relevant information’ must be disclosed to the defence. 110    Some rape crisis centres, 
counsellors and others began to resist or deny requests to produce records, citing 
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confidentiality and the need to protect the interests of their female clients.111  As the Criminal 
Code was silent on the availability and use of such records, there was confusion about when, if 
ever, they might be producible to the defence. 
 
3.2.1 R V O’CONNOR AND A PERIOD OF OPEN ACCESS TO RECORDS 
 
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this uncertainty in 1995 in O’Connor.112  This case 
involved a bishop charged with sexual offences committed twenty-five years previously in a 
Catholic school.  He sought access to school records and an order for ‘all therapists, 
counsellors, psychologists and psychiatrists who have treated any of the complainants with 
respect to allegations of sexual assault or sexual abuse to produce to the Crown copies of their 
complete file contents and any other material’.113  The majority of the Supreme Court ruled 
that access to such confidential material, even though in the possession of third parties, could 
be relevant to the accused’s right to a fair trial. Thus, they endorsed permitted defendants’ 
access to complainants’ personal records.   
 
The majority set out a two-part procedure for the release of records held by third parties.  
Firstly, the defence must demonstrate the ‘likely relevance; defined as ‘a reasonable possibility 
that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to 
testify’.114   The Court cautioned that the accused’s burden should not be ‘onerous’,115 thus 
they should not be required to demonstrate the specific use to which they might put the 
information as it is not possible to do more than speculate about what the documents 
contain.  Furthermore, the decision expressly excluded any consideration of complainants’ 
rights.  The second part requires the judge to determine, upon considering the records itself, 
whether the information is relevant, that is, ‘logically probative to an issue at the trial or the 
competence of a witness to testify’.116  If this test is met, the judge must ‘examine and weigh 
the salutary and deleterious effects of a production order and determine whether a non-
production order would constitute a reasonable limit on the ability of the accused to make full 
answer and defence’.117  They should consider the following factors: the extent to which the 
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record is necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence; the probative value of the 
record in question; the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy vested in 
the record; whether production of the record would be premised upon any discriminatory 
belief or bias; and the potential prejudice to the complainant’s dignity, privacy or security of 
the person that would be occasioned by production of the record in question.118  It was also 
stated that records were likely to be relevant, and thus should be disclosed, in a number of 
situations, including: where the record was created close in time to the date of the incidents; 
where it may contain information concerning the unfolding of events underlying the criminal 
complaint; and where it may reveal the use of therapy influencing the complainant’s memory 
of the events.119  Records that were already in the hands of the prosecution were to follow the 
rule in Stinchcombe,120 and be disclosed to the defence if they were likely relevant.121 
The test for production and disclosure established in O’Connor was problematic for several 
reasons, and ‘ushered in a period of wide-open access to complainants’ records’.122  As many 
analysts have argued, it rests on a presumption of the de facto relevance of third party 
records.123  Furthermore, the test does not take into account the equality rights of sexual 
assault complainants,124 and as Justice L’Heureux-Dube noted in dissent, nor does it consider 
the integrity of the trial process and the societal interests in reporting sexual crimes.125  Thus, 
the court made it clear that an accused could rely on discriminatory beliefs and prejudicial 
fact-finding techniques without regard to adverse impacts of records release on complainants. 
Furthermore, the initial threshold for production was also low, on the assumption that the 
complainant’s privacy was not comprised by mere production to the trial judge.  Research has 
demonstrated the disastrous effect of O’Connor for women who have been sexually violated, 
with judges ordering disclosure in 52 per cent of cases where production and disclosure 
decisions could be found.126  Furthermore, often records were not specifically identified, 
rather requests were made for ‘all medical records’ or ‘all records … kept by the department of 
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social services in connection with services provided to the complainants’,127 and frequently the 
defence did not give reasons for why they were seeking disclosure, instead simply asserting that 
the record related to credibility or contained a reference to the defendant.128 
 
As a result of the clear evidence of a rising tide of applications,129 and a response to feminist 
concerns about the manner in which records applications were being used,130 the federal 
government enacted Bill C-46 in 1997, creating a legislative regime designed to subject 
requests to a higher level of scrutiny.   
 
3.2.2 BILL C-46 AND THE DRAFTING OF THE PROVISIONS 
 
In 1997, Bill C-46 inserted sections 278.1-278.91 into the Canadian Criminal Code.131  These 
sections set out a fully comprehensive regime for dealing with confidential records in sexual 
offence cases, and, among other things, give trial judges more guidance on the factors to be 
considered.  Framed by the goals of protecting complainants and encouraging police 
reporting, while at the same time respecting fair trial rights, these provisions established a 
rigorous two-stage test for the production and disclosure of records.132   
 
Initially, an application for disclosure must be made in writing to the trial judge and no one 
else,133 and must specify how the record is not only ‘likely relevant’ but also how production is 
‘necessary in the interests of justice’.134   The statute sets out a list of assertions which will, on 
their own, be insufficient to establish that the record is of likely relevance to an issue at trial or 
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to the competence of a witness to testify.135  For example, it is not sufficient to apply simply on 
the basis that: the record exists; the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy 
or counselling that the complainant is receiving or has received; the record relates to the 
incident that is the subject matter of the proceedings; the record may disclosure a prior 
inconsistent statement of the complainant; and the record may relate to the credibility of the 
witness or complainant.  The aim of this is to rule out speculative applications and fishing 
expeditions based on stereotypical assumptions.136   
 
At the first stage, the issue is whether the document should be produced to the judge.  A 
hearing in camera takes place, at which the owner of the document, the complainant and any 
other person to whom the record relates may make representations.137 When considering 
whether to order production of the record, the judge must consider ‘the salutary and 
deleterious effects of the determination on the accused’s right to make full answer and 
defence and on the right to privacy and equality of the complainant or witness and any other 
person to whom the record relates’.138  The judge must take into account the following factors 
in particular: the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make full answer 
and defence; the probative value of the record; the nature and extent of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the record; whether production of the record is based 
on discriminatory belief or bias; the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to 
privacy of any person to whom the record relates; society’s interest in encouraging reporting of 
sexual offences; society’s interest in encouraging obtaining of treatment by complainants; and 
the effects of the determination on the integrity of the trial process.  Having considered these 
factors, the judge must be satisfied that the record is likely to be relevant to an issue at trial or 
to the competence of a witness to testify, and that production is necessary in the interests of 
justice.139  If the judge decides to view the document, the second stage is to decide whether the 
defence should view it.  In arriving at the decision, the judge must consider the same factors as 
at the first stage.  Where disclosure is ordered, the judge may imposes a series of conditions to 
protect the privacy of the complainant, for example, they could order that the record is edited, 
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that no copies are made, that it cannot be disclosed to other people or that information 
relating to names or addresses are removed.140 
 
The legislation applies to any record containing personal information for which there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, including medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, 
education, employment, adoption and social services records.141  Records held by third parties 
as well as those in the hands of the prosecution are included, so the same regime applies in 
both scenarios.142  If the record is in the hands of the prosecution, the complainant may waive 
the application of the regime but if there is no such waiver the prosecution must notify the 
defence that it has the document without disclosing its contents.143   
 
This procedure is different from the O’Connor regime in several important ways.  Crucial 
among the changes is the requirement that a wider set of concerns be weighed before records 
can be released to the trial judge.  By inserting production provisions, equality rights and the 
implications of records access at a societal level into the balancing exercise governing access, 
judges were clearly meant to engage in a more complex balancing process extending well 
beyond a narrow contest between the privacy of individual complainants and the legal rights 
claims of individual defendants. 144   Parliament therefore recognised that much more is 
implicated in records production that simply confidentiality and informational privacy. The 
provisions contemplate a contextual analysis of records applications, in which the individual 
rights of complainants and defendants are set against a backdrop of sexual violence as a 
serious social problem, and ‘framed by a recognition of the need to curtail the circulation of 
discriminatory myths within sexual assault trials’.145  
 
3.2.3 R V MILLS AND THE EROSION OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
No sooner was s278 passed than it was constitutionally challenged in R v Mills146 as a violation 
of the fair trial guarantees of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Mills confirmed 
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the constitutionality of the statutory regime,147 and so could be viewed as a feminist legal 
victory.  However, at the same time, it weakened the meaning of the regime,148  as discussed 
below, and is riddled with ambiguities, giving rise to a situation in which complainants remain 
vulnerable to disclosure of their records.149    
 
The subsection 278.3(4) lists a number of myth-ridden assertions, which, on their own, are 
insufficient to meet the criteria of likely relevance. However, the meaning of this phrase came 
under contention in the pre-Mills case law.  The reading which will curtail disclosure of 
complainants’ records is that the assertion, in the sense of ground or rationale, is 
impermissible per se, and will never be sufficient to support the production or disclosure of a 
complainant’s private records.  The defendant’s reason for disclosure would have to be a 
reason other than those assertions set out in the legislation.150  The alternative reading, which 
has little effect in curtailing defence access to records, is that an allegation unsupported by any 
evidence is insufficient to support an application.  Unfortunately, the majority in Mills argued 
that this provision does not prevent defence counsel from relying on any other of the listed 
assertions, but that they must also show an evidentiary or additional informational foundation 
in order to meet the test of likely relevance.  In other words, there must be ‘case-specific’ 
evidence or information that goes beyond the general assertion. 151   Following this, the 
defendant need only produce some evidence that the record, for example, relates to the 
incident or recent complaint in order to secure production.   
 
Furthermore, the ruling repeatedly stressed that s278 retains judicial discretion, positioning 
the final decision of likely relevance in the subjective hands of the trial judge.152  For example, 
even though subsection 278.5(2) codified a list of considerations to frame this analysis, the 
Mills majority transformed these criteria into a ‘checklist’ of factors which ‘may come into play 
during a judge’s deliberation’. 153   Thus ‘through the majority’s slight of hand, societal 
considerations are effectively reconstructed as optional concerns that need not be used in 
reaching decisions on production and disclosure’.154  Furthermore, the majority insisted that 
where there is any doubt about the likely relevance of the records, the ‘interests of justice’ 
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require that the judge must ‘take the next step in viewing the documents’.155  In its insistence 
that ‘in borderline cases, the judge should err on the side of production’156 the majority has 
effectively redefined and eroded the meaning of Bill C-46.  Ultimately, they have amended the 
test for disclosure laid out in the legislation is such a way that the fair trial rights once again 
assume a position of pre-eminence, undermining the protections that the legislative regime 
sought to erect.157  
 
3.2.4 POTENTIAL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES  
 
There are several elements of the Canadian law that offer advantages.  Firstly, it wisely rejects 
the distinction made in Brushett in England and Wales, between documents retained by third 
parties and records in the possession of the Crown.158  In Mills it was stated that ‘it is 
constitutionally permissible for the Crown … to end up with documents that the accused has 
not seen as long as the accused can make full answer and defence and the trial is 
fundamentally fair’.159   This would make the prosecutions’ task simpler, as they will not feel 
conflicted by their duty to investigate thoroughly versus the increased risk of disclosure once 
information is in their hands.  Additionally, similar to New South Wales, the law in Canada 
allows conditions to be placed on the viewing of disclosed documents.  As argued in relation 
to NSW, this is highly desirable in order to protect complainants’ privacy as much as is 
possible even when disclosure of records is considered necessary, and thus should be 
implemented in England and Wales.   
 
The law also requires judges to provide reasons for their decisions in s278 applications.160  It is 
suggested that England and Wales would benefit from a similar law that would mean judges 
have to give reasons for decisions on witness summons applications, as this may reduce the 
chance of judges making records decisions on the basis of discriminatory myths and 
stereotypes.  However, judicial analysis of whether records are ‘necessary in the interests of 
justice’ in Canada is mostly very succinct and economical.161  Judges often render a decision 
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without showing their actual reasoning, and without any analysis.162  Therefore while this may 
be advantageous in theory, it is difficult to know whether in practice, judicial commentary 
would amount to mere recitation.   
 
Furthermore, complainants and record holders have legal standing to resist disclosure, as in 
NSW.  In Renate Mohr’s key informant study, Crown prosecutors who were interviewed 
stated that ‘everyone takes it more seriously’ when there is independent counsel for the 
complainant. 163  All those interviewed agreed in the importance of having independent 
counsel for the complainant at applications for disclosure of third party records, particularly 
crown counsel and the third party record holders themselves. However, in contrast to NSW, 
there is no scheme of free legal representation.  This difference highlights how important such 
a scheme is to make these provisions more than just a theoretical advantage and actually 
change women’s lives. For example, Jennifer Koshan’s examination of decisions delivered 
between 1999 and 2001 found that legal representation was not standard,164 and there is little 
indication that legal representation had become more common by 2006.165  As Lise Gotell 
notes, lack of representation is in no doubt related to the patchwork nature of funding 
sources,166 as record holders and complainants are not eligible for general legal aid services.167 
The crucial importance of legal representation to the purposes of subsections 278.1-278.9 was 
articulated in R v JGC;168 ‘the quality of justice will be diminished and the very mischief that 
Parliament attempted to curb, the inappropriate disclosure of third party records, either to the 
judge or the accused, will continue’.169 Furthermore, independent counsel in Mohr’s study 
believed that independent representation should be automatically provided for all 
complainants.170  More recently, the Standing Senate Committee heard evidence from a wide 
range of those involved in Criminal Justice, who all emphasised repeatedly that the most 
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effective way for complainants to protect their privacy, security and equality interests is to have 
their own lawyer.171 It is therefore clear that, although providing for complainant standing in 
the decision relating to disclosure is to be recommended, to really make the difference, 
funding for legal representation is required. As analysed above, this is currently unlikely in 
England and Wales.   
 
The provisions are also advantageous in the amount of guidance they provide to judges.  As 
analysed in Chapter Two and in relation to New South Wales, discretionary regimes can be 
problematic as they rely on the views of the individual judge, and so can be influenced by 
discriminatory stereotypes.172  However, the Canadian legislation attempts to define the scope 
and exercise of judicial discretion by specifying those situations in which disclosure should not 
be permitted and those factors which must be taken into account in arriving at a decision 
whether to permit disclosure or not.  Furthermore, the guidance frames sexual violence within 
gendered power relations, constructing sexual violence as a systemic social problem, gesturing 
to the societal impact of judicial decisions and locating these legislative changes within a 
concept of substantive equality.173  This draws attention powerfully not only to the privacy 
rights of the complainant, but their equality rights, their dignity, the sway of discriminatory 
myths and the impact on reporting rates and counselling.  This is important because, for 
example, equality must be considered as the rules and practices permitting disclosure will have 
disproportionately invasive consequences for women and children174 and will, as a result, 
threaten the equality guaranteed to these vulnerable groups under the Charter. 175  It is 
therefore suggested that the law in England and Wales would benefit from such a contextual 
approach to weighing the rights of the accused and the rights of complainants, as is 
contemplated in the text and wording of s278.  
 
                                                      
171 For example, Ms Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Proceedings of the 
Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 3, 1st Session, 41st 
Parliament, 20 October 2011); Mr Phil Downes, Canadian Council of Criminal Defence 
Lawyers, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 4, 
1st Session, 41st Parliament, 3 November 2011); Professor Karen Busby, Proceedings on the 
Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 19, 3rd Session, 40th 
Parliament, 3 February 2011) 
172 Temkin, ‘Digging the Dirt’ (n68) 142; Louise Ellison, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric 
Evidence in Rape Trials’ (2009) 13(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 28, 38 
173 Gotell, ‘When Privacy Is Not Enough’ (n144) 755 
174 Mary Marshall, ‘Canada: Production of Private Records of Victims in Sexual Assault in R v 
Shearing’ (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 139, 140 
175 R v Osolin [1993] 2 SCR 595 at [669] 
  106 
However, subsequent judicial interpretation of these provisions has been problematic, and 
would need to be avoided if similar provisions were to be implemented in England and Wales.  
Judicial decisions have narrowed the reach of s278, ‘carving out a series of exceptions’ to their 
application,176 and thereby avoiding the complex balancing of individual and societal concerns 
that was intended as a core component of records applications.177  And even when this 
provision is applied, its meaning has been transformed.  The courts have reduced the 
legislative protections to a narrow and unelaborated conception of privacy, which is incapable 
of expressing the complex harms involved in access to confidential records.178  This judicial 
reconstruction finds its roots in the Mills decision.  The majority’s stress on the importance of 
judicial discretion, 179  their reframing of the subsection s278.5(2)’s guidance as simply a 
‘checklist’,180 their narrowing of complainants privacy interests and their argument that fair 
trial rights must prevail in ‘uncertain’ situations’181 continues to be relied upon in court 
decisions where records applications have been made.182   
 
This has been evident in academics’ investigation of case law.   While there have been some 
cases that have relied on equality analysis or raise concerns about how contents of records 
might detract from the fairness of the trial by introducing discriminatory myths,183 these are 
remarkably few and are noteworthy only as exceptions.184  Furthermore, in most decisions in 
which these issues were considered,185 records applications had already been dismissed on the 
basis of a failure to meet the threshold of ‘likely relevance’.186 Moreover, the contest between 
privacy and fair trial rights appears to become the only focus of judicial analysis;187 early case 
law following Mills suggests that the lower courts have followed the Supreme Court in holding 
that the rights of the accused must prevail when there are doubts about ordering disclosure.188  
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Later decisions reveal the same emphasis, for example the trial judge in J.M.S,189 having 
reviewed the therapeutic files with consent, emphasised that the right to full answer and 
defence must take precedence when a record contains potentially probative material, and on 
this basis, ordered full disclosure of the entire record.190  More recent analysis of Supreme 
Court decisions in 2011 demonstrates that trial and appellate courts continue to find it 
difficult to avoid stereotyped reasoning in sexual assault cases,191 and attention to equality has 
not yet infused trial practice or appellate reasoning. 192  Overall, the post-Mills decisions 
analysed are marked by persistent judicial refusals to consider the complex concerns 
implicated within access to personal records. 
 
The privileging of the accused’s rights, the tenuous protections afforded by privacy and the 
potential to avoid the legislative regime for the disclosure of confidential records are starkly 
illustrated in the Supreme Court decision in Shearing.193  In this case, the court held that the 
usual production regime established through the statutory provisions does not apply if the 
accused is able to gain access to the complainant’s private records. The case involved a diary, 
which the complainant had left in a previous residence around 20 years prior, and which had 
fallen into the hands of the defendant.  The diary made no mention of any abuse, which was 
alleged to have occurred at the time it was written, and the defence sought to use the diary to 
contradict the complainant’s evidence.  The trial judge allowed cross-examination on entries 
considered probative, but refused permission to cross-examine on the absence of entries 
recording abuse.  Following this, the Supreme Court held that the procedural machinery in 
s278 was not appropriate here because the defence already had possession of the diary, so it 
was not a matter of deciding whether evidence should be produced to the defence.  
Furthermore, questions dealing with the absence of entries were held to be no more intrusive 
into the complainant’s privacy than those the trial judge had already permitted.194 Moreover, 
the nature and scope of the complainant’s diary did not raise privacy or other concerns of 
such importance as to ‘substantially outweigh’ the appellant’s fair trial right, and thus cross-
examination on the diary was allowed to test the accuracy and completeness of the 
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complainant’s recollection.195   Justice L’Heureux-Dube dissented on two grounds.  Firstly, she 
argued that the diary should have been returned to the complainant, and the defendant 
should have had to seek production through s278.196  By allowing the defendant access to the 
diary, he was able to ‘circumvent the statutory scheme through unlawful or wrongful means’ 
and benefit from his ‘disreputable behaviour’.197  Secondly, she commented that even if the 
defendant had acquired the diary through the proper channels initially, the prejudicial effect 
of the proposed questioning on the absence of entries would substantially outweigh its 
probative value.198   
 
The Supreme Court majority in this case failed to explore the possibility that modern 
technology could make the complainant’s records accessible to a number of third parties 
including the accused.199   The Court’s ruling of ‘if you can get it, you can cross-examine on it’ 
is out of date, as third parties may be able to access private information by ‘hacking’ through 
inadequate security arrangements.200  Furthermore, the majority decision does not recognise 
the substantive privacy and equality rights of complainants that are infringed in such cases, 
nor the discriminatory nature of allowing such evidence. A complainant’s right to privacy 
should be protected by the regime in s278 regardless of physical possession or property 
interests.201  In this way, the decision effectively undermines the protection established in Bill 
C-46.  
 
Following on from this, the standard of ‘likely relevance’ deserves some analysis.  It appears 
that a high threshold test for finding that records were ‘likely relevant’ was elaborated, as the 
court insisted that record applications must be based upon ‘case specific’ evidence that goes 
beyond general assertion.202  This has had a positive impact for complainants, leading to a 
declining frequency of production orders.203  The test was developed in Batte,204 where it was 
held that records would pass the threshold of ‘likely relevance’ ‘only if there was some basis for 
concluding that statements have some potential to provide the accused with some added 
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information not already available to the defence, or have some potential impeachment 
value’. 205   This goes some way to protecting complainants from speculative production 
requests,206 however, while the Batte decision is binding on lower courts in Ontario, the 
decision does not bind courts across Canada.207   
 
A low threshold for production is one of the key problems with the current law in England 
and Wales, as research suggests that disclosure applications are frequent,208 with fishing 
expeditions being made regularly and often successfully.209 Therefore, a regime whereby the 
defendant must raise an assertion from the level of general to specific would be beneficial.  
However, as with the systemic, societal and equality factors, judges have avoided analysing the 
‘likely relevance’ of records and in some cases, production has been ordered on the basis of 
consent of complainants and/or record holders, even though the legal foundation for this is 
uncertain.210  Moreover, records are sometimes disclosed without case specific evidentiary 
foundations, with defence rationales amounting to bare assertions or discriminatory 
generalisations. 211    This may therefore reveal that while decisions on production and 
disclosure of records rest on the ‘likely relevance’ standard, which allows for discretion and as 
a result is inconsistently applied, complainants are at risk of being discredited through the 
contents of records.   
 
The legislation also encounters problems due to its broad nature.  Bill C-46 defined the scope 
of records subject to its strict procedures extremely broadly, as ‘any form of record that 
contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy’,212 thus it 
covers a broad range of documents that do not involve an identical set of considerations.213  
While it is advantageous to include protection of such a range of documents, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has distinguished between those records in which there is a high expectation 
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of privacy, and those in which there is a lower expectation of privacy:214 ‘privacy rights will be 
most directly at stake where a record concerns aspects of one’s individual identity or where 
confidentiality is crucial to a therapeutic or trust-like relationship’.215  The effect of this is to 
provide therapeutic records with a uniquely confidential nature, thus implying that other 
records deserve less protection and justifying the release of non-therapeutic records.216  It may 
therefore be the case that more specific legislation, such as the sexual assault communications 
privilege in New South Wales, is more effective.  
 
3.2 SUMMARY 
 
As in New South Wales, the statutory drafting of s278 offers many benefits. Additionally, the 
legislation attempts to guide judges to consider context, and therefore draws attention to 
complainants’ equality rights.  As Janine Benedet notes in relation to sexual history evidence, 
but is also relevant to records disclosure, the use of such evidence is not purely wrong because 
it constitutes an invasion of privacy, but because it undermines sexual equality.217  However, 
the judicial approach to this legislation has been to relegate substantive equality to a ‘second-
order principle’, only coming into play when the legal question cannot be resolved by more 
conventional tools.218  Moving beyond this notion of equality as a second-order principle will 
require the court to develop and exercise a habit of reasoning in accordance with its equality 
jurisprudence, and this remains to be seen.  It has also been noted that there is a paucity of 
recent and comprehensive research available that examines how the third party records 
scheme has developed in more recent years,219 which does make it difficult to make concrete 
conclusions on how the legislation is being interpreted and applied across Canada.  However, 
outstanding research has found that 64 per cent of victim-survivors believed that sections 
278.1-278.91 fail to provide adequate protections for those who choose to report rape.220 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
There are several aspects of both the New South Wales and Canadian law that would benefit 
England and Wales.  Firstly, starting from the presumption of non-disclosure, as in New 
South Wales, sets a higher hurdle and offers more protection to victims.  Secondly, the ability 
of both jurisdictions to seek redaction of parts of the records to protect the safety and welfare 
of the complainant or counsellor would be a useful tool for the judiciary in England and 
Wales, who are only able to edit records to protect the broader public interest, as discussed in 
section 2.1.4.  This would ensure maximum protection even when records must be disclosed, 
and therefore attempt to lessen ‘secondary victimisation’. Thirdly, a requirement to give 
reasons for disclosure, as in Canada, would hold judges accountable and may help to reduce 
decisions based on myths and stereotypes. Fourthly, having one set of provisions that covers 
both material held by third parties and material in the hands of the prosecution, similar to 
Canada, would be beneficial as would mean that the disclosure decision is not merely based 
on the technicality of who holds the record.  And finally, on paper, the context-sensitive 
guidance given in the Canadian legislation is very significant, as it draws attention to many 
important factors that should be considered, for example it includes specific reference to 
complainant rights, and to broader interests such as encouraging reporting and counselling.  
In this way, it attempts to limit the scope of discretion whilst also influencing judges to think 
more widely about the impact of the decision. 
 
Ideally, provisions allowing standing for complainants and record holders should also be 
implemented in England and Wales, as this gives complainants a voice and a means to resist 
disclosure in the statute.  This would be preferable to the current situation in England and 
Wales, where complainants have to rely on the prosecution for this, who are often not able to 
prioritise defending their privacy interests,221 and who can only argue against disclosure in 
terms of the public interest. However, it is clear from both the Canadian research and 
research from New South Wales that this is really only effective when coupled with a scheme 
of free legal representation.  Therefore, as such a scheme is currently unlikely, such provisions 
may seem hollow. Yet, they may still be able to provide some limited benefit, for example 
through pro bono help or help from organisations such as Rape Crisis.  Furthermore, if such 
provisions were enacted, this could lead to increased funding to such organisations for this 
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purpose, and so in the future more and more women may have access to the necessary 
support.  
 
However, it is clear from both the experience in New South Wales and in Canada that judicial 
resistance to provisions that provide more protection for complainants is strong.  Both the 
sexual assault communications privilege and s278 of the Canadian Criminal Code have been 
seriously eroded by judicial interpretation, and the legislature in England and Wales would 
have to find a solution to this if they were to introduce new legislation.  In New South Wales, 
the legislature overcame this problem by redrafting the provisions several times, but in 
contrast, the law has remained unchanged in Canada, and as Gotell notes, the problem of the 
use of complainants’ personal records against them seems to have ‘fallen off the collective 
register of Canadian feminist legal studies’.222  While there is no recent research from Canada, 
there is nothing to suggest that the situation has improved.  Attention would perhaps have to 
turn to judicial and societal education as a whole before any provisions could be successful, 
and this may take time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Rape is a unique crime, presenting distinct challenges.  Identifying an incident of sexual 
intercourse as non-consensual and labelling the behaviour of its perpetrator as criminal has 
frequently given rise to difficulty, and the majority of women who are raped do not receive 
justice in terms of a conviction.1  This is amplified for women with current, or historic, mental 
health problems, with most of these cases dropping out of the system very early on.  It appears 
from the limited research available that one reason for this is linked to the perceived 
credibility of those with mental health problems.2  This is then reinforced, for those that do 
reach trial risk invasive cross-examination on the content of their mental health records.   In 
no other crime is the credibility of the complainant considered relevant to the issue of 
whether the defendant’s behaviour is criminal, and this means that while personal records can 
be sought in any criminal case, in reality, they are rarely of interest to defence lawyers in other 
cases.   
 
This thesis argues that the use of mental health records in rape trials is often based on 
unwarranted generalisations about women with mental health problems.  Records are 
requested, and their use is effective in maligning the complainant’s credibility, because of the 
wide stigmatisation of mental health problems.  Historically, many women were branded as 
‘hysterics’ and accused of making false accusations of rape against men, and this remains a 
potent backdrop for modern-day rape trials.  A juror who does not have specialised knowledge 
of mental health may hear evidence of mental problems and may, perhaps unwittingly, come 
to the same conclusion.  Alongside these historical associations between mental illness and 
sexuality, the overwhelming majority of evidence points towards wide stigmatisation of mental 
illness in modern times.  While this manifests in a variety of different views and attitudes 
towards those with mental illness, the overall effect is to increase the chance that a juror may 
hear evidence relating to a woman’s mental health and give it more weight than it deserves, or 
may come to conclusions that are unjustified based on this evidence.  
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It is also clear that the use of records unfairly disadvantages those who have experienced 
mental illness.  As Justice L’Heureux-Dube notes:  
  
[R]outine disclosure of [therapeutic] records and unrestricted cross-examination upon 
disclosure threaten to function very unfairly against anyone who has undergone 
mental or psychiatric therapy, whatever the precipitating event or nature of the 
treatment, as compared to other members of the public.  Such persons would be 
subject to an invasion of their privacy not suffered by other witnesses who are 
required to testify.  They may have to answer to details of their personal life reflected 
in their records and effectively overcome a presumption, most often entirely 
unfounded, that their medical history is relevant to their credibility and ability to 
testify on the matter in issue.3     
 
When this is viewed alongside the evidence that women with mental health problems are far 
more likely to be raped in the first place, and that women are more likely to have undergone 
counselling or some other form of mental health treatment due to the high incidence of 
sexual assault against them, it becomes clear that such use of mental health records is highly 
prejudicial. It is unacceptable that the law does not adequately protect this group of highly 
targeted women, and that those vulnerable to victimisation should be deterred from seeking 
justice.  Furthermore, allowing the use of mental health records shrinks the margins of who is 
rapeable.4  Through the presumption that such women’s accounts need to be more carefully 
scrutinised, sex without consent for those with mental health problems is normalised as being 
something other than ‘rape’, and is therefore ‘effectively decriminalised’.5  Therefore, just as 
we must avoid general rape myths about rape complainants, so too must we avoid myths about 
the veracity and credibility of women with mental health problems.   
 
While it is difficult to evaluate the effects of the law on disclosure of mental health records 
due to lack of research, it is clear that the law relies on out-dated and inaccurate conceptions 
of relevance, whilst also failing to adequately protect the complainants interests.  In the 
                                                      
3 R v Osolin [1993] 2 SCR 595 at [496] 
4 Katherine Kelly, ‘"You Must Be Crazy If You Think You Were Raped": Reflections on the 
Use of Complainants' Personal and Therapy Records in Sexul Assault Trials’ (1997) 9 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 178, 195 
5 Katrin Hohl and Elisabeth Stanko, ‘Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: 
Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European Journal 
of Criminology 324, 325 
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absence of any clear framework governing the admissibility of psychiatric evidence in criminal 
proceedings, rape complainants are ‘likely to face continued gratuitous attacks against their 
credibility during cross-examination’.6   
 
Therefore, a coherent principled approach is required in England and Wales.  The law would 
benefit from distinct rules relating to disclosure of mental health records in rape cases, as this 
would draw public and judicial attention to the particular issues raised in relation to these, 
and would serve to provide specific protection for this vulnerable group of women.  Firstly, 
these rules should be the same regardless of who has the record or who has seen it, as the 
distinction made in the current formation of the law is arbitrary and illogical.  Secondly, the 
rules should start from the presumption of non-disclosure, as in New South Wales. This 
would be beneficial both in practical terms, as would place a higher burden on the defence, 
and in symbolic terms, as would serve to show that it is rare for mental illness to affect 
credibility, rather than this being the norm.  
 
Thirdly, these distinct rules should also place a higher burden on the defence in terms of the 
assertion of the relevance of any records. As Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon argue, 
any underlying assumption of relevance should not be misleading or discriminatory,7 and the 
defence should have to do more than just show that a witness has been diagnosed with a 
specific psychiatric condition or has received psychiatric treatment, regardless of the severity of 
the witness’s current or past mental health problem.8  Rather, the defence should have to 
demonstrate a scientific link between the record and the credibility of the complainant,9 
showing how a complainant’s capacity to provide reliable evidence is affected by the mental 
illness.  Furthermore, when judges are assessing the relevance of any mental health records 
requested by the defence, a contextual approach should be taken, as was intended by the 
legislature in Canada. Given that there is such strong evidence demonstrating the wide 
stigmatisation of mental illness, it is clear that in this area there are many myths and 
stereotypes. It is therefore important that any decision of relevance takes into account the 
potential prejudicial effect of such evidence.  In addition, it is important to also consider the 
                                                      
6 Louise Ellison, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric Evidence in Rape Trials’ (2009) 13(1) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 28, 42 
7 Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon, ‘The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analysing 
Sexual Assault as If Equality Really Mattered’ (1998) 41 Criminal Law Quarterly 198, 232 
8 Ellison, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric Evidence’ (n6) 42 
9 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, ‘Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibility of a 
Sexual Assault Complainant’ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1373, 1376 
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wider issues surrounding rape more generally, such as low reporting rates and high attrition 
rates, and how allowing the use of such evidence may impact upon these.   
 
Moreover, the law in England and Wales would benefit from several procedural rules that are 
in place in other jurisdictions.  These include enforcing stricter notice provisions, to ensure 
that the complainant and third party are adequately warned that records are being requested; 
complainant standing and legal representation, to ensure that her interests are fully protected; 
the ability for judges to make a range of orders to limit the harm if records are disclosed, such 
as ordering evidence to be heard in camera, suppression of some sections of evidence or 
removal of names and addresses; and a requirement of judicial reasons for decisions made in 
relation to disclosure of mental health records, to hold judges accountable and to increase 
transparency in the decision-making process in an attempt to remove mythical bases of 
decision-making.  Even without substantial reform, these procedural requirements are a very 
useful tool and would by themselves greatly improve the protection offered to the 
complainant. 
 
The enactment of any progressive legislation may however be undermined by prevailing 
attitudes and assumptions which reform of the substantial law does little to change.  In both 
Canada and New South Wales, it has been the case that reform has been met with counter-
moves by the judiciary in the form of resistance and subsequent interpretation. For example, 
in Canada, the failure to pay adequate attention to equality is not caused by the absence of 
legal tools or a lack of helpful precedent.10  Rather, the equality reasoning that characterised 
legislative reforms and judicial decisions in the 1990s seems to have been marginalised within 
subsequent trial practice, leading Lise Gotell to conclude that ‘once again this gesture in the 
direction of complainants is pulled back by the majority’s virtual rewriting of the legislative 
regime’.11  This pattern has also been clear in reform of law that has been generated to 
overcome sex discrimination in the adjudication of rape in England and Wales.  For example, 
the failure of firstly s2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 197612 and secondly s41 of 
                                                      
10 Emma Cuncliffe, ‘Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight of 
Substantive Equality’ (2012) 57 Supreme Court Law Review 295, 301 
11 Lise Gotell, ‘The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of 
Confidential Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law’ (2002) 40 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 251, 270 
12 Zsuzsanna Adler, ‘The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems of 
Subjective Interpretation’ (1985) Criminal Law Review 769-780; Zsuzsanna Adler, Rape on Trial 
(London: Routledge, 1987) 79; Jennifer Temkin, ‘Sexual History Evidence - the Ravishment of 
Section 2’ (1993) Criminal Law Review 3, 20 
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the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 199913 to restrict the use of sexual history 
evidence shows that the success of statutory intervention rests heavily on the attitudes and 
behaviour of legal professionals involved in its implementation.  This has also been an issue 
with drunken consent.  As Lacey notes, s74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 points ‘in the 
direction which cogent feminist analyses have argued to be desirable’,14 and in R v Bree,15 
principled statements have been made regarding both the need for positive consent, and the 
idea that capacity can be lost before unconsciousness.  However, this does not appear to be 
the general assumption in later case law. For example, in R v H16 the argument was made that 
the sixteen year old complainant was still functioning as she was walking and talking, despite 
being extremely drunk and having sexual intercourse with a man within minutes of meeting 
him.  So again, it is the operationalisation of such principles that appears to be elusive.17  
Experience therefore shows the potential limitations of evidentiary innovation in effecting 
change in the absence of institutional support.  
 
So what does this mean for reform of the law relating to use of mental health records in rape 
trials?  Although it is difficult to predict with any certainty, evidence suggests that there may be 
resistance to tighter restrictions on the use of mental health records, even though this may go 
unacknowledged, and may perhaps be unconscious and unrecognised.18  Temkin and Krahé’s 
research into legal professionals’ attitudes suggests that many believe that it is in the interests 
of the defence to have access to records, and that they are often relevant.19   This, along with 
evidence of wide stigmatisation of mental health, lack of general knowledge relating to how 
mental health affects credibility and belief in false allegations, points towards the possibility 
                                                      
13 Jennifer Temkin, ‘Sexual History Evidence - Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Criminal Law 
Review 217, 227; Ian Dennis, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Evaluating Section 41’ (2006) Criminal 
Law Review 869, 870; Liz Kelly, Jennifer Temkin and Sue Griffiths, Section 41: An Evaluation of 
New Legislation Limiting Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials (London: Home Office Online 
Report 20/06, 2006) 23; Clare McGlynn, ‘Feminist Judgment: R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25’ 
in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory 
to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 225; Jennifer Temkin, ‘Rape Myths and Rape Trials’ (paper 
presented at Representations of Sex: Criminal Evidence and the Impact on Jury Decision-
Making, 17th April 2015, Northumbria University) 
14 Nicola Lacey, ‘Beset by Boundaries: The Home Office Review of Sexual Offences’ (2001) 
Criminal Law Review 3, 12 
15 R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256 
16 R v H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 
17 Clare McGlynn, ‘Feminist Activisim and Rape Law Reform in England and Wales: A  
Sisyphean Struggle?’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Routledge, 2010) 150 
18 Ibid 
19 Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008) 154-155 
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that some members of the judiciary would continue to allow disclosure.  Having said this, 
reform may still encourage positive change.  As Victoria Nourse suggests, feminist reform of 
the criminal law involves both success and failure, so is not futile.20  While successes may be 
neutralised in practice, the situation may still be better than it was before any reform, even if 
only marginally.  Thus, in this way, important improvements to the law on rape can be made, 
albeit slowly.21  This could also be supported by education initiatives to increase the chance of 
significant change. It is clear from the experience in both New South Wales and Canada that 
education relating to any new law is important.  In NSW, the specialist legal aid sexual assault 
communications privilege service also aims to raise awareness of the changes to the law, and 
evidence suggests that this education initiative has been successful, and awareness of the 
privilege has increased.22  In contrast, research from Canada has found that very few legal 
actors were even aware of the preambles of s278, and seemed surprised when informed that 
the provisions direct judges to consider the equality interests of the complainant.23  As well as 
this, many complainants are still unaware that they are entitled to representations by 
independent counsel during records production applications.24  Any education initiative could 
also be extended to mental health more generally.  For example, Mind called for compulsory 
mental health awareness training for all criminal justice personnel.25  This may help to reduce 
mythical basis for decision-making. 
 
Ultimately, the focus in a rape trial needs to be shifted back towards the defendant; the 
existence of any rape supportive attitudes he may have, the reasons he thought the 
complainant consented, and his credibility.  Retaining a focus on the complainant’s character 
through the use of mental health records not only reinforces rape myths, but also myths about 
those who suffer from mental illness.  
  
                                                      
20 Victoria Nourse, ‘The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law’ 
(1999-2000) 75 Chicago-Kent Law Review 951, 951 
21 McGlynn, ‘Feminist Activisim and Rape Law Reform in England and Wales’ (n17) 151 
22 Alicia Jillard, Janet Loughman and Edwina MacDonald, ‘From Pilot Project to Systemic 
Reform: Keeping Sexual Assault Victims' Counselling Records Confidential’ (2012) 37 
Alternative Law Journal 254, 255 
23 Renate Mohr, "Words Are Not Enough": Sexual Assault Legislation, Education and Information 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, Bill C-49 and C-46 Key Informant Study, 2002) 20 
24 Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Statutory Review on the 
Provisions and Operation of the Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Production of Records in Sexual 
Offence Proceedings): Final Report (2012) 27 
25 Mind, Another Assault: Mind's Campaign for Equal Access to Justice for People with Mental Health 
Problems (London: Mind, 2007) 23 
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APPENDICES  
 
APPENDIX 1: S3 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 
1996  
 
3  Initial duty of prosecutor to disclose 
 
(1) The prosecutor must— 
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been 
disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the 
case for the accused, or 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description 
mentioned in paragraph (a). 
 
(2) For the purposes of this section prosecution material is material— 
(a) which is in the prosecutor’s possession, and came into his possession in 
connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused, or 
(b) which, in pursuance of a code operative under Part II, he has inspected in 
connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused. 
 
(3) Where material consists of information which has been recorded in any form the 
prosecutor discloses it for the purposes of this section— 
(a) by securing that a copy is made of it and that the copy is given to the accused, or 
(b) if in the prosecutor’s opinion that is not practicable or not desirable, by allowing 
the accused to inspect it at a reasonable time and a reasonable place or by taking 
steps to secure that he is allowed to do so; 
and a copy may be in such form as the prosecutor thinks fit and need not be in the same 
form as that in which the information has already been recorded. 
 
(4) Where material consists of information which has not been recorded the prosecutor 
discloses it for the purposes of this section by securing that it is recorded in such form as 
he thinks fit and— 
(a) by securing that a copy is made of it and that the copy is given to the accused, or 
(b) if in the prosecutor’s opinion that is not practicable or not desirable, by allowing 
the accused to inspect it at a reasonable time and a reasonable place or by taking 
steps to secure that he is allowed to do so. 
 
(5) Where material does not consist of information the prosecutor discloses it for the 
purposes of this section by allowing the accused to inspect it at a reasonable time and a 
reasonable place or by taking steps to secure that he is allowed to do so. 
 
(6) Material must not be disclosed under this section to the extent that the court, on an 
application by the prosecutor, concludes it is not in the public interest to disclose it and 
orders accordingly. 
 
(7) Material must not be disclosed under this section to the extent that it is material the 
disclosure of which is prohibited by section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000. 
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(8) The prosecutor must act under this section during the period which, by virtue of section 
12, is the relevant period for this section. 
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APPENDIX 2: GUIDANCE ON APPLICATIONS FOR NON-DISCLOSURE IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST SET OUT IN R V H AND C [2004] UKHL 3 AT [36] 
When any issue of derogation from the golden rule of full disclosure comes before it, the 
court must address a series of questions:  
(1) What is the material which the prosecution seek to withhold? This must be 
considered by the court in detail.  
(2) Is the material such as may weaken the prosecution case or strengthen that of the 
defence? If No, disclosure should not be ordered. If Yes, full disclosure should 
(subject to (3), (4) and (5) below) be ordered.  
(3) Is there a real risk of serious prejudice to an important public interest (and, if so, 
what) if full disclosure of the material is ordered? If No, full disclosure should be 
ordered.  
(4) If the answer to (2) and (3) is Yes, can the defendant’s interest be protected without 
disclosure or disclosure be ordered to an extent or in a way which will give adequate 
protection to the public interest in question and also afford adequate protection to 
the interests of the defence?  
This question requires the court to consider, with specific reference to the material which the 
prosecution seek to withhold and the facts of the case and the defence as disclosed, whether 
the prosecution should formally admit what the defence seek to establish or whether 
disclosure short of full disclosure may be ordered. This may be done in appropriate cases by 
the preparation of summaries or extracts of evidence, or the provision of documents in an 
edited or anonymised form, provided the documents supplied are in each instance approved 
by the judge. In appropriate cases the appointment of special counsel may be a necessary step 
to ensure that the contentions of the prosecution are tested and the interests of the defendant 
protected (see para 22 above). In cases of exceptional difficulty the court may require the 
appointment of special counsel to ensure a correct answer to questions (2) and (3) as well as 
(4).  
(5) Do the measures proposed in answer to (4) represent the minimum derogation 
necessary to protect the public interest in question? If No, the court should order such 
greater disclosure as will represent the minimum derogation from the golden rule of 
full disclosure.  
(6)  If limited disclosure is ordered pursuant to (4) or (5), may the effect be to render the 
trial process, viewed as a whole, unfair to the defendant? If Yes, then fuller disclosure 
should be ordered even if this leads or may lead the prosecution to discontinue the 
proceedings so as to avoid having to make disclosure.  
(7)  If the answer to (6) when first given is No, does that remain the correct answer as the 
trial unfolds, evidence is adduced and the defence advanced?  
It is important that the answer to (6) should not be treated as a final, once-and- for-all, answer 
but as a provisional answer which the court must keep under review. 
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APPENDIX 3: S2 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (ATTENDANCE OF 
WITNESSES) ACT 1965  
 
2  Issue of witness summons on application to Crown Court. 
 
(1) This section applies where the Crown Court is satisfied that— 
(a) a person is likely to be able to give evidence likely to be material evidence, or 
produce any document or thing likely to be material evidence, for the purpose of 
any criminal proceedings before the Crown Court, and 
(b) the person will not voluntarily attend as a witness or will not voluntarily produce 
the document or thing. 
 
(2) In such a case the Crown Court shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, 
issue a summons (a witness summons) directed to the person concerned and requiring 
him to— 
(a) attend before the Crown Court at the time and place stated in the summons, and 
(b) give the evidence or produce the document or thing. 
 
(3) A witness summons may only be issued under this section on an application; and the 
Crown Court may refuse to issue the summons if any requirement relating to the 
application is not fulfilled. 
 
(4) Where a person has been committed for trial, or sent for trial under section 51 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, for any offence to which the proceedings concerned relate, 
an application must be made as soon as is reasonably practicable after the committal. 
 
(5) Where the proceedings concerned have been transferred to the Crown Court, an 
application must be made as soon as is reasonably practicable after the transfer. 
 
(6) Where the proceedings concerned relate to an offence in relation to which a bill of 
indictment has been preferred under the authority of section 2(2)(b) of the 
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 (bill preferred by direction 
of Court of Appeal, or by direction or with consent of judge) an application must be made 
as soon as is reasonably practicable after the bill was preferred. 
 
(7) An application must be made in accordance with Crown Court rules; and different 
provision may be made for different cases or descriptions of case. 
 
(8) Crown Court rules— 
(a) may, in such cases as the rules may specify, require an application to be made by a 
party to the case; 
(b) may, in such cases as the rules may specify, require the service of notice of an 
application on the person to whom the witness summons is proposed to be 
directed; 
(c) may, in such cases as the rules may specify, require an application to be supported 
by an affidavit containing such matters as the rules may stipulate; 
(d) may, in such cases as the rules may specify, make provision for enabling the 
person to whom the witness summons is proposed to be directed to be present or 
represented at the hearing of the application for the witness summons. 
 
(9) Provision contained in Crown Court rules by virtue of subsection (8)(c) above may in 
particular require an affidavit to— 
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(a) set out any charge on which the proceedings concerned are based; 
(b) specify any stipulated evidence, document or thing in such a way as to enable the 
directed person to identify it; 
(c) specify grounds for believing that the directed person is likely to be able to give 
any stipulated evidence or produce any stipulated document or thing; 
(d) specify grounds for believing that any stipulated evidence is likely to be material 
evidence; 
(e) specify grounds for believing that any stipulated document or thing is likely to be 
material evidence. 
 
(10) In subsection (9) above— 
(a) references to any stipulated evidence, document or thing are to any evidence, 
document or thing whose giving or production is proposed to be required by the 
witness summons; 
(b) references to the directed person are to the person to whom the witness summons 
is proposed to be directed. 
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APPENDIX 4: S295-306 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 1986 (NSW) 
 
295 Interpretation 
 
(1) Definitions In this Division:  
 
"criminal proceedings" means: 
(a) proceedings relating to the trial or sentencing of a person for an offence (whether or 
not a sexual assault offence) including pre-trial and interlocutory proceedings but not 
preliminary criminal proceedings, or 
(b) proceedings relating to an order under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 
2007 . 
 
"harm" includes actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, stress or shock, damage to 
reputation or emotional or psychological harm (such as shame, humiliation and fear).  
 
"preliminary criminal proceedings" means any of the following: 
(a) committal proceedings, 
(b) proceedings relating to bail (including proceedings during the trial or sentencing of a 
person), 
whether or not in relation to a sexual assault offence.  
 
"principal protected confider" means the victim or alleged victim of a sexual assault 
offence by, to or about whom a protected confidence is made.  
 
"protected confidence" -see section 296.  
 
"protected confider" , in relation to a protected confidence, means: 
(a) the principal protected confider, or 
(b) any other person who made the protected confidence. 
 
"sexual assault offence" means: 
(a) a prescribed sexual offence, or 
(a1) acts that would constitute a prescribed sexual offence if those acts: 
(i) had occurred in this State, or 
(ii) had occurred at some later date, or 
(iii) had both occurred in this State and occurred at some later date, or 
(b) any other offence prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition. 
 
(2) Document recording a protected confidence In this Division, a reference to a document 
recording a protected confidence: 
(a) is a reference to any part of the document that records a protected confidence or 
any report, observation, opinion, advice, recommendation or other matter that 
relates to the protected confidence made by a protected confider, and 
(b) includes a reference to any copy, reproduction or duplicate of that part of the 
document. 
 
(3) Electronic documents For the purposes of this Division, if a document recording a 
protected confidence is stored electronically and a written document recording the 
protected confidence could be created by use of equipment that is usually available for 
retrieving or collating such stored information, the document stored electronically is to be 
dealt with as if it were a written document so created. 
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296 What is a protected confidence? 
 
(1) In this Division: "protected confidence" means a counselling communication that is made 
by, to or about a victim or alleged victim of a sexual assault offence. 
 
(2) A counselling communication is a protected confidence for the purposes of this Division 
even if it: 
(a) was made before the acts constituting the relevant sexual assault offence occurred 
or are alleged to have occurred, or 
(b) was not made in connection with a sexual assault offence or alleged sexual assault 
offence or any condition arising from a sexual assault offence or alleged sexual 
assault offence. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a communication may be made in confidence even if it is 
made in the presence of a third party if the third party is present to facilitate 
communication or to otherwise further the counselling process. 
 
(4) In this section: "counselling communication" means a communication: 
(a) made in confidence by a person (the "counselled person" ) to another person (the 
"counsellor" ) who is counselling the person in relation to any harm the person 
may have suffered, or 
(b) made in confidence to or about the counselled person by the counsellor in the 
course of that counselling, or 
(c) made in confidence about the counselled person by a counsellor or a parent, carer 
or other supportive person who is present to facilitate communication between 
the counselled person and the counsellor or to otherwise further the counselling 
process, or 
(d) made in confidence by or to the counsellor, by or to another counsellor or by or 
to a person who is counselling, or has at any time counselled, the person. 
 
(5) For the purposes of this section, a person "counsels" another person if: 
(a) the person has undertaken training or study or has experience that is relevant to 
the process of counselling persons who have suffered harm, and 
(b) the person: 
(i) listens to and gives verbal or other support or encouragement to the other 
person, or 
(ii) advises, gives therapy to or treats the other person, whether or not for fee or 
reward. 
 
297 Protected confidences-preliminary criminal proceedings 
 
(1) A person cannot seek to compel (whether by subpoena or any other procedure) any other 
person to produce a document recording a protected confidence in, or in connection 
with, any preliminary criminal proceedings. 
 
(2) A document recording a protected confidence cannot be produced in, or in connection 
with, any preliminary criminal proceedings. 
 
(3) Evidence cannot be adduced in any preliminary criminal proceedings if it would disclose a 
protected confidence or the contents of a document recording a protected confidence. 
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298 Protected confidences-criminal proceedings 
 
(1) Except with the leave of the court, a person cannot seek to compel (whether by subpoena 
or any other procedure) any other person to produce a document recording a protected 
confidence in, or in connection with, any criminal proceedings. 
 
(2) Except with the leave of the court, a document recording a protected confidence cannot 
be produced in, or in connection with, any criminal proceedings. 
 
(3) Except with the leave of the court, evidence cannot be adduced in any criminal 
proceedings if it would disclose a protected confidence or the contents of a document 
recording a protected confidence. 
 
299 Court to inform of rights under Division 
 
If it appears to a court that a witness, party or protected confider may have grounds for 
making an application under this Division or objecting to the production of a document or 
the adducing of evidence, the court must satisfy itself (or if there is a jury, in the absence of 
the jury) that the person is aware of the relevant provisions of this Division and has been given 
a reasonable opportunity to seek legal advice. 
 
299A Protected confider has standing 
 
A protected confider who is not a party may appear in criminal proceedings or preliminary 
criminal proceedings if a document is sought to be produced or evidence is sought to be 
adduced that may disclose a protected confidence made by, to or about the protected 
confider. 
 
299B Determining if there is a protected confidence 
 
(1) If a question arises under this Division relating to a document or evidence, a court may 
consider the document or evidence. 
 
(2) If there is a jury, the document or evidence is to be considered in the absence of the jury. 
 
(3) A court must not make available or disclose to a party (other than a protected confider) 
any document or evidence to which this section applies (or the contents of any such 
document) unless: 
(a) the court determines that the document does not record a protected confidence 
or that the evidence would not disclose a protected confidence, or 
(b) a party has been given leave under this Division in relation to the document or 
evidence and making available or disclosing the document or evidence is 
consistent with that leave. 
 
(4) A court may make any orders it thinks fit to facilitate its consideration of a document or 
evidence under this section. 
 
(5) This section has effect despite sections 297 and 298. 
 
299C Notice of application for leave 
 
(1) An applicant for leave under this Division must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, give 
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notice in writing of the application to each other party and each relevant protected 
confider (or the protected confider’s nominee) that: 
(a) specifies the document that is sought to be produced or the evidence that is 
sought to be adduced, and 
(b) in the case of a notice to a protected confider who is not a party to the 
proceedings-advises the protected confider that the protected confider may appear 
in the proceedings concerned, and 
(c) in the case of an application for leave to compel (whether by subpoena or any 
other procedure) a person to produce a document-specifies the day on which the 
document is to be produced, and 
(d) in the case of an application for leave to adduce evidence-specifies the day (if 
known) when the proceedings are to be heard, and 
(e) includes any other matter that may be prescribed by the regulations. 
 
(2) A requirement to give notice to a protected confider who is not a party to proceedings is 
satisfied for the purposes of this section if the notice is given to: 
(a) the prosecutor in the criminal proceedings, or 
(b) if the regulations prescribe a different person or body, that person or body. 
 
(3) A prosecutor (or person or body) who is given a copy of a notice under subsection (2) 
must ensure that a copy of the notice is given to the protected confider within a 
reasonable time after its receipt. 
 
(4) A court cannot grant an application for leave under this Division until at least 14 days (or 
such shorter period as may be fixed by the court) after the relevant notices have been 
given under subsection (1) or (2). 
 
(5) A court may waive the requirement to give notice if: 
(a) notice has already been given in respect of an application under this Division, 
being an application that relates to the same protected confidence and the same 
criminal proceedings, or 
(b) the principal protected confider has consented in writing to the notice being 
waived, or 
(c) the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances that require the 
notice to be waived. 
 
(6) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the giving of notices under this 
section. 
 
299D Determining whether to grant leave 
 
(1) The court cannot grant an application for leave under this Division unless the court is 
satisfied that: 
(a) the document or evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other 
documents or evidence produced or adduced or to be produced or adduced by 
the party seeking to produce or adduce the document or evidence, have 
substantial probative value, and 
(b) other documents or evidence concerning the matters to which the protected 
confidence relates are not available, and 
(c) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected confidences and 
protecting the principal protected confider from harm is substantially outweighed 
by the public interest in admitting into evidence information or the contents of a 
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document of substantial probative value. 
 
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of 
determining the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected confidences 
and protecting the principal protected confider from harm, the court must take into 
account the following: 
(a) the need to encourage victims of sexual offences to seek counselling, 
(b) that the effectiveness of counselling is likely to be dependent on the maintenance 
of the confidentiality of the counselling relationship, 
(c) the public interest in ensuring that victims of sexual offences receive effective 
counselling, 
(d) that the disclosure of the protected confidence is likely to damage or undermine 
the relationship between the counsellor and the counselled person, 
(e) whether disclosure of the protected confidence is sought on the basis of a 
discriminatory belief or bias, 
(f) that the adducing of the evidence is likely to infringe a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
 
(3) For the purposes of determining an application for leave under this Division, the court 
may permit a confidential statement to be made to it by or on behalf of the principal 
protected confider by affidavit specifying the harm the confider is likely to suffer if the 
application for leave is granted. 
 
(4) A court must not disclose or make available to a party (other than the principal protected 
confider) any confidential statement made to the court under this section by or on behalf 
of the principal protected confider. 
 
(5) The court must state its reasons for granting or refusing to grant an application for leave 
under this Division. 
 
(6) If there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any application for leave under this 
Division in the absence of the jury. 
 
300 Effect of consent 
 
(1) This Division does not prevent the production of any document recording a protected 
confidence or the adducing of evidence disclosing a protected confidence or the contents 
of a document recording a protected confidence, in, or in connection with, any 
proceedings, if the principal protected confider to whom the proceedings relate has 
consented to the production of the document or adducing of the evidence. 
 
(2) Consent is not effective for the purposes of this section unless: 
(a) the consent is given in writing, and 
(b) the consent expressly relates to the production of a document or adducing of 
evidence that is privileged under this Division or would be so privileged except for 
a limitation or restriction imposed by this Division. 
 
301 Loss of sexual assault communications privilege: misconduct 
 
(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication made, or 
the production or adducing of a document prepared, in the furtherance of the 
commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person 
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liable to a civil penalty. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act is a fact in 
issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that: 
(a) the fraud, offence or act was committed, and 
(b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission 
of the fraud, offence or act, 
the court may find that the communication was so made or document so prepared. 
 
302 Ancillary orders 
 
(1) Without limiting any action the court may take to limit the possible harm, or extent of 
the harm, likely to be caused by the disclosure of evidence of, or the contents of a 
document recording, a protected confidence, the court may: 
(a) order that all or part of the evidence be heard or document produced in camera, 
and 
(b) make such orders relating to the production and inspection of the document as, 
in the opinion of the court, are necessary to protect the safety and welfare of any 
protected confider. 
 
(2) Nothing in this section limits the power of a court to make an order under section 106 or 
119 of this Act or section 578A of the Crimes Act 1900. 
 
305 Inadmissibility of evidence 
 
Evidence that, because of this Division, cannot be adduced or given in proceedings is not 
admissible in the proceedings. 
 
305A Subpoenas for production of counselling communications 
 
The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the issue and service of subpoenas 
requiring the production of a document recording a counselling communication (within the 
meaning of section 296) in, or in connection with, any criminal proceedings or preliminary 
criminal proceedings, including the following: 
(a) the manner and time in which a subpoena must be served, 
(b) the form of a subpoena, 
(c) any documents or information that must be included with a subpoena. 
 
306 Application of common law 
 
(1) This Division does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of the common law in 
relation to evidence in criminal proceedings, except so far as this Division provides 
otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. 
 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), this Division does not affect the operation of such a 
principle or rule so far as it relates to the inspection of a document required to be 
produced in, or in connection with, criminal proceedings. 
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APPENDIX 5: S278.1-278.91 OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE 
 
278.1 Definition of “record” 
 
For the purposes of sections 278.2 to 278.9, “record” means any form of record that contains 
personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and includes, 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, 
education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals 
and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of 
which is protected by any other Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature, but does not 
include records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the 
offence. 
 
278.2 Production of records to accused 
 
(1) Except in accordance with sections 278.3 to 278.91, no record relating to a complainant 
or a witness shall be produced to an accused in any proceedings in respect of any of the 
following offences or in any proceedings in respect of two or more offences at least one of 
which is any of the following offences: 
(a) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 170, 171, 172, 
173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 286.1, 
286.2 or 286.3; or 
(b) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which 
this paragraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence 
referred to in paragraph (a) if it occurred on or after that day. 
 
(2) Section 278.1, this section and sections 278.3 to 278.91 apply where a record is in the 
possession or control of any person, including the prosecutor in the proceedings, unless, 
in the case of a record in the possession or control of the prosecutor, the complainant or 
witness to whom the record relates has expressly waived the application of those sections. 
 
(3) In the case of a record in respect of which this section applies that is in the possession or 
control of the prosecutor, the prosecutor shall notify the accused that the record is in the 
prosecutor’s possession but, in doing so, the prosecutor shall not disclose the record’s 
contents. 
 
278.3 Application for production 
 
(1) An accused who seeks production of a record referred to in subsection 278.2(1) must 
make an application to the judge before whom the accused is to be, or is being, tried. 
 
(2) For greater certainty, an application under subsection (1) may not be made to a judge or 
justice presiding at any other proceedings, including a preliminary inquiry. 
 
(3) An application must be made in writing and set out 
(a) particulars identifying the record that the accused seeks to have produced and the 
name of the person who has possession or control of the record; and 
(b) the grounds on which the accused relies to establish that the record is likely 
relevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify. 
 
(4) Any one or more of the following assertions by the accused are not sufficient on their own 
to establish that the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a 
  131 
witness to testify: 
(a) that the record exists; 
(b) that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling 
that the complainant or witness has received or is receiving; 
(c) that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of the 
proceedings; 
(d) that the record may disclose a prior inconsistent statement of the complainant or 
witness; 
(e) that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or witness; 
(f) that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the complainant or 
witness merely because the complainant or witness has received or is receiving 
psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling; 
(g) that the record may reveal allegations of sexual abuse of the complainant by a 
person other than the accused; 
(h) that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant with any person, 
including the accused; 
(i) that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent complaint; 
(j) that the record relates to the complainant’s sexual reputation; or 
(k) that the record was made close in time to a complaint or to the activity that forms 
the subject-matter of the charge against the accused. 
 
(5) The accused shall serve the application on the prosecutor, on the person who has 
possession or control of the record, on the complainant or witness, as the case may be, 
and on any other person to whom, to the knowledge of the accused, the record relates, at 
least 14 days before the hearing referred to in subsection 278.4(1) or any shorter interval 
that the judge may allow in the interests of justice. The accused shall also serve a subpoena 
issued under Part XXII in Form 16.1 on the person who has possession or control of the 
record at the same time as the application is served. 
 
(6) The judge may at any time order that the application be served on any person to whom 
the judge considers the record may relate. 
 
 
278.4 Hearing in camera 
 
(1) The judge shall hold a hearing in camera to determine whether to order the person who 
has possession or control of the record to produce it to the court for review by the judge. 
 
(2) The person who has possession or control of the record, the complainant or witness, as 
the case may be, and any other person to whom the record relates may appear and make 
submissions at the hearing, but they are not compellable as witnesses at the hearing. 
 
(2.1) The judge shall, as soon as feasible, inform any person referred to in subsection (2) who          
participates in the hearing of their right to be represented by counsel. 
 
(3) No order for costs may be made against a person referred to in subsection (2) in respect of 
their participation in the hearing. 
 
278.5 Judge may order production of records for review 
 
(1) The judge may order the person who has possession or control of the record to produce 
the record or part of the record to the court for review by the judge if, after the hearing 
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referred to in subsection 278.4(1), the judge is satisfied that 
(a) the application was made in accordance with subsections 278.3(2) to (6); 
(b) the accused has established that the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial or 
to the competence of a witness to testify; and 
(c) the production of the record is necessary in the interests of justice. 
 
(2) In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record for 
review pursuant to subsection (1), the judge shall consider the salutary and deleterious 
effects of the determination on the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence and 
on the right to privacy, personal security and equality of the complainant or witness, as 
the case may be, and of any other person to whom the record relates. In particular, the 
judge shall take the following factors into account: 
(a) the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make a full answer 
and defence; 
(b) the probative value of the record; 
(c) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
record; 
(d) whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias; 
(e) the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person 
to whom the record relates; 
(f) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; 
(g) society’s interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of 
sexual offences; and 
(h) the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process. 
 
278.6 Review of record by judge 
 
(1) Where the judge has ordered the production of the record or part of the record for 
review, the judge shall review it in the absence of the parties in order to determine 
whether the record or part of the record should be produced to the accused. 
 
(2) The judge may hold a hearing in camera if the judge considers that it will assist in making 
the determination. 
 
(3) Subsections 278.4(2) to (3) apply in the case of a hearing under subsection (2). 
 
278.7 Judge may order production of record to accused  
 
(1) Where the judge is satisfied that the record or part of the record is likely relevant to an 
issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify and its production is necessary in 
the interests of justice, the judge may order that the record or part of the record that is 
likely relevant be produced to the accused, subject to any conditions that may be imposed 
pursuant to subsection (3). 
 
(2) In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record to the 
accused, the judge shall consider the salutary and deleterious effects of the determination 
on the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence and on the right to privacy, 
personal security and equality of the complainant or witness, as the case may be, and of 
any other person to whom the record relates and, in particular, shall take the factors 
specified in paragraphs 278.5(2)(a) to (h) into account. 
 
(3) If the judge orders the production of the record or part of the record to the accused, the 
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judge may impose conditions on the production to protect the interests of justice and, to 
the greatest extent possible, the privacy, personal security and equality interests of the 
complainant or witness, as the case may be, and of any other person to whom the record 
relates, including, for example, the following conditions: 
(a) that the record be edited as directed by the judge; 
(b) that a copy of the record, rather than the original, be produced; 
(c) that the accused and counsel for the accused not disclose the contents of the 
record to any other person, except with the approval of the court; 
(d) that the record be viewed only at the offices of the court; 
(e) that no copies of the record be made or that restrictions be imposed on the 
number of copies of the record that may be made; and 
(f) that information regarding any person named in the record, such as their address, 
telephone number and place of employment, be severed from the record. 
 
(4) Where the judge orders the production of the record or part of the record to the accused, 
the judge shall direct that a copy of the record or part of the record be provided to the 
prosecutor, unless the judge determines that it is not in the interests of justice to do so. 
 
(5) The record or part of the record that is produced to the accused pursuant to an order 
under subsection (1) shall not be used in any other proceedings. 
 
(6) Where the judge refuses to order the production of the record or part of the record to the 
accused, the record or part of the record shall, unless a court orders otherwise, be kept in 
a sealed package by the court until the later of the expiration of the time for any appeal 
and the completion of any appeal in the proceedings against the accused, whereupon the 
record or part of the record shall be returned to the person lawfully entitled to possession 
or control of it. 
 
 
278.8  Reasons for decision  
 
(1) The judge shall provide reasons for ordering or refusing to order the production of the 
record or part of the record pursuant to subsection 278.5(1) or 278.7(1). 
(2) The reasons referred to in subsection (1) shall be entered in the record of the proceedings 
or, where the proceedings are not recorded, shall be provided in writing. 
 
278.9  Publication prohibited  
 
(1) No person shall publish in any document, or broadcast or transmit in any way, any of the 
following: 
(a) the contents of an application made under section 278.3; 
(b) any evidence taken, information given or submissions made at a hearing under 
subsection 278.4(1) or 278.6(2); or 
(c) the determination of the judge pursuant to subsection 278.5(1) or 278.7(1) and 
the reasons provided pursuant to section 278.8, unless the judge, after taking into 
account the interests of justice and the right to privacy of the person to whom the 
record relates, orders that the determination may be published. 
 
(2) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on 
summary conviction. 
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278.91   Appeal 
 
For the purposes of sections 675 and 676, a determination to make or refuse to make an 
order pursuant to subsection 278.5(1) or 278.7(1) is deemed to be a question of law. 
 
 
  
  135 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adler Z, ‘The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems of Subjective 
Interpretation’ (1985) Criminal Law Review 769-780 
Adler Z, Rape on Trial (London: Routledge, 1987) 
Angermeyer M, Dietrich S, Pott D and Matschinger H, ‘Media Consumtion and Desire for 
Social Distance Towards People with Schizophrenia’ (2005) 20(3) European Psychiatry 246-
250 
Appignanesi L, Mad, Bad or Sad: A History of Women and the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the 
Present (Virago Press, 2008) 
Appleby L and Wessely S, ‘Public Attitudes to Mental Illness: The Influence of the 
Hungerford Massacre’ (1988) 28(4) Medicine, Science and the Law 291-295 
Arata C, ‘Child Sexual Abuse and Sexual Revictimisation’ (2002) 9(2) Clinical Psychology-Science 
and Practice 135-164 
Ashworth A, ‘Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism’ (1996) Criminal Law 
Review 220-230 
Association of Chief Police Officers, Crown Prosecution Service and National Policing 
Improvement Agency, Guidance on Investigating and Prosecuting Rape (2010) 
Attorney General Hon. John Hatzistergos MLC, New Laws and $4.4 Million to Protect Sex 
Assault Victims (NSW Government 2010) 
Auld Lord Justice, Review of the Criminal Courts in England and Wales (London: Stationery 
Office, 2001) 
Bartley G, ‘Sexual Assault Communications Privilege under Siege’ (2000-2001) NSW Bar 
Association Journal 6-12 
Beaumont J and Lofts H, Measuring National Wellbeing - Health, 2013 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013) 
Benedet J, ‘Legal Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada in 2000: Seeing the 'Big Picture'’ 
(2001) 14 Supreme Court Law Review 97-109 
Benedet J and Grant I, ‘Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental 
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues’ (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 515-552 
Benedet J and Grant I, ‘Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with Mental 
Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases’ (2012) 50(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1-45 
  136 
Benedet J and Grant I, ‘Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority for Women 
with Mental Disabilities’ (2014) 22(2) Feminist Legal Studies 131-154 
Beres M, Crow B and Gotell L, ‘The Perils of Institutionalisation in Neoliberal Times: Results 
of a National Survey of Canadian Sexual Assault and Rape Crisis Centres’ (2009) 34(1) The 
Canadian Journal of Sociology 135-163 
Bill C-46, an Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Production of Records in Sexual Offence Proceedings), 
(35'hPan dS, 25th April 1997)  
Birch D, ‘Untangling Sexual History Evidence: A Rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ (2003) 
Criminal Law Review 370-383 
Bond S, ‘Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims: The Need for Fundamental Change 
in the Determination of Relevance’ (1993) 16 Dalhousie Law Journal 416-447 
Boyle C and MacCrimmon M, ‘The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analysing Sexual Assault 
as If Equality Really Mattered’ (1998) 41 Criminal Law Quarterly 198-237 
Brekke J, Prindle C, Bae S W and Long J, ‘Risks for Individuals with Schizoprehnia Who Are 
Living in the Community’ (2001) 52(10) Psychiatric Services 1358-1366 
Brewer N and Burke A, ‘Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on 
Mock-Juror Judgments’ (2002) 26 Law & Human Behaviour 353-364 
Briere J and Jordan C, ‘Violence against Women: Outcome Complexity and Implications for 
Treatment’ (2004) 19(12) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1252-1282 
‘British False Memory Society’,  <http://bfms.org.uk> accessed 16/1/15 
Bronitt S and McSherry B, ‘The Use and Abuse of Counselling Records in Sexual Assault 
Trials: Reconstructing the “Rape Shield”?’ (1997) 8(2) Criminal Law Forum 259-292 
Brown J, ‘Characteristics Associated with Rape Attrition and the Role Played by Scepticism or 
Legal Rationality by Investigators and Prosecutors’ (2007) 13(4) Psychology, Crime and Law 
355-370 
Brown J, ‘We Mind and We Care but Have Things Changed? Assessment of Progress in 
Reporting, Investigating and Proescution of Rape’ (2011) 17(3) Journal of Sexual Aggression 
263-272 
Brown J and Horvath M, ‘Do You Believe Her and Is It Real Rape?’ in Horvath M and Brown 
J (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009) 325-342 
Brown J, Hovarth M, Kelly L and Westmarland N, Connections and Disconnections: Assessing 
Evidence, Knowledge and Practice in Responses to Rape (London: Government Equalities 
Office, 2010) 
  137 
Buchanan A and Leese M, ‘Detention of People with Dangerous Severe Personality Disorders, 
a Systematic Review’ (2001) 358(9297) Lancet 1955-1959 
Burgess A and Holmstrom L, ‘Rape Trauma Syndrome’ (1974) 131(9) American Journal of 
Psychiatry 981-986 
Burman M, ‘Evidencing Sexual Assault: Women in the Witness Box’ (2009) 56(4) Probation 
Journal 379-398 
Burton M, Evans R and Sanders A, ‘Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses and the 
Adversarial Process in England and Wales’ (2007) 11(1) International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof 1-23 
Busby K, ‘Discriminatory Use of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases’ (1997) 9 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 148-177 
Busby K, ‘Third Party Records Cases since R v O'Connor’ (2000) 27(3) Manitoba Law Journal 
355-390 
Busfield J, ‘The Female Malady? Men, Women and Madness in Nineteenth Century Britain’ 
(1994) 28(1) Sociology 259-277 
Busfield J, Men, Women and Madness: Understanding Gender and Mental Disorder (London: 
Macmillan, 1996) 
Byrne P, ‘Psychiatric Stigma: Past, Passing and to Come’ (1997) 90 (11) Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 618-621 
Byrne P, ‘Stigma of Mental Illness and Ways of Dimishing It’ (2000) 6 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 65-72 
Byrne P, ‘Psychiatric Stigma’ (2001) 178 British Journal of Psychiatry 281-284 
Cabinet Office, The Government Response to the Stern Review (Cabinet Office, London, 2011)  
Campbell R, ‘What Really Happened? A Validation Study of Rape Survivors Help-Seeking 
Experiences with the Legal and Medical Systems’ (2005) 20(1) Violence And Victims 55-69 
Campbell R, Dworkin E and Cabral G, ‘An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual Assault 
on Women's Mental Health’ (2009) 10(3) Trauma, Violence and Abuse 225-246 
Campbell R, Wasco S, Ahrens C, Sefl T and Barnes H, ‘Preventing the 'Second Rape': Rape 
Survivors' Experiences with Community Service Providers’ (2001) 16(12) Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 1239-1259 
Chen L, Murad H, Paras M, Colbenson K, Sattler A, Goranson E, Elamin M, Seime R, 
Shinozaki G, Prokop L and Zirakzadeh A, ‘Sexual Abuse and Lifetime Diagnosis of 
  138 
Psychiatric Disorders: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2010) 85(7) Mayo Clinic 
Proceedings 618-629 
Clapham A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 
Coen R, ‘The Rise of the Victim - a Path to Punitiveness?’ (2006) 16(3) Irish Criminal Law 
Journal 10-14 
Communications Unit of Legal Aid NSW, Annual Report 2012-2013 (Legal Aid, NSW, 2013) 
Communications Unit of Legal Aid NSW, Annual Report 2013-2014 (Legal Aid, NSW, 2014) 
Cook K, ‘Sexual History Evidence: The Defendent Fights Back’ (2001) 151(6994) New Law 
Journal 1133-1134 
Cook K, ‘Rape Investigation and Prosecution: Stuck in the Mud?’ (2011) 17(3) Journal of 
Sexual Aggression 250-262 
Corker E, Hamilton S, Henderson C, Weeks C, Pinfold V, Rose D, Williams P, Flach C, Gill 
V, Lewis-Holmes E and Thornicroft G, ‘Experiences of Discrimination among People 
Using Mental Health Services in England 2008-2011’ (2013) 202(s55) The British Journal of 
Psychiatry s58-s63 
Corrigan P, On the Stigma of Mental Illness: Practical Strategies for Research and Social Change 
(Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2005) 
Corrigan P and Watson A, ‘Findings from the National Comorbidity Survey on the 
Frequency of Violent Behaviour in Individuals with Psychiatric Disorders’ (2005) 136(2-3) 
Psychiatry Research 153-162 
‘Corroborating Charges of Rape’, (1967) 67 Columbia Law Review 1137-1148 
Cossins A, ‘Contempt or Confidentiality?: Counselling Records, Relevance and Sexual 
Assault Trials’ (1996) 21(5) Alternative Law Journal 223-229 
Cossins A and Pilkington R, ‘Balancing the Scales: The Case for Inadmissibility of 
Counselling Records in Sexual Assault Trials’ (1996) 19 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 222-267 
Cossins A, Pilkington R, Martin F, Neilson D and Mitchell L, Submission to the New South 
Wales and Commonwealth Attorneys-General (Working Party Concerning Confidentiality of 
Counsellors Notes in Sexual Assault Court Matters, 1996) 
Coughlan S, ‘Complainants' Records after Mills: Same as It Ever Was’ (2000) 33(5th) Criminal 
Reports, Canada 300-310 
  139 
Coverdale J and Turbott S, ‘Sexual and Physical Abuse of Chronically Ill Psychiatric 
Outpatients Compared with a Matched Sample of Medical Outpatients’ (2000) 188(7) The 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 440-445 
Coverdale J, Turbott S and Roberts H, ‘Family Planning Needs and STD Risk Behaviours of 
Female Psychiatric out-Patients’ (1997) 171(1) British Journal of Psychiatry 69-72 
The Crisis in Rape Crisis, (London: Women's Resource Centre and Rape Crisis, 2008) 
Crisp A, Gelder M, Goddard E and Meltzer H, ‘Research Report: Stigmatisaton of People 
with Mental Illness: A Follow-up Study within the Changing Minds Campaign of the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists’ (2005) 4(2) World Psychiatry 106-113 
Crisp A, Gelder M, Rix S, Meltzer H and Rowlands O, ‘Stimgatisation of People with Mental 
Illness’ (2000) 177 The British Journal of Psychiatry 4-7 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2011-2012 (London: 
CPS, 2012) 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2012-2013 (London: 
CPS, 2013) 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2013-2014 Data: 
CPS Rape Victim Gender 2007-2014 (London: CPS, 2014) 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2013-2014 (London: 
CPS, 2014) 
Cuncliffe E, ‘Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight of 
Substantive Equality’ (2012) 57 Supreme Court Law Review 295-316 
Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder Bill, 
(2000)<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/088/2000088.htm
> accessed 15/05/15 
Davidson G, Neale J and Kring A, Abnormal Psychology (9th edn, New York: Wiley, 2004) 
Denike M, ‘Sexual Violence and Fundamental Justice: On the Failure of Equality Reforms to 
Criminal Proceedings’ (2000) 20(3) Canadian Women's Studies 151-159 
Dennis I, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Evaluating Section 41’ (2006) Criminal Law Review 869-
870 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Criminal Procedure Rules: Notes to Accompany 4th Update, 
March 2007 (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007) 
  140 
Department of Health, No Health without Mental Health: A Cross Government Mental Health 
Outcomes Strategy for People of All Ages (London: HM Government, 2011) 
Didi-Huberman G, Invention De L'hystérie (Paris: Editions Macula, 1982) 
Diefenbach D and West M, ‘Television and Attitudes toward Mental Health Issues: 
Cultivation Analysis and the Third-Person Effect’ (2007) 35(2) Journal of Community 
Psychology 181-195 
Dike C, Baranoski M and Griffith E, ‘Pathological Lying Revisited’ (2005) 33 Journal of the 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 342-349 
Disclosure: A Protocol for the Control and Management of Unused Material in the Crown Court, 
(Ministry of Justice, 2006)  
Doak J, Victims' Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties 
(Oxford: Hart Publications, 2008) 
Dockery L, Jeffery D, Schauman O, Williams P, Farrelly S, Bonnington G, Gabbidon J, 
Lassman F, Szmukler G, Thornicroft G, Clement S and MIRIAD study group, ‘Stigma- 
and Non-Stigma-Related Treatment Barriers to Mental Healthcare Reported by Service 
Users and Caregivers’ (2015) 228 Psychiatry Research 612-619 
Doyle S, ‘The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with Mental Disabilities’ 
(2010) 31 Liverpool Law Review 111-135 
Duff P, ‘Disclosure, PII and the Confidentiality of Personal Records’ (2010) 33 Scots Law 
Times 181-184 
Duke L, Allen D, Rozee P and Bommaritto M, ‘The Sensitivity and Specificity of Flashbacks 
and Nightmares to Trauma’ (2008) 22 Anxiety Disorders 319-327 
Eckert L, Sugar N and Fine D, ‘Characteristics of Sexual Assault in Women with Major 
Psychiatric Diagnosis’ (2002) 186 American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 1284-1291 
Edwards S, Female Sexuality and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) 
Ellison L, ‘The Mosaic Art?: Cross Examination and the Vulnerable Witness’ (2001) 21(3) 
Legal Studies 353-375 
Ellison L, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric Evidence in Rape Trials’ (2009) 13(1) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 28-49 
Ellison L, ‘Commentary on R v A (No 2)’ in Hunter R, McGlynn C and Rackley E (eds), 
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 205-210 
  141 
Ellison L and Munro V, ‘Of 'Normal Sex' and 'Real Rape': Exploring the Use of Socio-Sexual 
Scripts in (Mock) Jury Deliberation’ (2009) 18(3) Social and Legal Studies 291-312 
Ellison L and Munro V, ‘Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors' Assessments of 
Complainant Credibility’ (2009) 49(2) British Journal of Criminology 202-219 
Ellison L and Munro V, ‘Turning Mirrors into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) 
Juror Education in Rape Trials’ (2009) 49(3) British Journal of Criminology 363-383 
Ellison L and Munro V, ‘Getting to (Not) Guilty: Examining Jurors' Deliberative Processes in, 
and Beyond, the Context of a Mock Rape Trial’ (2010) 30(1) Legal Studies 74-97 
Ellison L, Munro V, Hohl K and Wallang P, ‘Challenging Criminal Justice? Psychosocial 
Disability and Rape Victimisation’ (2014) Criminology and Criminal Justice 1-20 
Englert D, Diserio A and Ryan K, ‘The Prosecutor's Guide to Mental Health Disorders’ 
(2007) 1(10) The Voice - American Prosecutors Research Institute Newsletter 1-8 
Erb M, Hodgins S, Freese R, Müller-Isberner R and Jöckel D, ‘Homicide and Schizophrenia: 
Maybe Treatment Does Have a Preventive Effect’ (2001) 11(1) Criminal Behaviour and 
Mental Health 6-26 
Evans-Lacko S, Henderson C and Thornicroft G, ‘Public Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviour 
Regarding People with Mental Illness in England 2009-2012’ (2013) 202(s55) The British 
Journal of Psychiatry s51-s57 
Eyssel F and Bohner G, ‘Modern Rape Myths: The Acceptance of Modern Myths About 
Sexual Aggression (Ammsa) Scale 2008’ in Morrison M and Morrison T (eds), The 
Psychology of Modern Prejudice (Nova Science Publishers, 2008) 261-276 
Faravelli C, Guigni A, Salvatori S and Ricca V, ‘Psychopathology after Rape’ (2004) 161(8) 
American Journal of Psychiatry 1483-1485 
Farrell L, ‘That Which Does Not Kill Us Makes Us Stronger’ Irish Medical News (Ireland, 21st 
June 1999) 
Farrelly S, Clement S, Gabbidon J, Jeffery D, Dockery L, Lassman F, Brohan E, Henderson R, 
Williams P, Howard L, Thornicroft G and MIRIAD study group, ‘Anticipated and 
Experienced Discrimination Amongst People with Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder and 
Major Depressive Disorder: A Cross Sectional Study’ (2014) 14(1) BMC Psychiatry 157-164 
Feist A, Ashe J, Lawrence J, McPhee D and Wilson R, Investigating and Detecting Recorded 
Offences of Rape (London: Home Office, Home Office Online Report 18/07, 2007) 
Feldthusen B, ‘Access to the Private Therapeutic Records of Sexual Assault Complainants’ 
(1996) 75 The Canadian Bar Review 537 
  142 
Finch E and Munro V, ‘Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room’ (2006) 26(3) 
Legal Studies 303-320 
Finch E and Munro V, ‘The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual 
Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants’ (2007) 16 
Social and Legal Studies 591-614 
Firth G, ‘The Rape Trial and Sexual History Evidence - R v A and the (Un)Worthy 
Complainant’ (2006) 57(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 442-464 
Fitzpatrick B, ‘Disclosure: Principles, Processes and Politics’ in Walker C and Starmer K (eds), 
Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
151-169 
Fletcher G, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (Reading: Addison Wesley, 
1995) 
Foucault M, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London: 
Tavistock, 1967) 
Frazier P, Keenan N, Anders S, Perera S, Shallcross S and Hintz S, ‘Percieved Past, Present, 
and Future Control and Adjustment to Stressful Life Events’ (2011) 100(4) Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 749-765 
Freud S, ‘An Autobiographical Study’ in Gay P (ed), The Freud Reader (New York: W W 
Norton, 1989) 3-44 
Freud S, ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’ in Gay P (ed), The Freud Reader (New York: W 
W Norton, 1989) 436-442 
Gardiner L and Roberson M, ‘Client Files and Confidentiality: Legal and Ethical Issues for 
Sexual Assault Counsellors’ (paper presented at First National Conference on Sexual 
Assault and the Law, 28-30 November 1995)  
Gilbert S and Gubar S, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth 
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979)  
Gleeson C, ‘The Sexual Assault Communications Privilege Pro Bono Scheme’ (2010-2011) 
Bar News: The Journal of the NSW Bar Association 73-78 
Gotell L, ‘Colonization through Disclosure: Confidential Records, Sexual Assault 
Complainants and Canadian Law’ (2001) 10(3) Social & Legal Studies 315-346 
Gotell L, ‘The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential 
Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 251-295 
  143 
Gotell L, ‘When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History 
Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records’ (2006) 43 Alberta Law Review 743-778 
Gotell L, ‘Tracking Decisions on Access to Sexual Assault Complainants' Confidential 
Records: the continued Permeability of Subsections 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code’ 
(2008) 20 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 111-154 
Gotell L, Beres M and Crow B, National Survey of Sexual Assault Centres: Analysis of Results 
(2005) 
Grierson J, ‘Man Who Decapitated Elderly Woman Found Legally Insane’ The Guardian (23rd 
June 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/23/man-who-decapitated-
elderly-woman-found-legally-insane> accessed 20/8/2015 
Hale M, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Volume 1 (London: Professional books, 1971) 
Hall A, ‘Where Do the Advocates Stand When the Goal Posts Are Moved?’ (2010) 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 107-118 
Hallam A, ‘Media Influences on Mental Health Policy: Long-Term Effects of the Clunis and 
Silcock Cases’ (2002) 14 International Review of Psychiatry 26-33 
Hamilton S, Lewis-Holmes E, Pinfold V, Henderson C, Rose D and Thornicroft G, 
‘Discrimination against People with a Mental Health Diagnosis: Qualitative Analysis of 
Reported Experiences’ (2014) 23(2) Journal of Mental Health 88-93 
Hanmer J and Itzen C, Home Truths About Domestic Violence (London: Routledge, 2000) 
Harris J and Grace S, A Question of Evidence? Investigating and Prosecuting Rape in the 1990s 
(London: Home Office, Home Office Research Study 196, 1999) 
Hattem T, Research Report: Survey of Sexual Assault Survivors (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 
Canada, 2000) 
Hayward P and Bright J, ‘Stigma and Mental Illness: A Review and Critique ’ (1997) 6 Journal 
of Mental Health 345-354 
Hellawell S and Brewin C, ‘A Comparison of Flashbacks and Ordinary Autobiographical 
Memories of Trauma: Content and Language’ (2004) 42(1) Behaviour Research and Therapy 
1143-1156 
Henderson C, Corker E, Lewis-Holmes E, Hamilton S, Flach C, Rose D, Williams P, Pinfold 
V and Thornicroft G, ‘England's Time to Change Antistigma Campaign: One-Year 
Outcomes of Service User-Rated Experiences of Discrimination’ (2012) 63(5) Psychiatric 
Services 451-457 
  144 
Henderson C, Noblett J, Parke H, Clement S, Caffrey A, Gale-Grant O, Schulze B, Druss B 
and Thornicroft G, ‘Mental Health-Related Stigma in Health-Care and Mental Health-
Care Settings’ (2014) 1 Lancet Psychiatry 467-482 
Henderson C, Williams P, Little K and Thornicroft G, ‘Mental Health Problems in the 
Workplace: Changes in Employers’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in England 2006-
2010’ (2013) 202(s55) The British Journal of Psychiatry s70-s76 
Henderson E, ‘All the Proper Protections - the Court of Appeal Rewrites the Rules for the 
Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 93-108 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate for the Constabulary, Rape Monitoring Group: Adult and Child Rape 
Data 2012/2013 (London: HMIC, 2014) 
Hester M, From Report to Court: Rape Cases and the Criminal Justice System in the North East 
(Bristol: University of Bristol in association with the Northern Rock Foundation, 2013) 
Heydon J, Evidence: Cases and Materials (London: Butterworths, 1975) 
Hinshaw S, The Mark of Shame: Stigma of Mental Illness and an Agenda for Change (Oxford 
Oxford University Press 2007) 
HM Government, Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls - a Strategy (London: 
HM Government, 2009) 
HMIC/HMCPSI, A Report on the Joint Inspection into the Investigation and Prosecution of Cases 
Involving Allegations of Rape (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2002) 
HMIC/HMCPSI, Without Consent: A Report on the Joint Investigation and Prosecution of Rape 
Offences (London: HMIC, 2007) 
HMIC/HMCPSI, Forging the Links: Rape Investigation and Prosecution. A Joint Inspection by 
HMCPSI and HMIC (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2012) 
Hohl K and Stanko E, ‘Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: Fresh Evidence 
on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European Journal of 
Criminology 324-341 
Holmes H, ‘An Analysis of Bill C-46: Production of Records in Sexual Offence Proceedings’ 
(1997) 2 Canadian Criminal Law Review 71 
Home Office, The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (London: Home Office, 2013)  
Horvath M and Brown J, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Vicious Cycle for Rape 
Victims’ (2010) 23(7) The Psychologist 556-559 
  145 
Hoyano L, ‘Case Comment: R v P [2010] EWCA Crim 2438, Sexual Offences: Allegations of 
Historic Sexual Abuse - Credibility of Complainants at Issue’ (2011) 6 Criminal Law Review 
502-505 
Hoyano L, ‘Evidence: R. v Doski - Disclosure - Rape - Defendant Seeking Third Party 
Disclosure Following Conviction’ (2011) Criminal Law Review 712-717 
Hoyano L, ‘What Is Balanced on the Scales of Justice? In Search of the Essence of the Right to 
a Fair Trial’ (2013) 1 Criminal Law Review 4-29 
Hyler S, Gabbard G and Schneider I, ‘Homicidal Maniacs and Narcissistic Parasites: 
Stigmatisation of Mentally Ill Persons in the Movies’ (1991) 42 Hospital and Community 
Psychiatry 1044-1048 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Southwark Sapphire Unit’s Local Practices for the 
Reporting and Investigation of Sexual Offences, July 2008 – September 2009 (London: IPCC, 
Independent Investigation and Learning Report, 2013) 
Itzin C, Tackling the Health and Mental Health Effects of Domestic and Sexual Violence and Abuse 
(Joint Department of Health, National Institute for Mental Health in England and Home 
Office Victims of Violence and Abuse Prevention Programme Implementation Guide, 
2006) 
Jackson J, ‘Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?’ (2003) 30(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 309-326 
Jillard A, Loughman J and MacDonald E, ‘From Pilot Project to Systemic Reform: Keeping 
Sexual Assault Victims' Counselling Records Confidential’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law 
Journal 254-258 
Jones H and Cook K, Rape Crisis: Responding to Sexual Violence (Dorset: Russell House 
Publishing, 2008) 
Jordan C, Campbell R and Follingstad D, ‘Violence and Women's Mental Health: The Impact 
of Physical, Sexual and Psychological Aggression’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology 607-628 
Jordan J, ‘True 'Lies' and False 'Truths': Women, Rape and the Police’ (PhD Thesis, University 
of Wellington, New Zealand 2001) 
Jordan J, Seriel Survivors: Women's Narratives of Surviving Rape (Annandale, Australia: Federation 
Press, 2008) 
Jordan J, ‘Here We Go Round the Review-Go-Round: Rape Investigation and Prosecution - 
Are Things Getting Worse Not Better?’ (2011) 17(3) Journal of Sexual Aggression 234-259 
Kanin E, ‘False Rape Allegations’ (1994) 23 Archives of Sexual Behaviour 81-91 
  146 
Kaukinen C and DeMaris A, ‘Sexual Assault and Current Mental Health: The Role of Help-
Seeking and Police Response’ (2009) 15(11) Violence Against Women 1331-1357 
Kebbell M, Hatton C and Johnson S, ‘Witnesses with Intellectual Disabilities in Court: What 
Questions Are Asked and What Influence Do They Have?’ (2004) 9(1) Legal and 
Criminological Psychology 23-35 
Kelly K, ‘"You Must Be Crazy If You Think You Were Raped": Reflections on the Use of 
Complainants' Personal and Therapy Records in Sexul Assault Trials’ (1997) 9 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 178-195 
Kelly L, Surviving Sexual Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) 
Kelly L, Lovett J and Regan L, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (Home Office 
Research Study 293, 2005) 
Kelly L, Temkin J and Griffiths S, Section 41: An Evaluation of New Legislation Limiting Sexual 
History Evidence in Rape Trials (London: Home Office Online Report 20/06, 2006) 
Kevles D, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York: Knopf, 
1985) 
Khalifeh H and Dean K, ‘Gender and Violence against People with Severe Mental Illness’ 
(2010) 22(5) International Review of Psychiatry 535-546 
Khalifeh H, Howard L, Osborn D, Moran P and Johnson S, ‘Violence against People with 
Disability in England and Wales: Findings from a National Cross-Sectional Survey’ (2013) 
8(2) PLoS ONE 1-9 
Kibble N, ‘Judicial Discretion and the Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence under 
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Sometimes Sticking to 
Your Guns Means Shooting Yourself in the Foot’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 263-274 
Kibble N, ‘Judicial Perspectives on the Operation of S41 and the Relevance and Admissibility 
of Prior Sexual History Evidence: Four Scenarios’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 190-205 
Kinports K, ‘Evidence Engendered’ (1991) 2 University of Illinois Law Review 413-456 
Kirstansen C, Haslip S and Kelly K, ‘Scientific and Judicial Illusions of Objectivity in the 
Recovered Memory Debate’ (1997) 7(1) Feminism & Psychology 39-45 
‘Knife Maniac Freed to Kill. Mental Patient Ran Amok in the Park’,  Daily Mail (London, 
26th February 2005) 
Konradi A, ‘Pulling Strings Doesn't Work in Court: Moving Beyond Puppetry in the 
Relationship between Prosecutors and Rape Survivors’ (2001) 10(1) Journal of Social Distress 
and the Homeless 5-28 
  147 
Konradi A, Taking the Stand: Rape Survivors and the Prosecution of Rapists (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2007) 
Konradi A and Burger T, ‘Having the Last Word: An Examination of Rape Survivors' 
Participation in Sentencing’ (2000) 6(4) Violence Against Women 351-395 
Koshan J, ‘Disclosure and Production in Sexual Violence Cases: Situating Stinchcombe’ (2002) 
40 Alberta Law Review 655-688 
Koss M and Figueredo A, ‘Cognitive Mediation of Rape's Mental Health Impact: Constructive 
Replication of a Cross-Sectional Model in Longitudinal Data’ (2004) 28(4) Psychology of 
Women Quarterly 273-286 
Koss M, Heise L and Russo N, ‘The Global Burdening of Rape’ (1994) 18 Psychology of Women 
Quarterly 509-537 
Koss M and Mukai T, ‘Recovering Ourselves: The Frequency, Effects and Resolution of Rape: 
Research on Battered Women and Their Assailants’ in Florence D and Michele P (eds), 
Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993) 
478-512 
Lacey N, ‘Beset by Boundaries: The Home Office Review of Sexual Offences’ (2001) Criminal 
Law Review 3-14 
Lasalvia A, Zoppei S, Van Bortel T, Bonetto C, Cristofalo D, Wahlbeck K, Bacle S, Van 
Audenhove C, van Weeghel J, Reneses B, Germanavicius A, Economou M, Lanfredi M, 
Ando S, Sartorius N, Lopez-Ibor J and Thornicroft G, ‘Global Pattern of Experienced and 
Anticipated Discrimination Reported by People with Major Depressive Disorder: A Cross-
Sectional Survey’ (2012) 381(9860) Lancet 55-62 
Lawrie S, ‘Newspaper Coverage of Psychiatric and Physical Illness’ (2000) 24 Psychiatric Bulletin 
104-106 
Lawson A and Fouts G, ‘Mental Illness in Disney Animated Films’ (2004) 49 Canadian Journal 
of Psychiatry 310-314 
Lawyer S, Ruggiero K, Resnick H, Kilpatrick D and Saunders B, ‘Mental Health Correlates of 
the Victim-Perpetrator Relationship among Interpersonally Victimised Adolescents’ (2006) 
21(10) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1333-1353 
Laycock T, An Essay on Hysteria (Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington and Haswell, 1840) 
Lea S, Lanvers U and Shaw S, ‘Attrition in Rape Cases: Developing a Profile and Identifying 
Relevant Factors’ (2003) 43 British Journal of Criminology 583-599 
Lee V and Charles C, Research into CPS Decision-Making in Cases Involving Victims and Key 
Witnesses with Mental Health Problems and/or Learning Disabilities (London: CPS, 2008) 
  148 
Lees S, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (2nd edn: The Women's Press Ltd, 2002) 
‘Legal Aid New South Wales’,  <http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/what-we-do/civil-law/sexual-
assault-communications-privilege-service> accessed 17/05/2015 
Leng R and Taylor R, Blackstone's Guide to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
(London: Blackstone Press, 1996) 
Levitt A and Crown Prosecution Service Equality and Diversity Unit, Under the Spotlight: 
Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in Cases Involving Allegedly False Rape 
and Domestic Violence Allegations (London: CPS, 2013) 
Link B and Phelan J, ‘Conceptualising Stigma’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 363-385 
Lisak D, Gardinier L, Nicksa S and Cote A, ‘False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis 
of Ten Years of Reported Cases’ (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1318-1334 
Little K, Henderson C, Brohan E and Thornicroft G, ‘Employers’ Attitudes to People with 
Mental Health Problems in the Workplace in Britain: Changes between 2006 and 2009’ 
(2011) 20(1) Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 73-81 
Lockwood G, Henderson C and Thornicroft G, ‘The Equality Act 2010 and Mental Health’ 
(2012) 200(3) British Journal of Psychiatry 182-183 
Longdill A, ‘Regulating Access to Therapeutic Records of Sexual Assault Complainants: An 
Analysis and Critique of Current New Zealand Procedure’ (2000-2003) 9 Auckland 
University Law Review 764-805 
Lonsway K, ‘Trying to Move the Elephant in the Living Room: Responding to the Challenge 
of False Rape Reports’ (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1356-1371 
Lovett J and Kelly L, Different Systems, Similar Outcomes? Tracking Attrition in Reported Rape Cases 
across Europe (London: Child and Women Abuse Studies Unit London Metropolitan 
University, 2009) 
Lovett J, Regan L and Kelly L, Sexual Assault Referral Centres: Developing Good Practice and 
Maximising Potentials (London: Home Office, 2004) 
Machtinger S, ‘Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases’ (1949) 
39(6) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 750-754 
MacKay R and Kearns G, ‘The Continued Underuse of Unfitness to Plead and the Insanity 
Defence’ (1994) Criminal Law Review 576-579 
Mackay R, Mitchell B and Howe L, ‘Yet More Facts About the Insanity Defence’ (2006) 
Criminal Law Review 399-411 
  149 
Maclean U, ‘Community Attitudes to Mental Illness in Edinburgh’ (1969) 23(1) British Journal 
of Preventive & Social Medicine 45-52 
Maier S, ‘"I Have Heard Horrible Stories...": Rape Victim Advocates Perceptions of the Re-
Victimisation of Rape Victims by the Police and Medical System’ (2008) 14(7) Violence 
Against Women 786-808 
‘Maniac Killed Twin Sisters’,  Evening Standard (London, 18th April 2005) 
Maniglio R, ‘Severe Mental Illness and Criminal Victimisation: A Systematic Review’ (2009) 
119(3) Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 180-191 
Marshall M, ‘Canada: Production of Private Records of Victims in Sexual Assault in R v 
Shearing’ (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 139-148 
Martin K, ‘Court Rules against Rape Victims’ Globe and Mail (Toronto, 15th December 1995) 
Martin P, Mad Women in Romantic Writing (Sussex: Harvester, 1987) 
Martin P, Rape Work: Victims, Gender and Emotions in Organisation and Community Context (New 
York: Routledge, 2005) 
Martin-Merino E, Ruigomez A, Wallander M-A, Johansson S and Garcia-Rodriquez L, 
‘Prevalence, Incidence, Morbidity and Treatment Patterns in a Cohort of Patients 
Diagnosed with Anxiety in UK Primary Care’ (2010) 27(1) Family Practice 9-16 
McColgan A, Women under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights (London: Longman, 
2000) 
McColl R, Letter from Bar Association Acting President Ruth McColl S.C to MLC NA-GSQ  
(11th November 1999) 
McCracken K, Perry A and Phillips C, Access to Justice: A Review of Existing Evidence of the 
Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Problems (London: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Justice Research Series 6/09, 2009) 
McDonald E, ‘Resisting Defence Access to Counselling Records in Cases of Sexual Offending: 
Does the Law Effectively Protect Clinician and Client Rights?’ (2013) 5(2) Sexual Abuse in 
Australia and New Zealand 12-20 
McDonald L, ‘Defending Child Abuse Cases - Tips and Pitfalls’ (2001) 151(6967) New Law 
Journal 540-541 
McDonald S, Wobick A and Graham J, Bill C-46: Records Applications Post-Mills, a Case Law 
Review (Department of Justice, Canada, 2004) 
  150 
McGlynn C, ‘Rape, Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 565-595 
McGlynn C, ‘Feminist Activisim and Rape Law Reform in England and Wales: A  Sisyphean 
Struggle?’ in McGlynn C and Munro V (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Routledge, 2010) 139-153 
McGlynn C, ‘Feminist Judgment: R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25’ in Hunter R, McGlynn C 
and Rackley E (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 211-
227 
McGlynn C, ‘Feminism, Rape and the Search for Justice’ (2011) 31(4) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 825-842 
McGlynn C, Westmarland N and Godden N, ‘"I Just Wanted Him to Hear Me": Sexual 
Violence and the Possibilities of Restorative Justice’ (2012) 39(2) Journal of Law and Society 
213-240 
McIntrye S, Boyle C, Lakeman L and Sheehy E, ‘Tracking and Resisting Backlash against 
Equality Gains in Sexual Assault Law’ (2000) 20(3) Canadian Women's Studies 72-83 
McLeod R, Philpin C, Sweeting A, Joyce L and Evans R, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental 
Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities and Limited Mental Capacity Report 1: Overview and 
Recommendations (London: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Justice Research Series 8/10, 
2010) 
McLeod R, Philpin C, Sweeting A, Joyce L and Evans R, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental 
Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities and Limited Mental Capacity Report 2: Before Court 
(London: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Justice Research Series 9/10, 2010) 
McLeod R, Philpin C, Sweeting A, Joyce L and Evans R, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental 
Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities and Limited Mental Capacity Report 3: At Court 
(London Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Justice Research Series 10/10, 2010) 
McManus S, Meltzer H, Brugha T, Bebbington P and Jenkins R, Adult Morbidity in England 
2007: Results of a Household Survey (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 
2009) 
McMillan L, Understanding Attrition in Rape Cases ESRC End of Award Report (Swindon: ESRC, 
RES–061–23–0138–A, 2010) 
Melville H, ‘Hawthorne and His Mosses’ in Miller P (ed), Major American Writers (New York, 
1962) 
Mendelson D, ‘Judicial Responses to the Protected Confidence Communications Legislation 
in Australia’ (2002) 10(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 49-60 
  151 
Meredith C, Mohr R and Cairnsway R, Implementation Review of Bill C-49 (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, 1997) 
Messman-Moore T and Long P, ‘The Role of Childhood Sexual Abuse Sequelae in the Sexual 
Revictimisation of Women: An Empirical Review and Theoretical Reformulation’ (2003) 
23(4) Clinical Psychology Review 537-571 
Micale M, ‘Hysteria Male/Hysteria Female: Reflections on Comparative Gender Construction 
in Nineteenth Century Medicine’ (paper presented at The Wellcome Symposium on the 
History of Medicine: History of Hysteria, 6th April 1990, London) 
Micale M, Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994) 
Mind, Ward Watch Report: Mind's Campaign to Improve Hospital Conditions for Mental Health 
Patients (London: Mind, 2004) 
Mind, Another Assault: Mind's Campaign for Equal Access to Justice for People with Mental Health 
Problems (London: Mind, 2007) 
Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid - Next Steps: Government Response (London: Ministry 
of Justice, 2014) 
Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual 
Offending in England and Wales (London: ONS, 2013) 
Mohr R, "Words Are Not Enough": Sexual Assault Legislation, Education and Information (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, Bill C-49 and C-46 Key Informant Study, 2002) 
Munro V and Kelly L, ‘A Vicious Cycle? Attrition and Conviction Patterns in Contemporary 
Rape Cases in England and Wales’ in Horvath M and Brown J (eds), Rape: Challenging 
Contemporary Thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009) 281-300 
Murray C and Lopez A, ‘Global Mortality, Disability and the Contribution of Risk Factors: 
Global Burden of Disease Study’ (1997) 349 Lancet 1436-1441 
National Patient Safety Agency, With Safety in Mind: Mental Health Services and Patient Safety 
(London: National Patient Safety Agency, 2006) 
‘National Self Harm Network’,  <http://www.nshn.co.uk> accessed 14/05/2015 
New South Wales Bar Association, Submissions on Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault 
Communications Privilege) Bill 1999   
Nourse V, ‘The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law’ (1999-
2000) 75 Chicago-Kent Law Review 951-978 
  152 
NSW Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), (Legislative Council, 20 October 1999)  
Office for National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending September 2014 (London: 
ONS, 2015) 
Oleskiw D, Tellier N and National Association of Women and the Law, Submissions to the 
Standing Committee on Bill C-46: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in Respect of Production of 
Records in Sexual Offence Proceedings (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 
1997) 
Ormerod D, ‘Improving the Disclosure Regime’ (2003) 7 International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof 102-129 
Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Hysteric’  
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hysteric> accessed 16/1/15 
Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Stigma’  
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/stigma> accessed 16/1/15 
Payne S, Rape: The Victim Experience Review (London: Home Office, 2009) 
Pedlar M, Baker S and Williams C, Silenced Witnesses (London: Mind, 2000) 
Pescosolido B, Martin J, Long J S, Medina T, Phelan J and Link B, ‘"A Disease Like Any 
Other"? A Decade of Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and 
Alcohol Dependence’ (2010) 167 American Journal of Psychiatry 1321-1330 
Pettitt B, Greenhead S, Khalifeh H, Drennan V, Hart T, Hogg J, Borschmann R, Mamo E 
and Mora P, At Risk yet Dismissed: The Criminal Victimisation of People with Mental Health 
Problems (London: Victim Support and Mind, 2013) 
Phillips C, ‘The Equality Act 2010: Impact on Mental Health-Related Disability Claims’ 
(2012) 109 Employment Law Bulletin 2-4 
Philo G, ‘The Media and Public Belief’ in Philo G (ed), Media and Mental Distress (London: 
Longman, 1996) 82-104 
Philo G, McLaughlin G and Henderson L, ‘Media Content’ in Philo G (ed), Media and Mental 
Distress (London: Longman, 1996) 45-81 
Pinfold V, Toulmin H, Thornicroft G, Huxley P, Farmer P and Graham T, ‘Reducing 
Psychiatric Stigma and Discrimination: Evaluation of Educational Interventions in UK 
Secondary Schools’ (2003) 182 British Journal of Psychiatry 342-346 
Plotnikoff J and Woolfson R, A Fair Balance? Evaluation of the Operation of Disclosure Law 
(Home Office, RDS Occasional Paper No 76, 2001) 
  153 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 4, 1st 
Session, 41st Parliament, 3 November 2011) 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 3, 1st 
Session, 41st Parliament, 20 October 2011) 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 6, 1st 
Session, 41st Parliament, 24 November 2011) 
Proceedings on the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, (Issue 19, 3rd 
Session, 40th Parliament, 3 February 2011) 
Putnam F, ‘Ten-Year Research Update Review: Child Sexual Abuse’ (2003) 42(3) Journal of the 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 269-278 
Raitt F, ‘Disclosure of Records and Privacy Rights in Rape Cases’ (2011) 15(1) Edinburgh Law 
Review 33-56 
Raitt F, ‘Independent Legal Representation in Rape Cases: Meeting the Justice Deficit in 
Adversarial Proceedings’ (2013) Criminal Law Review 729-749 
Rankin J, Mental Health in the Mainstream: Developments and Trends in Mental Health Policy 
(London Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004) 
Read J, Myths About Madness: Challenging Stigma and Changing Attitudes (Mental Health 
Media, 2009) accessed 12/10/14 
Read J and Baker S, Not Just Sticks and Stones: A Survey of the Stigma, Taboos and Discrimination 
Experienced by People with Mental Health Problems (Mind, 1996) 
Redmayne M, ‘Myths, Relationships and Coincidences: The New Problems of Sexual History’ 
(2003) 7 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 75-101 
Reece H, ‘Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?’ (2013) 33(3) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 445-473 
Regan L and Kelly L, Rape: Still a Forgotten Issue (London: CWASU/RCNE, 2003) 
Responding to Violence against Women and Children - the Role of the NHS, (The report of the 
Taskforce on the Health Aspects of Violence Against Women and Children, 2010) 
Roberts J and Benjamin C, Prevalence of Sexual Assault and Therapeutic Records: Research Findings 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1998) 
Robinson A and Hudson K, ‘Different yet Complementary: Two Approaches to Supporting 
Victims of Sexual Violence in the UK’ (2011) 11(5) Criminology and Criminal Justice 515-533 
  154 
Robinson A, Hudson K and Brookman F, ‘Multi-Agency Work on Sexual Violence: 
Challenges and Prospects Identified from the Implementation of a Sexual Assault Referral 
Centre (SARC)’ (2008) 47(4) Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 411-428 
Robinson A, Hudson K and Brookman F, A Process Evaluation of Ynys Saff, the Sexual Assault 
Referral Centre in Cardiff: Final Evaluation Report (Wales: South Wales Criminal Justice 
Board 2009) 
Rumney P, ‘False Allegations of Rape’ (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 128-158 
Schanda H, Knecht G, Schreinzer D, Stompe T, Ortwein-Swobda G and Waldhoer T, 
‘Homicide and Major Mental Disorder’ (2004) 110(2) Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 98-107 
Schlosberg A, ‘Psychiatric Stigma and Mental Health Professionals Stigmatisers and 
Destigmatisers’ (1993) 12(3-5) Medicine and Law 409-416 
Schmitz C, ‘'Whack' Sexual Assault Complainants at Preliminary Inquiry’ (27th May 1988) 
8(5) The Lawyers Weekly 
Schomerus G, Schwahn C, Holzinger A, Corrigan P, Grabe H and Carta M, ‘Evolution of 
Public Attitudes About Mental Illness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2012) 125 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 440-452 
Schönbucher V, Kelly L and Hovarth M, Archway: Evaluation of the Pilot Scottish Rape and 
Sexual Assault Referral Centres (Final Report for Greater Glasgow and Clyde NHS Trust, 
2008) 
Schuller R and Hastings P, ‘Complainant Sexual History Evidence: Its Impact on Mock Jurors' 
Decisions’ (2002) 26(3) Psychology of Women Quarterly 252-261 
Sharpe S, ‘Article 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in Criminal Trials’ (1999) Criminal Law 
Review 273-286 
Shaw (Attorney-General) J, NSW Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council (22 October 
1997)  
Shaw Trust, Mental Health: The Last Workplace Taboo (Shaw Trust, 2010) 
Sheehy E, ‘Evidence Law and "Credibility Testing" of Women: A Comment on the E Case’ 
(2002) 2 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 157-174 
Showalter E, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980 (London: 
Virago Press, 1987) 
Showalter E, ‘Hysteria, Feminism and Gender’ in Gilman S, King H, Porter R, Rousseau G 
and Showalter E (eds), Hysteria Beyond Freud (Berkele, CA: University of California, 1993) 
286-344 
  155 
Sianko N, ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Mental Health: What’s on the Agenda?’ (2011) 
81(2) American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 167-171 
Sieff E, ‘Media Frames of Mental Illness: The Potential Impact of Negative Frames’ (2003) 
12(3) Journal of Mental Health 259-269 
Sin C H, Hedges A, Cook C, Mguni N and Comber N, Disabled People's Experiences of Targeted 
Violence and Hostility (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research 
Report 21, 2009) 
Smith D, ‘K Is Mentally Ill: The Anatomy of a Factual Account’ in Smith D (ed), Texts, Facts 
and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling (London: Routledge, 1990)  
Social Exclusion Unit, Mental Health and Social Exclusion (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
2004) 
Spencer J, ‘Orality and the Evidence of Absent Witnesses’ (1994) Criminal Law Review 628-644 
Spencer J and Spencer M, ‘Witness Protection and the Integrity of the Criminal Trial’ (paper 
presented at Second World Conference on the Investigation of Crime, 2001, Institute of 
Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies, Durban) 
Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Statutory Review on the 
Provisions and Operation of the Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Production of Records in Sexual 
Offence Proceedings): Final Report (2012) 
Stangor C and Crandall C, ‘Threat and the Social Construction of Stigma’ in Heatherton T, 
Kleck R, Hebl M and Hull J (eds), The Social Psychology of Stigma (New York: Guildford 
Press, 2000) 62-87 
Stanko B and Williams E, ‘Reviewing Rape and Rape Allegations in London: What Are the 
Vulnerabilities of Victims Who Report to the Police’ in Hovarth M and Brown J (eds), 
Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009) 207-228 
Starmer K, ‘Human Rights, Victims and the Prosecution of Crime in the 21st Century’ (2014) 
11 Criminal Law Review 777-787 
The Stern Review – a Report by Baroness Vivien Stern OBE of an Independent Review into How Rape 
Complaints Are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales, (London: Home Office, 
2010) 
Still Getting Away with Rape,  (Dispatches Documentary, 2000) 
<http://www.broadcaster.org.uk/section1/rapecampaign/date_rape_trans.htm> accessed 
22/11/14 
Stromback J, Karlsoon M and Hopmann D, ‘Determinants of News Content: Comparing 
Journalists' Perceptions of the Normative and Actual Impact of Different Event Properties 
When Deciding What's News?’ (2012) 13(5) Journalism Studies 718-728 
  156 
‘Survey Shows Greatest Improvement in Public Attitudes to Mental Health in 20 Years’, 
(Mind, 7th October 2014) <http://www.mind.org.uk/news-campaigns/news/survey-shows-
greatest-improvement-in-public-attitudes-to-mental-health-in-20-years/ - .VLkqb0sjjwJ> 
accessed 16/1/15 
Survivors Trust, Developing Stability, Sustainability and Capacity for Specialist Third Sector Rape, 
Sexual Violence and Abuse Services (2010) 
Taslitz A, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom (New York University Press, 1999) 
Temkin J, ‘Rape Myths and Rape Trials’ (paper presented at Representations of Sex: Criminal 
Evidence and the Impact on Jury Decision-Making, 17th April 2015, Northumbria 
University) 
Temkin J, ‘Sexual History Evidence - the Ravishment of Section 2’ (1993) Criminal Law Review 
3-20 
Temkin J, ‘Prosecuting and Defending Rape: Perspectives from the Bar’ (2000) 27(2) Journal of 
Law and Society 219-248 
Temkin J, ‘Digging the Dirt: Disclosure of Records in Sexual Assault Cases’ (2002) Cambridge 
Law Journal 126-145 
Temkin J, Rape and the Legal Process (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Temkin J, ‘Sexual History Evidence - Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Criminal Law Review 217-
242 
Temkin J and Krahé B, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Oxford: Hart, 
2008) 
Teplin L, McClelland G, Abram K and Weiner D, ‘Crime Victimization in Adults with Severe 
Mental Illness: Comparison with the National Crime Victimization Survey’ (2005) 62(8) 
Archives of General Psychiatry 911-921 
The Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Bar Association's Position on Legal Aid (2001) 
<http://www.cba.org/ CBMAdvocay/legalAidAdvocacyResourcekit> accessed 12/12/2014 
The Havens (Sexual Assault Referral Centres), Wake up to Rape Research Summary Report (2010) 
The Law Commission, Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings (Law Com. No. 273, 
2001) 
The Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion Paper (London: 
The Law Commission, 2013) 
  157 
The Lord Chief Justice, Judicial Protocol on the Disclosure of Unused Material in Criminal Cases 
(Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2013)  
The Lord Chief Justice and The Senior President of Tribunals, Judicial Diversity Statistics 2015 
(Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin, July 2015) 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, Report of the Confidential Inquiry into Homicides and Suicides 
by Mentally Ill People (RCP, 1996) 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, Changing Minds: Every Family in the Land (1997-2003) 
<http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/about/campaigns/changingmindscampaign1997-.aspx> 
accessed 14/1/15 
The Sailsbury Centre for Mental Health, The Future of Mental Health: A Vision for 2015 (2006) 
The Supreme Court, ‘Biographies of the Justices’  
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/biographies-of-the-justices.html> accessed 
24/04/16 
Thornicroft A, Goulden R, Shefer G, Rhydderch D, Rose D, Williams P, Thornicroft G and 
Henderson C, ‘Newspaper Coverage of Mental Illness in England 2008-2011’ (2013) 202 
British Journal of Psychiatry S64-S69 
Thornicroft G, Shunned: Discrimination against People with Mental Illness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 
Thornicroft G, Brohan E, Rose D, Sartorius N and Leese M, ‘Global Pattern of Experienced 
and Anticipated Discrimination against People with Schizophrenia: A Cross-Sectional 
Survey’ (2009) 373(9661) Lancet 408-415 
TNS BRMB, Attitudes to Mental Illness: 2013 Research Report (Time For Change, 2014) 
Ullman S, ‘Correlates and Consequences of Adult Sexual Assault Disclosure’ (1996) 11 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence 554-571 
Ullman S and Brecklin L, ‘Sexual Assault History, PTSD and Mental Health Service Seeking 
in a National Sample of Women’ (2002) 30(3) Journal of Community Psychology 261-279 
Ussher J, Women's Madness: Misogny or Mental Illness (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 
Ussher J, The Madness of Women: Myth and Experience (Routledge, 2011) 
Veith I, Hysteria: The History of a Disease (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) 
Vevera J, Hubbard A, Vesely A and Papezova H, ‘Violent Behaviour in Schizophrenia: 
Retrospective Study of Four Independent Studies from Prague, 1949-2000’ (2005) 187 
British Journal of Psychiatry 426-430 
  158 
Victim Support, Disclosure of Information to and About Victims and Witnesses (Unpublished paper 
for Steering Group, 2001) 
Wahl O, Media Madness (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1995) 
Wahl O, Telling Is Risky Business: Mental Health Consumers Confront Stigma (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1999) 
Wahl O, ‘Depictions of Mental Illness in Children's Media’ (2003) 12(3) Journal of Mental 
Health 249-258 
Walsh E, Moran P, Scott C, Mckenzie K, Burns T, Creed F, Tyrer P, Murray R and Fahy T, 
‘Prevalence of Violent Victimisation in Severe Mental Illness’ (2003) 183(3) The British 
Journal of Psychiatry 233-238 
Walsh R and Bruce S, ‘The Relationship between Perceived Levels of Control, Psychological 
Distress and Legal System Variables in a Sample of Sexual Assault Survivors’ (2011) 17(5) 
Violence Against Women 603-618 
Ward G, Mental Health and the National Press (London: Health Education Authority, 1997) 
Warner S, Understanding the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse : Feminist Revolutions in Theory, Research 
and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009) 
Watts J, Sexual Assault Communication Privilege: Notes for Panel Discussion (2012) 
<http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0003/14088 
/Sexual-Assault-Communications-Privilege.doc - doc - 88k> accessed 21/04/2015 
Wells C and Quick O, ‘The Social Construction of Sexuality and Bodily Autonomy’ in Lacey 
N, Wells C and Quick O (eds), Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and Materials (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 477-488 
Westmarland N and Alderson S, ‘The Health, Mental Health, and Well-Being Benefits of 
Rape Crisis Counselling’ (2013) 28(17) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 3265-3282 
Why Women-Only? The Value and Benefits of by Women, for Women Services, (London: Women's 
Resource Centre, 2007) 
Widom C, Czaja S and Dutton M, ‘Childhood Victimisation and Lifetime Revicimisation’ 
(2008) 32 Child Abuse and Neglect 785-796 
Wigmore J, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1940) 
Wilkinson-Ryan T, ‘Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibility of a Sexual 
Assault Complainant’ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1373-1397 
Williams G, ‘Corroboration - Sexual Cases’ (1962) Criminal Law Review 662 
  159 
Williams M, ‘Sexual Violence Soars in UK Hospitals’ The Guardian (London, 31st December 
2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/dec/31/sexual-violence-soars-uk-
hospitals> accessed 16/1/15 
Wilson C, Nairn R, Coverdale J and Panapa A, ‘How Mental Illness Is Portrayed in Children's 
Television: A Prospective Study’ (2000) 176(5) British Journal of Psychiatry 440-443 
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Equality and the Charter: Ten Years of Feminist 
Advocacy before the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1996) 
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Submissions to the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Legal Affairs: Review of Bill C-46 (Ottawa: LEAF, 1997) 
Women's National Commission, Home Office Victims' Experience Review, WNC Report from 
Women's Discussion Groups, September - October 2009 (WNC, 2009) 
Women's National Commission, Still We Rise: Report from WNC Focus Groups to Inform the 
Cross-Government Consultation "Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls" 
(Home Office, 2009) 
World Health Organisation, ‘Gender and Women's Health’  
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/genderwomen/en/> accessed 
10/04/2016 
World Health Organisation, World Report on Violence and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2002) 
Wright B, ‘Sadie Jenkins Found Not Guilty of Attempted Murder of Two Children’ Wales 
Online (20th May 2015) <http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/sadie-jenkins-
found-not-guilty-9294111> accessed 20/8/2015 
Zilboorg G, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: Norton, 1941) 
 
  
  160 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
Atlan v United Kingdom [2002] 34 EHRR 833 
Aultman v Pennsylvania [1992] 504 US 977  
AW v the Queen [2009] NSWCCA 1 
Baegen v the Netherlands [1995] App no 16696/90 
Brown v Scott [2003] 1 AC 681 
Buck v Bell [1927] 274 US 200 
Carosella [1997] 1 SCR 80 
D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruetly to Children [1978] AC 171 
D v NSPCC [1977] 1 All ER 589 
Daniel M'naghten [1843] 10 CL & Fin 200 
Doorson v Netherlands [1996] 22 EHRR 330 
Jasper v United Kingdom [2003] 30 EHRR 441 
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales [1986] 5 NSWLR 465 
K (DT) [1993] 97 Cr App R 342 
Kudla v Poland [2005] 35 EHRR 198 
MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 EHRR 20 
PG and JH v United Kingdom [2001] Application No 44787/98 
R v A [2001] UKHL 25 
R v A(J) [2008] OJ No 1583, 2008 ONCJ 195 
R v Alibhai [2004] EWCA Crim 681 
R v Azmy [1996] 7 Med LR 415 
  161 
R v Batte [2000] 49 OR (3d) 321 (CA) 
R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256 
R v Brushett [2000] All ER (D) 2432 
R v Brushett [2001] Crim LR 471 
R v C.S [2000] 195 Nfld & PEIR 104 
R v CAL [1993] 67 A Crim R 562 
R v D.M [2000] 49 WCB (2d) 217 (Ont Sup Ct J) 
R v D.P.F [2001] 199 Nfld & PEIR 224 
R v Derby Magistrates Court Ex Parte B [1996] 1 Cr App R 385 
R v Doski (Niwar) [2011] EWCA Crim 987  
R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 
R v Fletcher [2005] NSWCCA 338 
R v Governor of Brixton Prison Ex Parte Osman [1992] 1 All ER 108 
R v H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 
R v H and C [2004] 2 CA 134 
R v H and C [2004] UKHL 3 
 
R v I (D.A) [2012] SCJ No5 280 CCC (3d) 127 (SCC) 
R v J.M.S [2003] NSJ No 117 
R v JGC [2003] OTC 508 
R v K [1993] 97 Cr App R 342 
R v K.W.T [2003] OJ No 5937 
R v L.G [2000] OJ No 5090 
  162 
R v Lockyer [1996] 89 A Crim R 457 
R v Mills [1999] 3 SCR 668 
R v Norman Lee [2000] NSW CCA 444 
R v O'Connor [1995] 4 SCR 411 
R v Osolin [1993] 2 SCR 595 
R v Reading Justices Ex Parte Berkshire County Council [1996] 1 Cr App R 239 
R v Savvas [1989] 43 A Crim R 331 
R v Shearing [2002] 214 DLR (4th) 215 
R v Stafford Crown Court [2006] EWCA 1645 
R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326 
R v Sutherland [2001] 156 C C C (3d) 264, 2002 NSSC 49  
R v Tatchell [2001] 207 Nfld & PEIR 131 
R v Thompson [2001] 52 OR (3d) 779 (CA) 
R v Tine [2006] EWCA Crim 1788 
R v Tompkins [2004] PESCTD 51 
R v Young [1999] 46 NSWLR 681 
R v Zhang [2005] NSWCCA 437 
Re H (L) [1997] Cr App R 176 
S [2009] 48 EHRR 50 
Schenk v Switzerland [1988] EHRR 242 
Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 
Sexual Abuse: Disclosure [2012] UKSC 60 
  163 
Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 
X and Y v the Netherlands [1985] ECHR 4 
Z v UK [2002] 34 EHRR  
